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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE KANTIAN THEORY OF THE SUBLIME AND HUMANIST POLITICS 
                                                         Ayas, Tuğba 
Ph.D. in Art, Design and Architecture 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
Co-supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
 
October 2013 
 
 
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s rendition of cosmopolitanism and the 
sublime have been quite popular separately in various discussions on politics and 
aesthetics since the late 90s. In today’s political conjuncture the Kantian sublime is 
consulted in describing the social disasters that had broad repercussions in 
international public. This study argues that in this century, Kantian ideal of 
cosmopolitanism together with its close relevance to human rights stands in an 
unusual relation with the sublime due to the feeling of distant suffering caused by 
social disasters. Moreover, this relation indicates that Kant’s cosmopolitanism and 
sublime can be tools for contemplating contemporary world politics. The present 
study seeks to disclose this present relationship and the regained value of Kantian 
philosophy in the face of a new world order through examining a) Kantian 
cosmopolitanism normatively, as in its original version and; theoretically as in the 
discussions on its revival in late 90s; b) the transformation of the Kantian sublime 
after 1945; and c) the state of distant suffering in the face of social disasters of the 
20
th
 century interpreted as sublime and its relation to ideal of cosmopolitanism.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Kant, Cosmopolitanism, Aesthetic experience, Sublime, Distant 
suffering. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
KANTÇI YÜCE TEORİSİ VE HUMANİST SİYASET 
     Ayas, Tuğba 
          Doktora, Sanat, Tasarım ve Mimarlık 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
                                 Ortak Tez yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
 
     Ekim 2013 
 
Alman filozof Immanuel Kant’ın kozmopolitanizm anlayışı ve yine filozofun Yüce 
nosyonu, 90’lı yılların sonundan itibaren politika ve estetik temalı farklı 
tartışmalarda popülerlik kazanmıştır. İçinde yaşadığımız bu yüzyılın siyasal 
konjonktüründe ise Kant’ın Yüce nosyonuna uluslararası toplumda yankı bulan 
toplumsal felaket olaylarını betimlemek için başvurulmaktadır. Bu çalışma bu 
yüzyılda Immanuel Kant’ın insan haklarıyla yakın ilişkili olan Kozmopolitanizmi ile 
Yüce nosyonu arasında, sosyal felaketlerin yol açtığı “distant suffering” (ırak 
ızdırap) olgusu üzerinden sıra dışı bir ilişki ortaya çıktığını iddia eder. Bu durum, 
Kant’ın kosmopolitanizm ve yüce nosyonlarının günümüz uluslararası siyasetinde 
yararlı birer analiz aracı olabileceğine işaret eder. Bu çalışma bu iki Kantçı nosyon 
arasında işaret edilen ilişkiyi ve yeni dünya düzeninde Kant felsefesinin geri 
kazanmış olduğu değeri ortaya koymak için a) Kantçı kozmopolitanizmi hem orijinal 
normatif versiyonu hem de 90’ların sonunda bu nosyonun tartışmalara konu edilen 
teorik biçimi ile; b) Kantçı yüce anlayışını klasik anlamı ve 1945 sonrası geçirdiği 
dönüşümü bağlamında; c)  20. yüzyılın yüce olarak betimlenen toplumsal felaketleri 
karşısında ortaya çıkan uzak felaket haberleri ve bunların kozmopolitanizm ideali ile 
olan ilişkisini bağlamında inceler.  
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kant, Kozmopolitanizm, Estetik deneyim, Yüce nosyonu, Uzak 
Felaketler. 
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cited from the English translation edition given here. References to the Critique of 
Pure Reason are to the pagination of the first and second editions in the traditional 
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translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
 
MM-  The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) in Kant: Political Writings Hans Reiss, 
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PP-  “Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795) in Kant: Political 
Writings Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.1991, 131-175. 
 
IUH-  “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Kant: 
Political Writings Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.1991, 41-53. 
 
FMM-  Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785). Thomas 
Kingsmill Abbott, trans., 2008. 
 
Lyotard’s works are referred to in-text by following abbreviations: 
 
AS-  Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans., 1994.  
 
 
D-  The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Georges Van Den Abbeele, trans., 1988. 
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CHAPTER I: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the post-war period, the phenomenon of globalization has spread worldwide and 
changed the flow of discussions of politics effectively. In contemporary times, the 
three dimensions of globalization that are, drastically increased cross-border trade, 
the Internet and identity politics have blurred the concept of border in the classical 
sense. As one of the outcomes of discussions of globalization, the idea of breaking 
down of borders both socially and economically towards a global polity has 
attracted great attention. The possibility of this idea has inevitably recalled the 
ancient notion of cosmopolitanism which is basically grounded on the assumption 
that the world is a great village and all the peoples of the world are its habitants.  
The history of the ideal of cosmopolitanism can be traced back to ancient 
Greece and through time different versions of cosmopolitanisms are envisioned by 
many thinkers. Due to the dramatic decline of nationalism after the WWII, 
cosmopolitanism with its ideal for a cosmopolitan world has gained more attention 
than ever. In the post-war era, Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitan vision has often been 
revisited more than the ancient followers of the notion such as Socrates, Marcus 
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Aurelius or Alexander the Great.  The prevailing elements of the Kantian model of 
cosmopolitanism such as perpetual peace, a world federation, spirit of commerce 
and the right of hospitality made it popular among scholars in the discussions of the 
fate of nationalism (Nussbaum, 1997; Calhoun, 1997; Calhoun, 2006) and in that of 
the possible new forms of cosmopolitan thinking in the twentieth century (Bohman 
and Lutz-Bachmann,1997; Wood, 1998; Williams, 1992; Calhoun, 1997; Honneth, 
1997; Cheah and Robins, 1998).  
In the 1990s and especially during the second half of the decade, Kant’s 
political views gained much more attention than they had ever before. The possible 
reasons given by Kant scholars vary. For instance, according to Allen D. Rosen, 
since Kant is known to be one of the founders of classical liberalism, due to the 
growing interest in liberal politics Kant’s political thought finally gets the attention 
it deserves (1993: vii). For Hans Reiss, one good but ignored reason for Kant’s 
return to political discussions is that political principles suggested by Kant indicate 
“basic human aspirations” and thus, cannot be overlooked since they “become a 
part of the stock of current ideas” (1991: 272). According to Otfried Höffe, both in 
the debates of legitimatization of right and state and, also in that of the philosophy 
of freedom in an age of nuclear armament one could consult Kant as much as other 
political thinkers. And this fact suggests that his cosmopolitan ideal is still 
persuasive (2006:  xvi). Furthermore, his provisional thought on the power of 
commerce in mutual relations of states and possible antagonist tendencies of states 
towards other states due to their concerns relating commonwealth are experienced 
respectively in world history.  
But be that as it may, Kant did not write a distinct political work and this 
fact puts a damper on Kant’s reputation, which depends on his magnificent 
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Critiques, when it comes to the possible application of his notions to political 
theory. It is undeniable that some of the Kantian views cannot compete with the 
present political circumstances. As Rosen rightly puts that “his property 
qualification for the electoral franchise, his absolutist conception of sovereignty, 
and his unwillingness to admit any right of revolution” remain indefensible (1993: 
209). Additionally, Kant’s provisional assumptions remain too much attached to 
the ideal of a nation-state with respect to the transnational character of world 
politics. However, some proponents of the theory of nationalism (Nussbaum, 1997) 
who are also in search of a normative ground that could regulate today’s 
multifaceted political life are in favor of the Kantian view.  
The transnational dynamic structure of today’s politics changes in an insane 
speed and it seems that no structure or theory supplies a solid ground for defining 
the present precisely or predicting the future accurately. Even in such conditions, 
mostly due to the hope to find a “new” normative ground for dynamic political 
practices, Kant’s political thought is still relevant to contemporary discussions. For 
instance, Kant is consulted in the assessments of some contemporary issues of 
transnational space of world such as international organizations both profited and 
non-profited, refugee rights and military intervention. As an Aufklärer from 
eighteenth-century Europe Kant is seen as a distant resource for contemporary 
politics. Furthermore, long before the inevitable alteration of nationalistic 
perspective into a transnational political structure in the post-war era, the history of 
political thought was driven by dialectics and negative politics especially after 
Hegel. In those times, Kant was never seen as a leading philosopher in political 
thought. Moreover, with his strictly normative and critical political stance, Kant’s 
political thought does not have much to offer for our time. Nevertheless, 
 4  
 
interestingly enough, in post-war period Kant’s possible contribution to world 
politics is sought both in his aesthetics as well as his political views.  
This present study focuses on Kant’s aesthetics and its implications for 
contemporary world. Although, it is not easy to derive a political agenda from 
Kant’s aesthetic theory, a patient observation shall unearth the contemporary 
political import of his aesthetics. The possible relationship between aesthetics and 
politics is already addressed by thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, Theodor 
Adorno, Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard. Among these names, Arendt 
and Lyotard applied in particular to Kant’s aesthetics in order to expose the link 
between aesthetics and politics. In their own unique approaches, they both focused 
on Kant’s third critique. As a result, Arendt claimed that between the two 
judgments of taste, the judgment of beautiful offers more than just aesthetic or 
subjective concerns whereas Lyotard made the same claim for the other judgment 
of taste, namely the sublime. First by following and then by criticizing these two 
approaches, this study aims to reach a “new” reading of Kant’s sublime besides the 
mainstream readings on Kant and his political relevance today.  
The present study is divided into six chapters. At the outset of the study 
there is a brief section that strolls around the vast history of the concept of 
cosmopolitanism in order to remind notion of cosmopolitan thinking in a nutshell. 
This section constitutes the first part of chapter two and it aims to introduce a 
pathway for the following section that concerns Kant’s well known political views 
on the concept of right and world peace. 
After introducing the Kantian political elements, the possible reasons for the 
rising popularity of the Kantian political thinking will be explored. Indeed, the fact 
that it is revisited by many scholars in debates of current politics- better to say; in 
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cosmopolitics- is a fundamental motivation for the present study. It will be 
contended that the present ways in which the Kantian notions are taken up are in no 
way successful in order to reach a consensus on cosmopolitanism. 
Kant’s politics cannot respond to a desire of finding a solid normative 
ground for political regulation. It is mainly because his politics is strictly bound up 
with his ethics due to the fact that in Kantian system the categorical imperative 
governs all possible human actions. Driven by this principle, Kantian ethics is a 
duty-based, thus, a deontological ethical system rather than a consequence-based 
ethics. With its roots in Kant’s deontological ethical system, Kantian politics 
remains an insufficient source for the dynamic transnational political space. Thus, 
if what is at stake here is to find a formula, this study indicates the impossibility 
and futility of giving any kind of static formulation relaying on Kant’s politics. The 
third part of the second chapter will try to address the problematic structure of the 
Kant’s universal politics. The section will end with the inference that for a fruitful 
Kantian politics that would function in this century, which has already given up 
universalist frames, we should turn our attention to his aesthetics. Due to the 
peculiar character of the faculty of judgment which is concerned with particulars 
more than universals and, also due to the contemporary appearance of the sublime 
in international politics in particular, Kantian aesthetics seems to present an 
alternative ground for a political reading. Yet, it is significant to point out here that 
this study will not propound immediate practical or feasible solutions to the 
concerns of political practices. 
The third chapter tries to present a thorough analysis of the theory of the 
Kantian sublime. The faculties involved (the imagination and reason) will be traced 
back to the first Critique in order to richen the promising appearances of each for 
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an alternative reading that would open Kantian aesthetics to a political approach. In 
this framework, the sublime appears to be a possible ground to reject humanist 
politics and its universal approach to recent debates on politics.  It will be argued 
that the Kantian sublime in its unique mode can reveal a ground which is not 
normative or in other words, which differs from the universalist approach within 
Kant’s system. On this ground one can treat the plurality and difference in their 
heterogeneous character without reducing or pushing them into rigid universal 
categories. 
Following the assumptions above, this study will propose a new ground for 
reading the Kantian politics through the philosopher’s third Critique, the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment.
 
Thus, the fourth chapter evaluates the possible political 
import of the sublime.
 
There are different approaches that reflect on the political 
repercussions of aesthetic judgments. This kind of attempt is surely not new. To 
name a few, Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard are well-known scholars 
who have meticulous works on Kant’s third Critique. In the fourth chapter, Arendt 
and Lyotard will be revisited as their insightful attempts furnish the way of this 
study in many aspects. Arendt will be visited for her assessments on judgments of 
taste and sensus communis as a plural will. Yet, this study does not support her 
reading since; Arendt’s approach unfortunately culminates in a search for a 
universal criterion even if this criterion is to be decided by the majority of people. 
Lyotard’s views on Kant’s aesthetics are resourceful and most helpful to construct 
a mental map for this study. By comparing and contrasting these views, the central 
assertion of the study will be that the sublime, as an aesthetic moment, is 
impregnated with more than solely aesthetic concerns. Indeed, from the point of 
view of the first Critique, the sublime means an anti-humanist moment in the 
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Kantian philosophy. Thus, the end of Chapter four elaborates the anti-humanist 
aspect of the sublime. 
Chapter five assesses the contemporary value of the Kantian sublime and its 
unusual relation to cosmopolitanism. In contemporary world politics, the sublime is 
attributed to international social disasters and turned into adjective of acts that are 
most immoral.
 
This chapter claims that the catastrophic social disasters of the 
twentieth century such as The Holocaust and Hiroshima created a ground for the 
contemporary nexus between the Kantian cosmopolitanism and the sublime. The 
attempt to describe such horrifying events called upon the sublime whereas the 
cosmopolitan thinking is accounted as one of the after effects of the mentioned 
instances. Therefore, they enabled the Kantian cosmopolitanism to the Kantian 
aesthetics relate in such a unique way that in contemporary times, the sublime turns 
into a tool of politics whereas cosmopolitanism transforms into an aesthetical 
experience. If this relationship is analyzed, it can be seen that Kant’s possible 
contribution to today’s political agenda appears much different from any normative 
framework it has ever been attached to. A political philosophy that is centered on 
this new relationship can make both the Kantian cosmopolitanism and aesthetics 
more effective than it is. Humanist philosophy of Kant is firmly attached to the 
notions of nation-state, duty, universalism etc… In this frame there seems no 
ground for a non-determinacy that is almost the nub of today’s political agenda. 
This study claims that today the sublime can supply a ground for reassessing the 
value of aesthetics together with its non-cognitive, thus, non-determinable 
character. Non-rationality of aesthetics in Kant can be read as an opportunity of the 
Kantian frame to catch an alternative approach to cosmopolitan politics.  
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CHAPTER II: 
 
KANT AND THE COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 
 
 
2.1. On the Notion of Cosmopolitanism and Kant’s Appeal to the Notion 
If mind is common to us all, then so is the reason which makes us rational beings; and if 
that be so, then so is the reason which prescribes what we should do or not do. If that be so, there is 
a common law also; if that be so, we are fellow-citizens; and if that be so, the world is a kind of 
state. For in what other common constitution can we claim that the whole human race participates? 
Marcus Aurelius 
 
The word ‘cosmopolitan’, comes from Ancient Greek, from the word 
kosmopolitēs which means ‘world citizen’ (Heater, 1996: 7). As a notion, 
cosmopolitanism is based on the idea that all human beings, living on earth can be 
seen as members of a single community, where all peoples are conceived as 
citizens of the world despite all differences. The quest for cosmopolitanism has 
been an item of debate since ancient times. It is first propounded by an ancient 
school of philosophy, The Cynics and later developed in ancient times by another 
school, the Stoics as well as Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers in medieval 
age.  
As cosmopolitan thought is known to be developed by the Cynics first, the 
word kosmopolitēs is known to be used firstly by Diogenes the Cynic, a famous 
Cynic, who is known to live in a tub. He is reported to say ‘I am a citizen of the 
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world ’. It is widely accepted that by these words Diogenes refuses any local 
connections or memberships related to any particular polis because he seeks 
defining himself in a more universal frame by withdrawing himself from any kind 
of categorization implying a discrimination regarding class, status or gender. In this 
sense, Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism is both an individual act of liberation and a 
moral sensibility. The Cynic cosmopolitanism does not go further than rejecting the 
conventional thinking. However, one significant contribution of the Cynic 
cosmopolitanism is that it paved the way for “a critical sensibility” in cosmopolitan 
imagination. This critical aspect of the Cynic cosmopolitanism emphasized the 
restricted world view of the republic in Greek polis (Delanty, 2009: 20). 
Before Diogenes, passages that have a cosmopolitan voice are also noticed 
in the writings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. For instance, Socrates is also 
known to answer a question on his origins by saying that he is not from Athens but 
from the world. In Protagoras Plato writes, “I count you all my kinsmen and 
family and fellow-citizens by nature not by convention” (Heater, 1996: 6). As for 
Aristotle, in Politics he mentions that a world state would be possible. However, 
none of these passages is regarded as cosmopolitan statements because none of 
them indicates the notions of world citizenship, world state or a world federation. 
Besides, especially in the case of Socrates, he uses the word kosmios (universe) not 
mundum (world) to explain that he associated himself with all life and so, with 
humankind in particular. Thus, with respect to these famous three philosophers the 
themes with a cosmopolitan content usually do not go further than being just 
logical statements. 
The Stoics give cosmopolitanism its core political focus. They improve the 
notion of cosmopolitanism by grounding it on a moral philosophy that is based on 
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the notion of virtue. They believed in human sociality and claimed that human 
beings have the potential to share a world in a cosmopolitan sense (Sellars, 2006: 
133). 
When the notion of unity of mankind is concerned, another celebrated 
historical figure, Alexander the Great, comes to the fore. He ruled the broadest 
empire that the Western world had ever seen. He was a general with a desire of 
merging the races of Greeks, Macedonians, Persians and Medes. He tried to extend 
the lands under his reign through conquest in order to achieve his goal of uniting 
the mankind. Even if he did not succeed empirically, his intention was in 
accordance with the cosmopolitan ideal: uniting all differences by ignoring 
difference as a principle of discrimination or domination. In this sense, by his 
conquests Greek language and culture is carried further from the closed system of 
the Greek polis (Delanty, 2009: 22).  
Taken as a whole, global politics was not of a high importance in the 
Hellenistic age. The existing ideas of the age were developed into a more 
systematic schema by the Stoics who followed the path of the Cynics. According to 
the Stoic philosophers, we are members of at least two communities. The first is 
the community that we are born into and the second is the one in which we 
recognize all human beings as our fellow citizens. In this way, the Stoic idea of 
cosmopolis becomes of moral and social life.  
For both the Cynics and the Stoics, the notion of cosmopolis was not 
understood as a proper political system such as a ‘constitution for universal state’. 
In Cosmopolis, all human beings would be equal and subject to law of nature 
against the social and cultural diversities. Thus, for the Cynics and Stoics, this is 
served as the core of the concept of cosmopolis (Heater, 1996: 1-21). 
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In the long tradition of ideas with cosmopolitan content, Cicero and Marcus 
Aurelius Antoninus have great influence on Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal with regard 
to the idea of unity of mankind. In her article “Kant and Cosmopolitanism”, Martha 
Nussbaum states that Kant is deeply indebted to Cicero and Marcus Aurelius. She 
argues that Ancient Greek cosmopolitanism is not only the origin of the concept 
but it also inspires much of the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal (1991: 1). From the 
Stoic cosmopolitan ideal “Kant appropriates—the idea of a kingdom of free 
rational beings, equal in humanity, each of them to be treated as an end no matter 
where in the world he or she dwells” (Nussbaum, 1997: 36). Following this idea, 
Kant asserts that we share the same structure of mind and our rational minds 
presuppose a common participation in law. Thus, our rationality leads us to a 
polity, a cosmopolitan polity, even if there is no empirical correspondence in the 
form of a constitution (Nussbaum, 1997: 36).       
We may summarize Nussbaum’s argument on Kant’s debt to Stoic 
philosophy— especially to Cicero and Marcus Aurelius— as follows: firstly, Kant 
strictly follows Cicero in his belief that the peoples of the earth have entered a 
universal community due to the organic interconnectedness which is emerged out 
of the conditions of the earth. Secondly, when Kant writes on cosmopolitan law 
that is defined as the unwritten complement of the international law, he closely 
follows Cicero and Marcus Aurelius. Moreover, Kant’s thoughts on the hospitality 
right and the free speech of the philosopher for the good of the public also seem to 
be influenced by these thinkers.  
In addition to the ancient cosmopolitanism of the Greco-Roman world, 
there is also a tradition of classical cosmopolitanism shaped by the spirit of the 
eighteenth century. Among the representatives of eighteenth-century 
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cosmopolitanism such as Erasmus, Rousseau, Grotius, Pufendorf, Kant is counted 
as “the true inaugurator” (Cheah, 2006) and the best representative of modern 
cosmopolitanism. As Delanty puts it, in Kant’s works “the ambivalence of the 
eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism as somewhere between a new universalism 
and international law was encapsulated” (2009: 31).  
  Kant refers to Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau in his essay “Idea 
toward a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan View”.1 Yet, his intentions are 
different from the former because he does not bestow favors on heads of the state 
like Abbé de Saint Pierre. Furthermore, his approach also differs from Rousseau’s 
since he also does not merely indicate injustices the heads of the state cause. He 
addresses not a specified class of rulers but humanity as a whole. International law 
which immediately springs from collective reason as a component of living in and 
being a member of the community of humankind is the central concern and element 
of his cosmopolitan reflections (Wood, 1998:  61). Before proceeding to the 
elements of Kantian cosmopolitanism, let us learn more about the historical 
conditions of the eighteenth century in the following section. 
 
2.1.2 The Age of Enlightenment and Kant, the Aufklärer 
The eighteenth century, in which Kant was born and lived most of his life, 
“critically” affected the direction of the dominant intellectual life. It was the Age of 
Enlightenment2. It began in the late 17
th
 century and survived the entire 18
th
 
century. It was an age of a cultural movement of intellectuals emphasizing the 
reason and individualism. It was the beginning of modernity. All components of 
                                               
1 Here after cited as Idea. 
2
 The name is not widely accepted until the nineteenth century. 
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tradition and traditional life-“religion, political organization, social structure, 
science, human relations, human nature, history, economics, and the very grounds 
of human understanding- was subjected to intense scrutiny and investigation” 
(Wilson, 2004: ix) in the age of Enlightenment. Moreover, in this century, the 
western world was in an age of struggles in social, governmental and individual 
states. For the present purposes, in order to trace the development of the Kantian 
politics to its roots a brief overview of the eighteenth-century Germany can be 
instructive here. 
In 1748 (the time young Immanuel was a 24 year-old), Germany was not a 
state in the form of a single nation state like France and England. Rather it was a 
loose confederation of states. As a confederation of states, it consisted of over three 
hundred autonomous territories which belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. This 
number was more than the rest of the Europe in total. These autonomous German 
states were governed by territorial despotic princess. Due to the lack of a common 
law established by the German kings, each prince was the guarantor of both the 
peace and the justice of the land he ruled. 
The period between 1648 and 1815 is known as the age of absolutism in 
Germany. Many rulers desired to “maintain their own armies, establish loyal 
bureaucracies… and administering the territory in a profitable way” (Fulbrook, 
1990: 71-2). The rise of Brandenburg-Prussia may be the most significant political 
change of this period. In late eighteenth century, Prussia became a powerful rival to 
Austria for dominance of German affairs.  
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The peculiarly German variant of the Enlightenment, Aufklarung3,
 
tended to 
sustain the role of worldly rulers. However, at the same time, it was frequently 
embedded in the process of secular rule with quite progressive effects, as implied in 
the notion of ‘enlightened absolutism’ which was popular among the supporters of 
natural law theory (Fulbrook, 1990: 72-3).  
In the eighteenth century, social transformation in Germany had long lasting 
effects. Feudal aristocracy was transformed into a bureaucratic aristocracy. 
Educated people were raised into civil servants and minor court officials. Then they 
later emerged as new middle class. In the late eighteenth century, an astounding 
literary revival is experienced by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and 
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). Also, the eighteenth-century Germany had many 
great composers like Corelli, Vivaldi, Albinoni, Handel, Bach and his sons 
particularly Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Telemann, Ramaeau, Stamitz, Haydn, 
Mozart, Beethoven, Gluck and Boccherini. 
In the eighteenth century, an expanding reading public caused a great 
increase in publications. Not only books but also kinds of printed materials like 
newspapers, magazines and periodicals were published. Reading and discussion for 
the sake of personal development was a rising trend. Many societies, associations 
and organizations emerged in the second half of the century such as scientific or 
reading societies, educational associations and freemasons’ lodges (firstly in 
Hamburg in 1737). Reading societies were particularly common in Germany and 
present in almost every big German town. The ideas of the age were spread through 
these societies not merely among intellectuals or aristocrats but also among other 
classes of society. In Germany, the clubs of Rhieland, Mainz, Landau, and Cologne 
                                               
3 The German expression Aufklarung is known to indicate the era from the 1780s onwards. 
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were democratic organizations with between 200 and 300 members. Intellectuals as 
well as clergy and merchants, artisans and peasants attended these clubs which 
supported the interaction of ideas (Im Hoff, 1990: 207-18). 
Another colorful element of the social life in the eighteenth century was 
coffee houses. Beginning from the late seventeenth century, they emerged and 
spread widely in many cities such as London, Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna and 
Leipzig. In a coffee house, one could read newspapers, watch chess tournaments 
and engage in political discussion while having a cup of coffee. Anyone, even 
women, could enter coffee houses without hesitation (Outram, 2006: 59). The 
societies and coffee houses supplied a productive social ground of the ideas which 
led to revolution. In these places rational thoughts on life in general even if many 
societies were banned after when they were thought to be sharing ideas on political 
or religious matters. The phenomenon of coffee houses marks a discursive space, a 
public sphere where people perform political participation through talking. Jurgen 
Habermas formalizes the public sphere as follows:  
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of 
private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public 
sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to 
engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the 
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange 
and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar 
and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason 
(öffentliches Räsonnement). In our [German] usage this term (i.e., 
Räsonnement) unmistakable preserves the polemical nuances of both sides: 
simultaneously the invocation of reason and its disdainful disparagement as 
merely malcontent griping (1991: 27). 
 
The people’s public use of their reason is no doubt deeply influenced Kant 
and shaped his thoughts on the freedom of speech. He lived this dynamic historical 
period in Königsberg. The city was the administrative centre of East Prussia as well 
 16  
 
as a legal, military and educational centre with mutual connections to Europe 
(Guyer, 2006: 16). Kant was a great name for this period. But until his critical 
philosophy which is known to end the dominant effect of Leibniz-Wolffian4 form 
of rationalism, the eighteenth-century German intellectual thought has been driven 
by Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), Christian 
Thomasius (1655-1728), and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). 
In this promising historical period, Kant indubitably identified himself as an 
Aufklärer. His identifying himself as an Aufklärer in the specific German sense of 
the term is closely related to Fredrick II and his determined intention to turn 
Prussia into a highly cultured and intellectual kingdom (Zammito, 1992: 17). 
Kant’s thoughts on political matters are surely shaped by the social and cultural 
factors of the eighteenth century which emphasized rationality and individualism. 
Manfred Kuehn writes that even if Königsberg is not a center of any significant 
events of the age, Kant’s intellectual thoughts are an “expression of and response to 
these changes” and moreover, “his intellectual life reflected most of the significant 
intellectual, political and scientific developments of the period” (2001:20). 
 
2.2. On Kant’s Political Philosophy 
Kant, the philosopher of the age of Enlightenment, did not write any books, any 
distinct treatises or critiques for a political philosophy. Thus, unlike his three great 
Critiques, his political thought was not particularly applied or accepted as a 
noticeable contribution to systematized theory of political thought. We learn his 
political views primarily from his short essays that are penned by the philosopher 
                                               
4 Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is generally considered one of the two founders of the German 
Aufklarung. He is known as the most eminent thinker between Leibniz and Kant.  
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in a broad period of time5 and from the Doctrine of Right (Rechtslehre), the first 
part of his book The Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten) published 
in 1797. The Doctrine of Right entails Kant’s final thoughts on the notion of right, 
since it is the latest work of the philosopher on the subject. In the Doctrine of 
Right, Kant announces that freedom is an innate right of an individual. He also 
claims that individuals, if they are eager to preserve their freedom, have a duty to 
enter into a civil constitution that is driven by the social contract. Apart from the 
Doctrine of Right, which is focused on the notion of right, Kant’s political essays 
were on the freedom of public speech in Enlightenment; on history in Idea; on the 
notion of state in Theory; and on the international relations of states in Perpetual 
Peace. 
It is a known fact that Kant’s magnificent Critiques get considerable 
attention from the readers. His political essays, on the other hand, are not united 
into another Critique. Single appearances of these essays caused a negligence of 
Kant’s political views. In addition to this, the language of his political writings has 
a more plain style of language in comparison to the demanding and most of the 
time stringent language of his Critiques. In his political essays, Kant focused on the 
urgent political matters of his time. Thus, the language he used was more 
particularistic and thus, different from that of his critiques. This change in the 
language is considered as another reason for the negligence of the readers. It is also 
considered as the reason of philosopher’s exclusion from the list of distinguished 
political philosophers that entails Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau. In other 
                                               
5 “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (1784) ,“Idea for a Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Purpose”  (1784); “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it 
does not apply in Practice” (1792); “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795); “The Contest 
of  Faculties” (1798). Here after these essays will appear as Enlightenment; Idea; Theory; Perpetual 
Peace; The Contest. 
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words, not the weight of his writings but the relative place of his political essays in 
his critical system is blameworthy for the negligence of his name in political 
philosophy.6
 
Whether these reasons are valid or not, it is a fact that Kant’s name has 
not been often cited in political theory till the rise of phenomenon of globalization. 
It is agreeable that exclusion of Kant from political theory is a serious mistake 
since Kant’s political writings or essays “grow organically out of his critical 
philosophy” (Reiss, 1991: 3). In other words, these essays grew specifically in the 
historical background of the eighteenth century. They each reflect the spirit of the 
Enlightenment and the influences of the French and American revolutions as well.  
The first thing that catches the attention of a Kant reader is that his political 
essays lack the pure theoretical character or the language of other three Critiques. 
The essays were penned after fervid social and political changes of those times and 
thus, they are necessarily written in relation to particular social and political 
instances. Considering this, the particularistic attitude in the essays would be 
regarded as deceptive in terms of universal thinking. Yet still, the Kantian 
characteristic of all those essays is determined as the search for a priori principles 
which can realize the universal right and perpetual peace. Because Kant thinks that 
the idea of a state must not be derived from any particular example but from an 
absolute ideal of the possibility of peoples’ living together under rightful laws. 
Therefore, the idea of the state as an absolute ideal and freedom as an innate right 
emphasize the a priori character of Kant’s approach. And this transcendental (a 
priori) employment of reason drags him into metaphysics (MM 174).  
                                               
6 In contrast to this general view, relaying on the Doctrine of Right, Roger Sullivan defends Kant by 
stating that Kant had already given the highest place to the notion of state thus, to his political 
philosophy by declaring that “a state is an essential part of our necessary moral goal on earth- the 
freedom of ends in political form; and obedience to the laws of such a state is a moral duty, as 
sacred as if they were divine commands”. See Sullivan, 1989, pp. 258-60. 
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Another expected aspect of Kant’s political writings is the characteristic and 
the influence of dominant trends of thought in the eighteenth century. In this 
century, Hobbes and his famous Leviathan which suggested relinquishing from all 
individual rights for the sake of protection from the state of war was criticized 
heavily by theorists of the theory of natural law (jus naturae).  
Natural law was a system that combined the Classical Roman law7
 
and the 
Bible’s Ten Commandments. It is not derived from the lives of men as communal 
beings but from the life of man as an individual and as a citizen. Natural law theory 
was developed into an international and cosmopolitan thinking by the great names 
of 18
th
 century such as Hugo Grotius8, Samuel Pufendorf9 and the Abbé de Saint 
Pierre.10 Most defenders of natural law theory believed in enlightened monarchs 
and their ministers who would supply a constitution which guarantees the rights of 
individuals in terms of the natural law. This notion paved the way for the 
liberalistic approaches of the following decades.  
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Contract Social (1762) had a revolutionary effect 
on eighteenth century politics. He defined the republic as the ideal form of a 
government. If natural law theory is one fundamental source for Kant’s thought, 
then Rousseau and the social contract theory is the other that impressed Kant 
deeply. Kant recognized Rousseau as the first thinker who had emphasized the 
                                               
7 The Classical Roman Law says: Juris praecepte sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, 
suum cuique tribuere, (‘The principles of law are as follows: live honestly, do harm to no man and 
give everyone his due’).
 
 
8 His three volume book De Jure Belli ac Pacis- On the Law of Peace and War that seeks a 
foundation for the natural law, analyses the five legal authorities of the time respectively as ‘reasons 
of state’, common law, philosophical doctrines, Roman law and lastly the divine law (Im Hoff,
 
1990: 81-2).
 
 
9 Pufendorf’s work was followed by Christian Wolff , John Locke and Anthony Shaftsbury.
 
 
10 He had already written on the notion of a league of nations in 1713.  
 20  
 
distinction between ‘natural man’ and ‘cultural man’ within a socially constituted 
definition of freedom.  
In “Conjectural Beginnings of Human History” Kant analyses Rousseau’s 
essays “On the Influence of the Sciences” and “On the Inequality of Man”. He 
agrees that as a physical species the human race has its moral aspect and its natural 
aspect. According to the nature of man, each individual is to fulfill its destiny 
alone. Yet, man is also a moral species and can develop into a community. 
Rousseau deals with the problem of culture in Émile and in the Social Contract 
where he seeks a course for culture to take in order not to hinder the development 
of human species. According to Kant, in the antagonism between the nature and the 
culture of man the genuine evil that decreases the quality of human life lies (1991: 
227-8).  
Detecting this conflict between nature and culture in Rousseau’s view, Kant 
tries to avoid from this conflict by postulating the social contract as an a priori 
principle of reason. In other words, Kant treats the social contract as Idea of reason 
acting like a norm rather than a historical fact. According to the philosopher, social 
contract as a historical fact would mean to be bounded by a pre-existing civil 
constitution inherited from the previous nations. The presupposition of a pre-
existing civil constitution necessarily conflicts with the idea of a “coalition of the 
wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a common, public will for the 
purposes of rightful legislation…” (Kant, 1991: 79).  Instead, an original contract 
must entail the principle of an eager agreement with majority. In this way, a lawful 
civil constitution and so commonwealth can be achieved without any coercion. 
Since an original contract, which entails the universal agreement, resources from 
being rational subjects, an agreement on a civil constitution can be launched 
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without any external condition because all man are subject to the very same 
principles in the realm of rationality.   
This point that Kant makes with regard to Rousseau is apparent in his 
famous essay Perpetual Peace, as well as in many of his other political essays. 
Kant is after a vindication of the validity of a republican government in the light of 
present political developments of the age of Enlightenment such as French 
Revolution. 
Relying on the records of his academic life, it can be said that Kant’s 
interest in politics was always present in his thoughts. He gave a lecture on the 
“Theory of Right” in 1767 long before he published his Critique of Pure Reason11 
in 1781. Furthermore, we see that his essays Enlightenment
 
and Idea were written 
before his third Critique, Critique of Judgment12. All his political writings were 
written after 1790. He never organized these into a systematic book but his political 
views were even present in CPR (Reiss, 1956:191).  
As a fervent defender of human freedom in the age of enlightenment, Kant 
was a liberal for he was against any patriarchal government. According to him, 
political freedom evolves from the definition of man and it is definitely a -
philosophically- provable right of man. This view was a great contribution to 
Germany’s political development. His views were criticized by his successors such 
as German Romantics, for they had seen Kant as the “arch-enemy” and, also by 
Hegel whose thoughts have dominated the historical studies of politics and law 
after Kant. Yet, Kant’s liberal approach influenced thinkers like Fredrich Schiller 
and Alexander von Humboldt as well as Jakob Friedrich Fries and Sir Karl Popper. 
                                               
11 From now on will appear as CPR. 
 
 
12 From now on will appear as CJ.
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While his emphasis on man’s continuously developing intellectual and thus, 
political maturity was found interesting by the contemporary politics, his approach 
was undervalued during the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
 
2.2.1. Kant’s Ethics and His Political Thought 
Between Kant’s morals and politics there exists an ambiguous yet profound 
relationship. The Kantian ethics can be found in three works of the philosopher: 
Fundamentals of Metaphysic of Morals13 (1785), Critique of Practical Reason 
(1788) and The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). Among these, as we have seen in 
the previous section, The Metaphysics of Morals caused the view that Kant’s 
political philosophy is derived from his practical or moral philosophy.  
When dealing with political issues Kant clearly takes his ethical views for 
granted and sees the categorical imperative as the fundamental principle of 
political right. In favor of this claim, Christine Korsgaard writes that for Kant, the 
emergence of the rights of man and the abandonment of speculative metaphysics 
are not unrelated and, taken together they participate in the discussion of the scope 
and the power of reason. The limits of theoretical reason are surpassed by practical 
reason which announces that every human being is free and autonomous. In Kant’s 
ethical works, this dictate of practical reason is given as the legitimate ground for 
politics as well as morality (2004: 3). More specifically, Kant’s political views are 
grounded upon the foundations of his moral philosophy and have their primordial 
support from the fundamental principle of morality, i.e. the categorical imperative. 
This link between Kant’s ethics and politics has been a contentious matter but, in 
                                               
13 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. This work is also translated in English as The 
Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals or Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals. 
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the end, it is widely recognized that Kant’s practical and political philosophy aim 
at “the possibility of realizing a moral political order through interventions in 
social-political reality by autonomous reason” (Apel, 1997: 82).  
Kant’s practical philosophy basically follows his critical philosophy of the 
first Critique. It represents the objective validity of theoretical reason. It seeks the 
answer for one question: “What ought one to do?” Kant explicitly states that the 
answer of the question cannot be found in the empirical world or among 
contingent beings. The answer must be a universal formula that can be applied to 
all possible human actions. Hence, in practical reason we are to find a principle 
that will be treated as an abiding law and regulate all human actions. This principle 
is an a priori principle of morality according to which we will know how we ought 
to act. Kant introduces this fundamental principle as the categorical imperative or 
the absolute a priori command of our pure practical reason and thus, that of 
morality.  
In the Fundamentals of Metaphysics of Morals (1785), which is accepted as 
Kant’s first book on his moral thought, Kant defines categorical as absolute and 
imperative as command. On the absolute or categorical character of the command 
Kant writes that “everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to 
be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity” (FMM 7). By 
this assertion the categorical imperative claims for absolute respect and obedience. 
Kant continues by an example: 
The precept, “Thou shalt not lie”, is not valid for men alone, as if other 
rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral 
laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be 
sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which 
he is placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason (FMM 
7).   
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It is necessary to write that the term “everyone” in the above sentence refers to 
“rational beings”, because Kant defines morality as rational beings’ acting 
according to the categorical imperative. The condition of being a rational being is 
the use of reason and the use of reason necessitates self-determination, i.e. 
autonomy.  
The notion of autonomy is taken to be the core of the Kantian theory of 
right and Kant’s political philosophy by many scholars (Gregor 1963; Mulholland 
1990; Weinrib 1992; Sullivan 1994). The notion of an autonomous individual 
necessitates a right to external liberty. This external freedom is supplied by the 
commitment of individuals to legal protection. Mary Gregor claims that by the 
capacity to be autonomous, an external liberty is assured since this right should be 
respected by every other man. The lawful constraint that this state bears is 
“contained analytically in the concept of outer freedom” (1963: 43). Similarly, 
according to Mulholland, autonomy necessitates an external milieu that would 
supply “a non-teleological constitutive structure” (1990:2). Furthermore, for 
Sullivan, “the power of the autonomy is what gives every person moral authority 
and status against the might of the state” (1994:15). Weinrib claims from another 
angle that the external relationship and the autonomy is united in the concept of 
right in Kant and “accordingly, the union of the externality and freedom in the 
concept of right permits law to be understood as an idea of reason with practical 
reality” (1992: 24).  
The notion of autonomy in Kant necessarily corresponds to the concept of 
freedom in two senses: positive and negative. Positive freedom necessitates 
realizing the categorical imperative as a constraint upon one’s actions. According 
to Kant, negative freedom in the sense of autonomy indicates that one takes the 
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control of his or her own life and voluntarily abandons himself or herself to the 
moral law (Beck, 2008: 187). The sense of negative freedom (autonomy) and the 
moral law distinguish man who is subject to the laws of freedom from other things 
that are necessarily and merely subject to the laws of nature. Thus, in Kantian 
morality a rational being is strictly autonomous and free. Yet, according to Kant, 
the autonomy and freedom mean that the individuals admit the categorical 
imperative as the ultimate guiding principle for their actions.  
In Kant, freedom in the ordinary sense of the word appears as the right to 
lawful freedom and, it is defined as a priori component of humanity. In 
“Metaphysical Elements of Justice” Kant writes: 
Freedom (independence from the constraint of another’s will), insofar as it 
is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a 
universal law, is the one sole and original right that belongs to every 
human being by virtue of his humanity (1965:43-4).   
 
This formulation of freedom, as we shall see soon, will provide the sufficient 
ground for the notion of justice. According to Kant, the categorical imperative, 
which introduces the law of freedom, in accordance with which one must act, will 
be recognized by all rational beings who beat the call of their desires or 
inclinations and by that they will determine their will independently (FMM 72). 
To be fair to Kant’s notion of categorical imperative, we must state that Kant does 
not intend to say that this principle actually exists but must be treated as if it exists. 
In other words, rational beings who can choose freely that is, independent of the 
influence of the inclinations of their nature must act as if in accordance with a 
universal moral law i.e. the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is 
good in-itself. It does not tell us whether an action is good or not as a means to 
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something. The good of the categorical imperative comes form its accordance to 
reason.  
Kant provides three formulations of the categorical imperative. The first 
commands: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” (FMM 39). This imperative is free 
from any kind of contingent end and it “would be that which represented an action 
as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively 
necessary” (FMM 32). This first formulation is the necessary shape of the 
categorical imperative and it considers the form of the imperative.  
The second formulation of the categorical imperative seeks the content and 
commands that rational beings must be treated as ends. It is formulated as follows: 
“So act as to treat humanity, whether thine own person or in that of any other, in 
every case as an end withal, never as means only” (FMM 47). 
In the third formulation, we see the “principle of autonomy” at work. 
According to Kant, rational subjects create the moral law themselves and they 
subject to that law without an external obligation. They are subject to the law that 
they legislated as a result of their autonomous willing. From this fact the third 
formulation, the autonomy of the will follows: “Always so to choose that the same 
volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law” (FMM 
58). The nexus between autonomy and morality is clear when Kant writes: 
That the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals 
can be readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For 
by this analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative 
and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very 
autonomy (FMM 58). 
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In the light of these three formulations it is clear that in the case of morality the 
categorical imperative- without an alternative- is the only principle that can be 
adopted freely. In this sense, we should recognize that for Kant freedom is not the 
freedom of choosing among some options but instead it is the “power of self-
determination” (Becker, 1993: 82). Therefore, according to Kant, rational beings 
are free as long as they adopt and act in accordance with the categorical 
imperative. Furthermore, they may act immorally but if they know that they acted 
wrong, it should be realized that they are capable of such awareness only because 
they have recognized the categorical imperative (FMM 41).  
In its relation to politics, as the ultimate principle of pure practical 
philosophy (or metaphysics of morals) the categorical imperative appears as the 
absolute principle of all deliberate actions of man. In Metaphysics of Morals Kant 
is concerned with how this principle is to be practiced by human beings. This work 
consists of two parts, respectively, the “Doctrine of Right” and the “Doctrine of 
Virtue”. As pointed out earlier, Kant expresses most of his political stance in the 
former part of the book where in his remarks a logical connection can be traced 
between ethics and jurisprudence or better to say; between his practical and 
political philosophies. For instance, according to Kant the notion of legislation has 
two forms, ethical and juridical, and  
If legislation makes no action of a duty and at the same time makes this 
duty the incentive, it is ethical. If it does not include the latter condition in 
the law and therefore admits an incentive other than the Idea of duty itself, 
it is juridical (1965: 19). 
 
From the above paragraph it is clear that for Kant, the duty in ethics is never taken 
as coercion whereas in jurisprudence the duty is externally motivated and a person 
 28  
 
has some other incentives for his actions. In that case jurisprudence (doctrine of 
right) for Kant is “the body of those laws, that is, externally legislated” (1965: 33). 
We must notice here the distinction of two kinds of duty in Kant, namely 
perfect duty and imperfect duty. The former implies the duties that every action of 
a subject must accord with any circumstances. For instance, “killing oneself” or 
“defiling yourself with lust” or “stupefying oneself” are the examples for perfect 
duties that every subject must fulfill by avoiding them.  
Imperfect duties imply those duties that entail principles to adopt but they 
are not necessarily acted upon in every action, for instance, self-perfection. 
Following from these definitions, we see that jurisprudence, for it applies to the 
external relationship of one person to another, entails concerns about imperfect 
duties. Since Kant defines the categorical imperative as the sole constraint on the 
will of rational beings, it appears as the definitive principle of how a rational 
being, if it ever calls itself rational, must act. Following from this point, justice 
emerges as the external complement of the categorical imperative.  
In addition to its relation to morality, justice or the theory of right (Ius/ 
Rechtslehre) must have “immutable principles” which provide guidance and 
convenience. They are to be looked for in pure reason rather than among empirical 
laws since a theory consisting solely of empirical laws can just be like the wooden 
head in Phaedrus’ fable: charming but without brains (MM 132).  Therefore, the 
concept of right, when it is taken- as it must be- in relation to obligation (i.e. the 
moral concept of right), is applicable three specific conditions.  
The first condition concerns mutual external relations between people. It 
aims to regulate human actions or deeds that appear as the practical consequences 
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of their free will in order to make sure that there are no violations of freedom. In 
the second condition, the concept of right guards the freedom of choice of both 
individuals, thus, it focuses on the relationship between the wills (Willkür) of two 
people. Lastly, the concept of right is not concerned with the aim of the will, 
which is the material aspect of it, but with only the form of the interaction between 
two wills. In other words, it is concerned with the form of freedom of each will in 
their conformity with a universal law (MM 133). 
The ethical duty commands us to act in accordance with our perfect duties. 
Yet, as for the imperfect duties, since our duty is to adopt them but not necessarily, 
it is possible to act in accordance with them but they need to be regulated by some 
law in order not to violate the very principle of freedom. In this sense, the concept 
of right is given by Kant as follows: “Right is therefore the sum total of those 
conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (MM 133). Now nothing 
other than morality can compel the individual to make this a maxim for himself or 
herself. Following this, the universal law of right is: “let your external actions be 
such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of 
everyone in accordance with a universal law” (MM 133). On the point of the 
continuity and preservation of this universal law which entails the right to external 
freedom, Kant indicates that logically if it is ever possible to hinder the right to 
external freedom, the authority to use coercion must be allowed (MM 134). Thus, 
justice or right can appeal to coercion in order to guarantee this right to external 
freedom in a universal scale. 
The practice of the innate right to external right entails both the right to 
security in oneself and the right to possess things outside of oneself. According to 
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Kant, in order to benefit from both these rights people must abandon themselves to 
the law. Since, 
experience teaches us the maxim that human beings act in a violent and 
malevolent manner, and that they tend to fight among themselves until an 
external coercive legislation supervenes (MM 137). 
 
Yet, Kant thinks neither the experience nor knowledge is the cause of 
public legal coercion but, 
(O)n the contrary, even if we imagine the men to be benevolent and law-
abiding as we please, the a priori rational idea of a non-lawful state will 
still tell us that before a public and legal state is established, individual 
men, peoples and states can never be secure against acts of violence from 
one another, since each will have his own right to do what seems right and 
good to him, independently of the opinion of others (MM 137). 
 
From this detection pertaining to the nature of man, the following result is 
derived: Exeundum e statu naturali! The state of nature must be abandoned. 
People must willingly enter into a state of civil society if they ever wish to enjoy 
their rights. By this means, both the right to be secure and possess things in peace 
is guaranteed by the state which, under these circumstances, appears as a “union of 
an aggregate of men under rightful laws”. This phrase is followed by a crucial 
passage in which Kant writes that  
in so far as these laws are necessary a priori and follow automatically from 
the concepts of external right in general (and are not just set up by statute), 
the form of the state will be that of a state in the absolute sense, i.e. as the 
idea of what a state ought to be according to pure principles of right. This 
can serve as an internal guide (norma) for every actual case where men 
unite to form a commonwealth (MM 138). 
 
It is clear from the paragraph that the laws that constitute a state are by no 
means derived from empirical realm or experience. On the contrary, due to their a 
priori character they would govern any kind of state that is to be established. In 
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this sense, neither the commonwealth of people nor the welfare of the state is 
about happiness or well-being of people but instead they imply the “conditions in 
which the constitution most closely approximates to the principles of right; and 
reason, by the categorical imperative, obliges us to strive for its realization” (MM 
143).  
In the Kantian system, there is no sufficient way of constructing a state 
other than the guidance of reason. In this sense, Kant is the first among the social 
contract theorists (such as Hobbes and Locke) who find the ground of establishing 
state in pure practical reason alone (Kersting, 1992: 144). In Kant, the voluntary 
act of giving up the unlimited freedom becomes a necessity that derives its power 
from the pure reason. In this peculiar position the social contract emerges as the 
will of the reason rather than people’s (IUH 28). Thus, Kant’s original contract is a 
document of reason and by this means “Kant transforms the contractualistic act of 
foundation of state rule to a practical idea of Reason which functions normatively 
as the principle of political justice” (Kersting, 1992: 149). Furthermore, if we 
follow Kant’s hypothetical social contract, we notice that for human beings 
accepting to submit themselves to the social contract is a must, “because their 
consent is a necessary manifestation of their humanity, i.e. it is known a priori 
that, inasmuch as a being is rational, and one to whom the concept “human” 
applies, this being necessarily consents to the social contract (Becker, 1993: 96). 
Following this, state or civil state that Kant expects, has three a priori 
principles. First one concerns the freedom of every member of society as a human 
being. Kant formulates this principle as follows: 
No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of 
the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he 
sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to 
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pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone 
else within a workable general law—i.e. he must accord to others the same 
right as he enjoys himself (Kant, 1991: 74). 
 
The second principle concerns equality of each man with all the others as a 
subject. According to Kant, except from the head of state, who by right coerce 
others without being coerced by the law, all members of a state bear the same 
rights before the law.   
We see that the third principle is the independence of each member of a 
commonwealth as a citizen (Kant, 1991: 74). Among these three principles, only 
the last one takes historical and social circumstances into account (Williams, 
2006:1). According to Kant, the legislation for commonwealth  
(R)equires freedom, equality and unity of the will of all the members. And 
the prerequisite for unity, since it necessitates a general vote (if freedom 
and equality are both present), is independence. The basic law, which can 
come only from the general, united will of the people, is called the original 
contract (Kant, 1991: 77).  
Independence then appears as the last condition of the civil state and more 
importantly it implies the condition of being a citizen that is, to participate in 
legislation. A citizen, in these circumstances, is the one who is free and equal with 
others before the law and is the one who can vote in legislation. Thus, the people 
who are to be called independent (sibisufficientus) citizens are the ones who 
possess some property that enables them not to serve any master. Kant writes that 
in order to be an independent citizen one 
must be his own master (sui iuris) and must have some property (which 
can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support himself. In the 
case where he must earn his living from others, he must earn it only by 
selling that which is his, and not by allowing others to make use of him; for 
he must in the true sense of the word serve no-one but the commonwealth 
(Kant, 1991: 78). 
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Hence, in contrast to freedom and equality, independence has a peculiar 
relationship with economic development. According to Kant, poverty hinders 
independence to flourish. It is surprising to see an empirical or in this case a 
historical motive as an attribute of an a priori principle in Kant. Independence 
under these circumstances appears as both a right and a duty in Kant. Our 
independence is bound up with our participation in legislation. As a member of the 
commonwealth, a citizen, and a co-legislator it is our duty to participate in the 
exercise of the power (Williams, 2006: 372-3).   
Following these three a priori principles, the original contract appears as 
the fact of reason- as it is an Idea of reason- rather than a historical fact. It 
basically entails the unity of the will of all the individuals of a community. Kant 
writes the following in CPR: 
I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no 
corresponding object can be given in sense-experience. Thus the pure 
concepts of reason, now under consideration, are transcendental ideas. 
They are the concepts of pure reason, in that they view all knowledge 
gained experience as being determined through an absolute totality of 
conditions (CPR A327 B383). 
 
Therefore, once something is determined as an idea of reason, it gains the practical 
reality immediately in the Kantian system of thought. Then, as one of the ideas of 
reason, the Idea of social contract cannot be found in experience as incorporated in 
a specific state. Rather, it serves as a guide which  
obliges every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could 
have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard 
each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented 
within the general will (Kant, 1991: 79).  
Hence, according to Kant, the notion of social contract is an idea of reason that 
regulates the experience in politics of state. Together with the transcendental 
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principle of right it guarantees the external security of acting freely in accordance 
with the moral law. Thus, the principles and concepts of morality, determined by 
pure practical reason in its solitude are supported by justice or right in external 
world. Moreover, they unavoidably and immediately apply, since the idea or 
principle of pure practical reason has immediate application in empirical world for 
Kant.  
In order to construct a general frame for Kant’s late political stand, The 
Doctrine of Right should be the source because in this section of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (1797) Kant amalgamates all his views in his essays. The Doctrine of 
Right is popular among scholars who seek for an account of the notion of right in 
Kant, since the Kantian political philosophy seems to be derived from a philosophy 
of right. It is mainly because it seems to give a more concise theory of right though 
it is written almost fifteen years after his political essays.  
In The Doctrine of Right, Kant gives his full attention to define the 
relationship between the concepts of right and freedom. While elaborating this 
relation Kant excludes individual freedom, which is the ground of actions 
pertaining to morality, from his query. It is basically because free action of an 
individual concerns merely his own self and concludes in either being moral or 
immoral. However, in the Doctrine of Right, especially in Part II: Public Right, 
Kant is concerned with a new form of freedom comes to the fore: freedom as the 
ground of all actions of political subject. In The Doctrine of Right, freedom of an 
individual is defined as being limited by the freedom of another individual. This 
conditioned freedom, as we will see later, necessarily culminates in giving oneself 
to coercion willingly. This voluntary submission to the law constitutes the very 
principle of right. Thus, according to Kant, in political or communal life of man, 
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the principles of right are the only criteria for an accurate political action. In this 
attempt, the universal principle of right appears as follows: “Every action which by 
itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to coexist with 
the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (MM 
139).  
This principle is not a restriction on the freedom of individual. It suggests 
that one should be aware of individual freedoms of other people. Thus, it requires a 
concedence of a plurality of freedoms. According to this picture, the categorical 
imperative organizes our inner decisions and moral actions whereas for our 
external relations, we have the universal principle of right as the guarantor of 
common public relations. Following this, in the crowd of freedoms in order to 
prevent the clash of choices based on the freedom of individual there is one thing to 
surrender: Law. 
According to Kant’s formula of universal right, the freedom of individual is 
safe only if the coercion of law is admitted or in other words, only if the individual 
submits to surrender himself to coercion. Through this formula, the moral principle 
as the inner guide of human soul finds its complement, that is, the universal right in 
the external world. The universal character of principle of right corresponds to a 
form or a priori principle in the Kantian political philosophy. 
Kant’s contribution to the diversity of theories of right14 is no doubt due to 
the transcendental i.e. a priori position that he attributes to right. Kant defines 
                                               
14 Kant’s theory of right stands between Rousseau’s and Hobbes’ due to its reasserting the priority 
of individual. Kant seems to favor Hobbes’ theory in that the individual is given natural rights but in 
his theory of rights, he modifies this natural right and applies it without its baggage of cruel natural 
behavior as Hobbes suggests. He also favors Rousseau in his understanding of rights but unlike 
Rousseau, he imagines individual independent of collective consciousness. Like Hobbes he thinks 
that the natural state of man is war but also thinks like Rousseau that the state of war does not 
necessarily need an absolute sovereign authority. By means of self-limitation and self-regulation, 
the people can admit the priority and superiority of law and peace. 
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theory of right as “the sum total of laws which can be incorporated in external 
legislation” (MM 132). The concept of external right does not derive from the “end 
which all men have by nature” i.e., happiness. This would probably call the 
diversity of tastes into discussion of politics, so Kant appeals to duty which 
underlies autonomy rather than heteronomy like the concept of happiness (Reiss, 
1956:179). Adding this to the a priori character of rights, they appear as the 
preconditions of sociable freedom. It is at the same time the restriction to live 
coexistent freedoms in the Kantian theory of right.    
Right is, then, a restriction to an individual’s freedom in order that the 
freedom of individual can be harmonized with that of others’ under the rules of a 
general law. Following this, public right is the distinctive quality of external laws 
which make this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom 
through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil 
constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, 
while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows (MM 
132). 
The theory of right is a theory of a positive right if an external legislation 
exists. The concept of right in its relation to the moral concept of right appears in 
three conditions. First, it is applicable only to the mutual exterior and empirical 
side of relations between two individuals whose actions can affect each other. 
Secondly, it is concerned with the relationship between the wills of two people. 
Lastly, the concept of right is not concerned with the aim of the will, which is the 
material aspect of it, but with only the form of the interaction between two wills. In 
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other words, the concept of right is concerned with the form of freedom of each 
will in their conformity with a universal law. 
According to Kant, ethics makes it necessary for us to regard this principle 
as the maxim of all our actions to be able to act rightly which means not being a 
hindrance to freedom by the action we do freely. Kant writes that the law of 
reciprocal coercion is like a construction of the concept of right. This is because for 
Kant the law of reciprocal coercion represents the concept of right in a “pure a 
priori intuition by analogy with the possibility of free movement of bodies within 
the law of the equality of action and reaction”. He continues to explain that it is 
“just as the qualities of an object of pure mathematics cannot be directly deduced 
from the concept but can only be discovered from its construction”,…“a general, 
reciprocal and uniform coercion “ is which makes any representation of the concept 
[of right] possible” (MM 135). 
Public right is divided into three kinds: political, international and 
cosmopolitan right. With regard to all three types of rights, we see a transcendental 
concept of public right which is the formal attribute of publicness. All three derive 
their legitimacy relaying on this transcendental formula which says: ‘All actions 
affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not 
compatible with their being made public’ (PP 125-6). 
In accordance with the above formula political right appears as the system 
of laws for individuals who are members of a state. Political rights of individuals 
work as the guarantor of the order and freedom in order to live in a just society. 
These rights are crucial, since in the absence of such a dispute over will and right, a 
disorder may occur like the one similar to the state of nature that Hobbes describes. 
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The international right or the right of nations represents the right of a state 
in the community of all other states in their mutual relations. According to Kant, 
international right involves the rights concerning war. It concerns the right to 
declare war or the right of a state after war or the right of states to struggle in order 
to prevent war. The latter can be by means of forcing a constitution which will keep 
the world in peace. Thus, according to the elements of international right; 1) 
Interstate relations lack right, 2) Therefore, they are surrounded by risk of war, if 
there is not already one and 3) both in order to protect the privacy of the internal 
relations of states and to keep the external relations of states free from aggression a 
federation of peoples is needed; 4) This idea of federation should not culminate in a 
universal single state but it should be understood as the confederation of states or a 
universal union of states.  According to Kant, perpetual peace is the “ultimate end 
of international right” and it is grounded on notion of duty. Following this, it can 
well be realized (MM 171). 
For cosmopolitan right, Kant writes that it emerges out of the gathering of 
political and international right. Since as in earth we live in a finite geography, each 
nation is necessarily in some kind of contact with each other. According to Kant, 
every nation has the same right to live on the earth and the mutual relations of 
nations constitute a community of    action (commercium). Hence, commerce is the 
way that nations may interact with each other without being inimical to each other. 
To demand to commerce is a right for Kant and it is called a cosmopolitan right of 
the nations (MM 137). 
Up to this point, we have consulted The Metaphysics of Morals and The 
Doctrine of Right in particular. In the latter, Kant announces “There shall be no 
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war” as a categorical imperative that the moral-practical philosophy commands. 
Hence, for Kant perpetual peace both morally and politically is the ultimate end.  
Besides Kant’s theory of right, which is given in his latest moral work, there 
are some other essays in which Kant brings up some central notions for 
understanding his political stand. In the next section, three of his essays on history 
will be consulted.   
 
2.2.2. On Kant’s Political Essays 
Kant’s essay Enlightenment (1784) attracted great attention both in his time and 
long after his death. This essay is obviously aimed to define the age of 
Enlightenment in which the very conceptions of man and freedom are seriously 
changed through passionate discussions of intellectual world. 
The essay announces the motto of the Enlightenment as: Sapere Aude!15 
(Have courage to use your own understanding!). Taken seriously, this advice can 
save a community from its immaturity or inability of using one’s own reason. For 
Kant, the only means to achieve this is freedom: the “freedom to make public use 
of one’s own reason”. Public reason stands in opposition to the private reason of 
the individual and it is the means that can bring enlightenment to a community. 
Kant writes: 
…by the public use of one’s own reason I mean that use which anyone may 
make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public. What I 
term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in a 
particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted (1991: 55).  
 
Pertaining to this distinction, if a man is a “private” military officer, then he must 
follow orders. If he is a citizen then he must pay taxes, as a clergyman he must 
teach according to directions of his church. But “as a member of a complete 
                                               
15 The qoute belongs to Horace and originally means “Dare to be wise” (footnote in Reiss, 1991: 273). 
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commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society” he might criticize these deeds in 
writing. This corresponds to what Kant speaks of as “using one’s own reason 
publicly” and enjoying the unlimited freedom while performing this. Absolute 
freedom should be allowed for printing materials and to people in public use of 
their reason. The expression of thoughts in print carries the potential of 
enlightening the public. But it should be noted that Kant believes that the age is not 
enlightened but keeps the hope of enlightenment. The process is slow and much 
time is needed “before men as a whole can be in a position (or can even be put into 
a position) of using their own understanding confidently and well in religious 
matters, without outside guidance” (1991: 58). 
Another crucial essay to review is Idea (1784). Allen Wood states that in 
this essay we can find Kant’s attitude on the history of philosophy in its fullest 
sense. The essay is also significant in the sense that it precedes Kant’s application 
of natural teleology in the third Critique (2007: 107).  
 
Idea is loaded with such relations pertaining to history and nature as well as 
political matters. In the essay, Kant makes a swift transition from morality to 
politics. He writes that we formulate the concept of freedom of the will by 
reflecting in metaphysics, but whatever its conception may be, the material 
consequences of the will’s freedom are necessarily subjected to natural laws. In 
other words, human actions are freely willed actions that appear in the phenomenal 
world. This appears as the first step of the transition. Any action or event in the 
phenomenal world necessarily entails a net of relations both with nature and with 
actions of other men. Next, we see nine propositions in the name of the guiding 
principles to history which is defined as the attempt to give the account of the 
phenomena consisted of human actions. 
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First principle is a presupposition: All the natural capacities of a creature 
are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with 
their end (IUH 42). This is an indisputable fact for Kant. Arguing otherwise 
suggests a random nature instead of a law-governed one. Following the first 
proposition, the second proposes that man’s “natural capacities which are directed 
towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in 
the species, but not in the individual. From this it is obvious that for Kant 
individual improvement does not supply a progressive step in the history of human 
species. 
The third proposition asserts that nature gave man reason and willed that 
man should  
produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the 
mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake 
of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for 
himself without instinct and by his own reason (IUH 43).  
 
The mentioned inner capacities are triggered by nature’s means such as the 
principle of antagonism within the society which leads to a law-governed society in 
the end. The latter appears as the fourth proposition. Kant recognizes antagonism in 
society as the unsociable sociability of men which means “their tendency to come 
together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly 
threats to break this society up”. Kant sees this inclination in the very nature of 
man and continues that: 
Man has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this state more 
like a man, that is, he feels able to develop his natural capacities. But he 
also has a great tendency to live as an individual, to isolate himself, since he 
also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct 
everything in accordance with his own ideas (IUH 44). 
 
Hence, nature is appreciated by Kant because it supports discord where man wishes 
concord. It fosters the natural impulses of man that are basically  
 42  
 
…the sources of the very unsociableness and continual resistance which 
cause so many evils, at the same time encourage man towards new 
exertions of his powers and thus towards further development of his natural 
capacities (IUH 44). 
 
The key to recurrent improvement and more prominently to realizing 
nature’s utmost end, which is actualizing the whole innate potentials, lies in 
achieving a just civil society. This highest objective is possible in a society where 
unsocial sociability of man (antagonism) is continuous and members have the 
greatest freedom in so far as they “co-exist with the freedom of others”. After 
achieving a civil constitution, the problem grows into the “external relationship” 
with other states. In the case of mutual relations of states, nature intrudes again by 
means of wars. Even if they are non-pleasant, they bring new networks of relation 
between states. Kant elaborates three types of possible ideas on the mutual 
relationship of states.  We may believe that random collision of states will 
accidentally cause an order (like in Epicurus’ clashing world of atoms) or we may 
also believe that nature “follows a regular course” which gradually brings the 
“highest level of humanity” or as a third possibility we may think that it is not 
decidable nor predictable whether the intention of nature will bring good or evil in 
the end. The underlying question of these three suppositions is “whether it is 
rational to assume that the order of nature is purposive in its parts but purposeless 
as a whole.” Kant intends to read the savagery of the states as a functional tool in 
transition to a more civilized condition.  
In the eighth proposition of the essay which follows from the previous one, 
history is visualized in its ultimate duty:  
The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization 
of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally-and for this purpose 
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also externally-perfect constitution as the only possible state within which 
all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely (IUH 50).  
 
In the end of this continuous process, cosmopolitan existence will be 
achieved after a great endeavor of mankind which will be prepared by many more 
revolutions and by all their transforming affects. A cosmopolitan existence 
acquired this way will have the promise of realizing all the capacities of human 
kind.  
Ninth or the last proposition of the essay is as follows: 
A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in 
accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind, 
must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose 
of nature itself.  
 
According to Kant, even if nature does not have a plan or purposeful end, 
this idea can serve as a “guide to us in representing an otherwise planless aggregate 
of human actions as confirming, at least when considered as a whole, to a system” 
(IUH 52). Related to this notion of planless character of human actions in Theory, 
Kant writes that the diversity and conflicting appearance of the ends of men as 
individuals does not necessarily yield the world to function randomly. For by 
providence they will be given the right route coherent with the natural purpose.  
This optimistic voice of history has lost its hope by the drastic incidents of 
the 20
th century, however, in Kant’s understanding as well as the empirical there is 
a moral-teleological sphere for history. It is not only because the empirical facts are 
positive that we feel optimistic about history but also because it is the requirement 
of our moral side that we should be optimistic about progress of history. The two 
sides can be reconciled in deeds of the moral politician or the philosopher in Kant 
(Williams, 1992: 11). Thus, even in the empirical realm the things are not very 
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promising or rather horrible, in the reflective level, Kant believes that history is 
progressive and there is no doubt that the day follows the night. This was also 
applicable to the French Revolution which according to Kant’s strict political view 
is a rebellion against the sovereign and thus in this sense it is wrong, illegitimate 
and immoral. However, in the reflective level, the French Revolution was a clear 
step forward in the history of mankind for Kant (Williams, 1992: 3).16 
As regards to Kant’s most famous political work Perpetual Peace, we know 
that it was written in 1795 and a year later in 1796 an enlarged version of the 
treatise was published. In the second edition, a “Secret Article of Perpetual Peace”, 
in which the permission of kings for philosophers’ speaking freely and publicly on 
the warfare and peacemaking, is added to the essay.17 It is a common view that the 
treatise was inspired by the conclusion of the Treaty of Basel of 1795.18 The treatise 
may be read both as an “expression of support for the Republic itself and for the 
Prussian policy of peace with France” and as an intention of not to keep silent on 
the issues that concerns general public other than religion (Wood, 1998: 59).  
The treatise is opened by a playful note that insinuates that perpetual peace 
always carries the risk of being a mere dream. Once, writes Kant, there is a Dutch 
innkeeper who has an inn with a signboard on which there hangs a humorous 
                                               
16 Peter P. Nicholson (in Williams 1992) takes up Kant’s treatment of the French Revolution as 
follows: From the point of Kant’s moral-juridical theory, it is both forbidden and  immoral to rebel 
but from the perspective of his philosophy of history individual man can act in a collective 
movement like rebelling (264). Nicholson thinks that this attitude causes an inconsistency when the 
French Revolution is considered. Kant’s rejection of political intervention seems to contradict with 
his support of the enthusiasm of people who are the spectators of French Revolution. 
 
 
17 According to James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann,  the audience of the treatise is not 
only the princes and rulers but also the public of all enlightened citizens of the world, thus  “Kant’s 
ill-ease at the political implications of such an audience compelled him to add” this secret article 
(1997:
 
2).  
 
 
18 The Peace of Basel of 1795 involves three peace treatises that France made with Prussia in April 
5; with Spain in July
 
22 and with Hessen Kassel (Hesse Cassel) in  August
 
28. 
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inscription saying ‘perpetual peace’ on a picture of a graveyard. Kant by this 
satirical example warns his reader that he is well aware that ‘perpetual peace’ can 
be a far ideal to expect for this world. 
The treatise consists of two sections. In the first section, we see six 
preliminary articles concerning the peace among states. In the second section, three 
definitive articles and two supplements deal with the form of the three constitutions 
(ius civitatis, ius gentium and ius cosmopoliticum) which can supply an 
approximate formula of perpetual peace. The preliminary articles that are necessary 
for the peace among the states are the following: 
1) “No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made 
with a secret reservation of the material for a future war”; 2) “No independently 
existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by 
inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift”; 3) “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) will 
gradually be abolished altogether”; 4) “No national debt shall be contracted in 
connection with the external affairs of the state”; 5) “No state shall forcibly 
interfere in the constitution and government of another state”; 6) “No state at war 
with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence 
impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include employments of 
assassins (percussores) or poisoners (venefici), breech of agreements, the 
instigation of treason (perduellio), within the enemy state, etc.” (PP 93-6). 
Kant explains that although all the preliminary articles are prohibitive in 
their mode, the first, fifth and sixth articles are of the strictest sort whereas the rest 
are not because in accordance with circumstances they can let some subjective 
latitude (PP 97).  
 46  
 
As to the second section of the treatise, it considers the definitive articles of 
perpetual peace among the states. According to Kant, a state of peace is different 
from a state of nature. In general, the latter is a state involving a risk of war 
because it lacks order or lawful application. Because of this fact, the state of peace 
should be formally instituted and it follows that the men who ever have the 
slightest possibility of mutual relationship must be subjected to one of three civil 
constitutions19 below:  
-Ius civitatis: A constitution which concerns a nation and cares the civil 
right of the individuals of that nation. 
-Ius gentium: A constitution which considers the international right of states 
in mutual relationship of states with each other. 
-Ius cosmopoliticum: A constitution which is grounded on cosmopolitan 
right of the citizens of a universal state of mankind constituted by both individuals 
and states of the world.  
Three definitive articles of the second section follow this footnote and they 
each correspond to the forms of civil constitutions indicated above. The first article 
asserts that “the civil constitution of every state should be republican.” This 
republican constitution has three fundamental principles;  
-Freedom should be possessed by all the members of a society as men, 
-As subjects all men should affirm their dependence on just one and the 
same particular legislation, 
-Equality of every citizen in front of law should be fostered. 
                                               
19 Kant gives these three forms of institutions in a long footnote
 
(PP 98-9).  
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The republican constitution, with all these three principles, appears to be the 
pure product of the original social contract which is, according to Kant, an idea of 
reason. It is the guarantor of making and enacting laws in a righteous manner. 
Republicanism, therefore, appears to be the “original basis” for any kind of civil 
constitution because it is derived from the pure concept of right. It offers a valid 
alternative to the other types of states such as autocracy, aristocracy or democracy. 
In a republic, the government and the legislative power are separated and this, as a 
principle, amplifies it’s the representative character.  
Indeed, the formula of a perfect rate of representation is given by Kant as 
follows: “the smaller number of ruling persons in a state and the greater their 
powers of representation, the more the institution will approximate its republican 
potentiality, which it may hope to realize eventually by gradual reforms” (PP 101). 
Kant seems to believe that ruling persons are necessarily moral and just, since he 
prefers a system regulated by a ruling class over democracy. Following this 
formula, in Kant’s political system despotism is seen mostly in democratic kind of 
states. This is mainly because 
democracy establishes an executive power through which all the citizens 
may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual 
without his consent so that decisions are made by all the people and yet not 
all the people. This means that the general will is in contradiction with 
itself, and thus also with freedom (PP 101). 
Here the key concept is representative system because Kant insists that “if the 
mode of the government is to accord with the concept of right, it must be based on 
representative system” (PP 102). 
The second definitive article suggests a federation of peoples or free states 
for the sake of security of nations in international arena. The rights of nations 
should be based on this federation. The federation is not proposed as a state of an 
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international kind. In other words, Kant does not suggest the fusion of all nations 
into one and, likewise all states into a single international state. It is suggested that 
a federation of states is a structure where all states co-exist separately. This 
federation is necessary due to the lack of an external tribunal to judge the claims of 
states against each other. Thus, in the absence of such an external objective 
authority, war becomes the occasion where states “seek their rights”. In such a 
picture, achieving perpetual peace among states needs more than peace pacts. Thus, 
a “particular kind of league, which we might call a pacific federation (foedus 
pacificum) is required” (PP 104). This federation’s primary aim must be preserving 
the freedom of the confederated states, while it tries to prevent war. According to 
Kant, “...this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and 
thus, leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality” (PP 104). 
“Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality” 
is the third definitive article of Perpetual Peace. Kant warns us immediately in the 
opening sentences of the account of the article that not philanthropy but right is the 
main concern of all the articles in the treatise. With the concept of cosmopolitan 
right, we see that the principle of hospitality raises its voice. It is argued that a man 
must have a right to approach (not to enter) to a land that he does not belong.20
 
Perhaps, he is not always wanted in the land he arrives but he is to be treated nice, 
even if he is send away or rejected by the land owners. Violence should be 
condemned, since we are members in a universal community, “a violation of rights 
in one part of the world is felt everywhere (PP 108). 
                                               
20 Kant seems to struggle with the invasive character of colonialism. Cosmopolitan right does not 
mean to have a right to enter to others’ land but to ask to communicate, trade or travel.  
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As to the guarantor of perpetual peace, nature appears with a purposive 
function in the form of providence. “It appears as the underlying wisdom of a 
higher cause, showing the way towards the objective goal of the human race and 
predetermining the world’s evolution…” (PP 108). By this means, nature aims to 
produce concord. Its arrangement is three-folded. Firstly, by supporting life on 
earth; then by distributing peoples all around the earth by means of struggles or 
wars the nature caused the states to have some legal and economic relations with 
each other. Thirdly, by the same means that she drives the peoples all around the 
world, she makes them to connect to each other. Each region of the world has its 
own diversity of natural products those become the means for exchange among 
different states (PP 109-10). 
Perpetual peace as an objective of nature for humanity is also in accordance 
with the moral duty which is imposed on us only by the practical reason without 
any external constraint. However, since duty is given only by practical reason, 
nature uses human inclinations in order to achieve its purpose. Reason makes 
perpetual peace a duty for man and in this way, the ideal of perpetual peace gains 
universal validity. Yet, nature does not abandon perpetual peace only to human 
inclinations. The wars, the religious and linguistic differences among states and 
lastly, the spirit of commerce are the genuine means of nature to support perpetual 
peace.  
In addition to these means, there exists another article for realization of 
perpetual peace. It is the secret article of the treatise. It says: “The maxims of the 
philosophers on the conditions under which public peace is possible shall be 
consulted by states which are armed for war” (PP 115). This is the most interesting 
article of the essay. It gives philosophers the permission to talk freely and publicly 
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on the universal maxims of the warfare. This kind of thought results from Kant’s 
belief that the thought of philosophers are necessarily in accordance with universal 
reason. In other words, a philosopher always reflects on the commonwealth of all 
states.  
 
2.3. On the Return of the Kantian Cosmopolitan Ideal in the Twentieth 
Century 
The notion of cosmopolitanism has always been popular among scholars. Yet, there 
are some who think that the very core of cosmopolitanism opposes to existing 
forms of solidarity and community. For instance, Calhoun contends that 
cosmopolitanism with its universal normative character offers to ignore national, 
religious, local or ethnic forms of attachment which are indeed some “positive 
sources of meaning” (1997). According to him, nationalism is an important asset in 
imagining the world and in this sense, it is not a “moral mistake” (Calhoun, 2002:1; 
2006:8). Furthermore, cosmopolitanism emerges as a threat not only to nationalism 
but also to cultural diversity by its all-embracing character (Calhoun, 2002: 885).  
The discussions regarding cosmopolitanism and attempts to reinvigorate the 
ideal have gained velocity in the face of the phenomenon of globalization. 
According to Fine (2007), the emergence of new cosmopolitanism is triggered by 
the political changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, for it paved the way 
for the uptrend of human rights, international law and global approaches in 
governance. Thus, from 1989 onwards, cosmopolitanism entered into an 
interdisciplinary dynamic in the field of social sciences. . In the face of this fact, 
“visions of cosmopolitanism have mutated from an intellectual ethos to an 
institutionally grounded global political consciousness” (Cheah, 2006: 491). 
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The possible relation between cosmopolitanism and globalization is seen as 
inevitable by many scholars. For instance, according to Beck, “by placing globality 
at the heart of political imagination, action and organization”, globalization forms 
the basis of this new cosmopolitanism (1999:9). Delanty claims for a closer bind 
between globalization and cosmopolitan thinking and contends that “the normative 
significance of globalization…necessitates a new kind of imagination, which can 
be called the cosmopolitan imagination” (2009:2). In this sense, a number of 
contemporary approaches regard new cosmopolitanism as being aware of the 
changing world and being open to cultural differences (Hannerz, 1990; Cheah and 
Robins, 1998; Tomlinson, 1999; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). Thus, 
cosmopolitanism now is defined as a mode of “extensive global consciousness” 
(Robertson and White 2005: 349–51) and an “embodied way of being in and 
moving around the world” (Molz, 2006: 2) or “a willingness to engage with the 
Other” (Hannerz, 1990: 239). These approaches ground on the inevitable 
transnational character of contemporary politics. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism 
today is counted as both subjective and particular. Thus, it refers to particular 
transnational experiences. This means that the ideal is not applied necessarily in its 
Western rendition. In this sense, it is not surprising to find that new 
cosmopolitanism is usually identified with the attempt of getting rid of national 
inclinations or the link between nation-state and the theories of social sciences. It 
criticizes traditional social sciences by asserting that new world order requires a 
new understanding of relations of humanity which is based on mutual 
interdependence (Fine, 2007: 1-2). 
Due to the transnational cultural flows now we can talk about the plurality 
of cosmopolitanism(s). According to Vertovec and Cohen, “a proposed new 
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politics of the left, embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric 
nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism” (2002:1) constitutes the face of 
new cosmopolitanism. In accordance with this, we can talk about the plurality of 
cosmopolitanisms such as Asian specific (discussed by Aihwa Ong, Louisa Schein) 
or African specific cosmopolitanism (by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Tiyambe 
Zeleza). Deriving from this changed character, Paul Rabinow defines new 
cosmopolitanism as “an ethos of macro-interdependencies, with an acute 
consciousness (often forced upon people) of the inescapabilities and particularities 
of places, characters, historical trajectories, and fates” (1986: 258).    
The distinction between the old and new cosmopolitanism is due to the 
unique position the latter occupies between universalism and pluralism. New 
cosmopolitanism receives many labels: Vernacular cosmopolitanism (Homi 
Bhabha), discrepant cosmopolitanism (James Clifford), rooted cosmopolitanism 
(David Hollinger), actually existing cosmopolitanism (Bruce Robbins), national 
cosmopolitanism (Martha Nussbaum) and situated cosmopolitanism. All these 
cosmopolitanisms variously discuss the possibility of a response to a transnational 
realm, which brings up issues of diversity and particularity. A closer look in 
different kinds of new cosmopolitanism shows that the new cosmopolitan thinking 
does not see diversity as a problem as the old universalist approach does. The 
common aim is to develop a new cosmopolitan framework in which it is possible to 
cope with the unavoidable diversity of cultures in the experience of living. In this 
sense, what makes the new cosmopolitanism intriguing is “its determination to 
maximize species-consciousness, to fashion tools for understanding and acting 
upon problems of a global scale, to diminish regardless of colour, class, religion, 
sex and tribe” (Hollinger, 2002: 238). 
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Kant’s return to political philosophy of the twentieth century corresponds 
both to the discussions of globalization and also to the significant changes in the 
political life of the world. After World War II, parallel to the policies of United 
Nations, the notion of perpetual peace has rendered possible and “the idea of a 
cosmopolitan order” has been taken up in politics (Habermas, 1997: 126). 
According to Axel Honneth, it is after 1991, “with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
[that] the world appeared to have moved a significant step closer to the Kantian 
project of a perpetual peace” (1997:155). Even if the exact date or instance that 
calls for a Kantian political stance cannot be defined, it is mostly agreed that Kant 
has returned to political discussions in the late 90s.  
A direct application of Kant’s political stance to the present political 
circumstances seems impossible (Lutz-Bachmann, 1997: 61), but still quite a 
number of theorists are known to try to appropriate or deconstruct the Kantian 
cosmopolitan elements to contemporary politics (Rawls, 1999; Benhabib, 2004; 
Held, 1995; Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997; Habermas, 1997; Cheah and 
Robbins, 1998).  From a philosophical approach, Höffe sees Kant’s political 
approach as adoptable to the contemporary political conjuncture: 
The “application” of the categorical imperative to right and the state and to 
their specific tasks leads to a legal and state ethics that recognizes the 
authorization to use coercion as an integral element of right and law, 
develops the principle of human rights, and grounds the basic institutions 
such as property and criminal punishment. Above all, it overcomes the 
prevailing tendency to restrict legal and political philosophy to the 
“national” level, and responds to its concentration on single communities 
with a global and cosmopolitan perspective (2006: 2).     
 
However, for the political sociologists who think an appropriation is possible, all 
discussions around cosmopolitanism and its Kantian model deal with the new 
forms of social relations of nations gained currency by United Nations, 
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international courts, the idea and preservation of human rights and mechanisms for 
rendering peace  (Fine, 2007: 4).  
The new cosmopolitanism’s appeal to Kant is due to its contention that if 
they are rethought, the thought of Enlightenment and especially Kant will fit the 
recent context of world politics. In this sense Cheah summarizes four modalities of 
Kant’s modern cosmopolitanism that constitute the nub of contemporary 
discussions in international relations as follows:  
(1) a world federation as the legal and political institutional basis for 
cosmopolitanism as a form of right; (2) the historical basis of 
cosmopolitanism in world trade; (3) the idea of a global public sphere; and 
(4) the importance of cosmopolitan culture in instilling a sense of belonging 
to humanity (2006: 487). 
 
The motto of scholars who seek a remedy in Kant for a normative cosmopolitan 
theory is ‘to think Kant against Kant’.21 Rethinking universal character of right is 
more consistent with the theory of world citizenship than that of citizenship in 
relation to independent states (Fine, 2007: 4). The main tenet of this “new 
cosmopolitanism” is given to be the reassessment of the normative value of 
nationalism. Fine writes that “the universalistic character of the idea of right, once 
swamped by the self-assertion of one nation against another, is best suited to the 
identity of world citizens and not to that of citizens of one state against another” 
(2007:4).22   
Fine criticizes the approach of “new cosmopolitanism” by contending that it 
is never new because it strictly follows the natural law theory and thus, Kant as the 
                                               
21 Karl-Otto Apel, in Kant’s “Towards Perpetual Peace” as Historical Prognosis from the Point of 
View of Moral Duty” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. ed. James Bohman 
and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann.  
 
22 Fine states that his aim is agreed upon by many thinkers such as Habermas
 
(1997), Höffe
 
(2006), 
Apel (1997).
 
 
 55  
 
best representative of it. Even if Fine does not claim for a refusal of the natural law 
theory, he believes that a critical approach to it would enable us to situate the 
cosmopolitanism somewhere between the old tradition of natural law and social 
theory which concerns the application of natural law to empirical realities. The nub 
of what Fine entitles cosmopolitan social theory is that the decision of whether the 
new social forms regarded as cosmopolitan can supersede the nation-state or 
reconcile with existing forms of nation-state is not fruitful for contemporary 
discussions of cosmopolitanism. “Cosmopolitan social theory acknowledges the 
accomplishments of political modernity in developing a universal conception of 
humanity and it looks to the growth of new social forms to sustain this conception 
of humanity” (Fine, 2007: xii).  
Fine’s distinction of two tendencies in discussions of cosmopolitan is 
valuable for the present study for it shows how, whether given as opposing or not, 
the existing discussions of cosmopolitanism does not ever think to criticize or 
interrogate the very conception of humanity. And in this sense apart from the 
natural law theory, the Kantian core of these theories is the universal conception of 
humanity. By this indubitable assumption in mind all discussions around 
cosmopolitanism and its Kantian model are concerned with the new forms of social 
relations of nations. 
In order to be more specific about the method or routine of these approaches 
whether entitled “new cosmopolitanism” or “cosmopolitan social theory”, some 
specific concerns will be taken up such as globalization and hospitality rights in 
discussions of which Kant has emerged as central figure or point of conversation. 
In the anniversary year, 1995, of his essay “Toward Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Skecth”, it was a common view among majority of the Kantian 
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scholars that both in a theoretical and practical sense the cosmopolitan ideal is still 
relevant. For instance, Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann in an introductory piece to a 
group of essays they edited in 1997, write that although the normative aspects of 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism are both challenged and defended, the one thing that many 
agree is that the modern ideal of peace must be positive and cosmopolitan (1997: 
6).23
 According to the authors, any scholar who wishes to reconstruct Kant’s 
cosmopolitan ideal would face three challenges: the complex effects of 
globalization; “internal sovereignty of nations as a condition of global order”; and 
the contrast between local and cosmopolitan citizenship.  
The first challenge entails a series of problems such as the worldwide 
networks and transnational civil societies brought by the phenomenon of 
globalization. In Kant’s understanding, world peace of the 18th century was 
supported by nature that served to mankind by causing discord and unintended 
relations among states. Also by the power of commerce and the sharing of peaceful 
thoughts against the war are the mechanisms that would lead the world to eternal 
peace gradually. Yet, in the twentieth and more drastically in the twenty-first 
century globalization accelerated the decay of nationalism and brought about the 
consideration and discussions of annihilation of borders.  
In the light of the contemporary state of world politics at the end of 
twentieth century for instance, Habermas contended that Kant’s approach should be 
revised in a much more dialectical manner. That is that Kant’s understanding of 
progress should have been more dialectical. The main point of Habermas’ remark 
is that globalization and its effects are two sided; in one side it creates opportunities 
                                               
23 Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann write that in additon to themselves this point is commonly accepted by the writers who 
partake in the collection, namely by Martha Nussbaum, Karl-Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Thomas 
McCarthy, Kenneth Baynes and David Held. 
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for new forms of governance but in the other side it threatens the democratic style. 
If we jump to the core of Habermas’ understanding, he suggests that for the 
implementation and preservation of human rights United Nations can be 
reformed.24 
The second challenge is the problem of national sovereignty and its relation 
to global order. For Kant, a plurality of nations with their educated, enlightened 
people, the violations of human rights are condemned globally. In such a milieu 
public opinion is the mere authority. The public opinion of a nation-state and 
cosmopolitan public sphere in which these violations are condemned are not 
external to each other. In other words, cosmopolitan public sphere is maintained in 
each society and state. In the movement of “new cosmopolitanism” some scholars25 
deny the Kantian suggestion of internal sovereignty of a nation-state. Instead they 
look for some structure “stronger” than a world federation of free states and 
“weaker” than a single world republic (Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann, 1997: 13).   
The third challenge is the understanding of pluralism. The Kantian 
understanding does not seem to allow for differences and it identifies itself with a 
unitary structure either in a nation-state or in a federation consisting of free states. 
Therefore, Kant’s conception of tolerance must be worked for reconciling the 
concern for protecting minorities and keeping a universalistic approach. The most 
significant level where this concept is mostly exposed is the right of hospitality. On 
this subject let us take a glance at two different approaches.  
                                               
24 See Habermas’ “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’s Hindsight” in Bohman and 
Lutz-Bachman, 1997, pp. 113–55.  
 
25 These are the names mentioned before; Martha Nussbaum, Karl-Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Thomas 
McCarthy, Kenneth Baynes and David Held. 
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Pauline Kleingeld, for instance, in the light of the developments that came 
from the very idea of globalization complains about the negligence of some 
political principles of the Kantian political philosophy such as cosmopolitan law. 
According to Kleingeld, due to the article of cosmopolitan law’s limited scope 
compared to the other two definitive articles of Perpetual Peace, it was seen not as 
a separate article but as a part of the second article. Also colonialist aggression of 
Europe which was told as “cultural mission” was in contradiction with the content 
of cosmopolitan law. Lastly, due to the belief that cosmopolitan law cannot be 
institutionalized without a single world republic it did not receive much attention 
till twentieth century. Focusing on solely the cosmopolitan law in order to account 
for the recent changes in international law and its impact on individuals, she draws 
attention especially to the status of refugees and this area under discussion.  
The right to hospitality as the center of cosmopolitan law has almost 
predicted the contemporary debates of refugee rights even if Kant did not seem to 
concern much about refugee groups of his time such as Jews. Kant writes that a 
country can reject the visitor or traveler to enter its land without causing his death 
or destruction (Untergang). In today’s context this would have serious 
implications. If we are to follow Kant’s cosmopolitan law it is compulsory to 
accept a refugee who will be killed or arguably who will be destructed or tortured. 
But Kleingeld proposes that we could extend the scope of Untergang from death to 
any mental destruction or incapacitating physical harm. Furthermore, Kant’s 
cosmopolitan law admits some limitations on the rejection of refugees which 
enables people to preserve their rights to make contact (1998: 77). 
Kleingeld, obviously a Kantian scholar writes these in 1998 and favors the 
Kant’s cosmopolitan law in discussions of refugee rights. It is significant not to 
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ignore the Kantian political principles that are still relevant to contemporary 
political issues such as-the right of hospitality which is defined as a right of all 
human beings- but it is also crucial not to ignore the altering structure of world 
politics.  
From the end of the 20
th
 century let’s come to the first decade of the 21st 
century. Seyla Benhabib reminds us the sheer fact that 
The evolution of cosmopolitan norms, from crimes against humanity to 
norms extending to refugee, asylum and immigration have caught most 
liberal democracies within a network of obligations to recognize certain 
rights claims. Although the asymmetry between the ‘demos’ and the 
‘populus’, the democratic people and the population as such, has not been 
overcome, norms of hospitality have gone far beyond what they were in 
Kant’s understanding: the status of alienage is now protected by civil as 
well as international law; the guest is no longer a guest but a resident alien, 
as we say in American parlance, or a “foreign co-citizen”, as Europeans say 
(2006: 36).  
Benhabib emphasizes the fact that political communities do not have to bear 
a unity of cultural identities. On the contrary cosmopolitanism now is gone far 
beyond by multiple allegiances of language, ethnicity, religion, and nationality 
(2004:174-5). For a new kind of understanding in visiting rights of man Benhabib 
suggests further analysis and thought must be given to the possible relation of 
hospitality right and contemporary immigration rights. This particular approach 
insinuates a new cosmopolitan thinking which reaches to individual level in 
contrast to the cosmopolitan project that aims at consensus between states as in 
classical cosmopolitanism.  
Several scholars and examples can be given in relation to Kant’s present 
engagement in contemporary political discussions. Yet, as a future section entitled 
“Kant’s Transcendent Politics” tries to explicate, a hope for a new kind or genre of 
normativity that can allow the transition from pure theoretical to practical concerns 
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regarding world politics lies beneath all these discussions. The endeavor to define 
and limit the content of political ideals necessarily culminates in endless 
discussions between the scholars. Yet, the abandonment of such an attempt seems 
to let oneself into chaos. Reminding that Kant’s progressive look is limited by the 
perspectives of his own time is not saying something genuine but reading the whole 
Kantian philosophy by keeping this fact in mind is still significant for the 
upcoming sections.  
In the endless attempt to derive a normative ground from Kant’s political 
views seems futile in the face of the very nature of politics. Furthermore in the 
contemporary times, the abstract normativity that cosmopolitanism offers renders it 
more like a utopian ideal than a political project, so it is often accused of being an 
empty signifier which has no proper substance or empirical standpoint. (Skrbis et 
al., 2004: 132). This section concludes by the claim that the re-appropriation of the 
Kantian political stance in its determinate, prescriptive frame is rendered 
problematic in the sense that it does not promise much than it achieved in the 
eighteenth-century political life. The following section goes over the normative or 
prescriptive character of Kantian political stand. 
 
2.4. Kant’s Politics: Inconclusive or Provisional? 
Human beings are distinguished from the other animals due to use of reason. As 
rational beings, they are capable of thinking and willing. They have both innate 
rights and acquired rights. According to Kant, the primary innate right is freedom. 
As we have mentioned earlier, freedom is classified as positive and negative by 
Kant. The negative freedom is the state of absolute freedom i.e. being independent 
of the laws of nature, whereas the positive freedom refers to willing as a rational 
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being that is, self-determination in accordance with the moral law. Hence, a free 
subject is the one who admits the categorical imperative and acts according to it in 
any instance. As free rational beings act according to their will, the results of the 
actions appear as external events (i.e. phenomena). From the moment that they are 
performed they are subject to the laws of nature and would be a cause of another 
event.  
Besides the moral character, man has also a social character that 
necessitates interrelation. In this sense, the acquired rights escort the innate right to 
freedom. Acquired rights are basically to possess things and to be secure. In 
accordance with these two rights, interrelations of two human beings necessitate 
some guarantee to exercise these rights in peace. Although it is everyone’s duty to 
act in accordance to the moral law, according to Kant, man has a malevolent 
character that can jeopardize the realization of this duty. This fact makes the 
existence of an external law necessary. As a result, in order to realize their 
freedom people need to hear the call of reason saying that the state of nature 
should be abandoned. Justice or right is considered in connection to the moral law, 
the freedom it provides to man and the action as the consequence of this free 
choice. In this regard, the principle of right appears as transcendental and it 
suggests that people are free when their actions are compatible with the rights of 
freedom of other people.  
This task is parallel to the three formulations of the categorical imperative 
that concern 1) acting in a universal fashion, 2) the value of man as an end in 
himself and 3) acting in accordance to the kingdom of ends.   
Moral law recognized as the rational component of humanity and man’s 
moral capabilities allow for “the highest end intended for man”, namely 
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sociability. The moral law, which is a guide for us to perform the right action in 
any possible environment, is formulated and contemplated by the pure reason 
alone. It is formulated by reason in such a way that it has a universalizing power 
and it can be followed all throughout history. Since, for Kant and the other 
Enlightenment philosophers, reason bestows man with humanity and sociability in 
particular, it is solely the reason that can control the present and shape the future.  
According to Kant, in the realm of ends, things have either price or dignity. 
Man has dignity and cannot be replaced with any other thing or by any other man. 
Thus, each man is unique and deserves respect solely because of his dignity. The 
universal character of reason that all men share supplies a ground for the right 
action to be actualized and, again because of this universal sharing, the right action 
can be easily recognized and logically accepted by others. As a species, human 
beings have powers and capacities that can be activated collectively rather than 
individually. These capacities improve through time. In this sense, history can be 
the record of this progress.  
The a priori (Angeboren) character of the idea of state, which is literally 
defined as an Idea of reason by Kant, provides the philosopher with a unique 
position in the traditional history of political theory. Together with the 
transcendental principle of right, this Idea is accepted to govern the realm of 
human actions. Nevertheless, Kant’s political views do not seem to suggest a 
schema to govern the empirical complexity of the interrelations between states. 
The obvious reasons why this study claims that the Kantian politics 
remains inconclusive can be summarized in the following steps: 
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1) Moral subject in its autonomous and free character acts in coherence 
with the moral law’s command. All free subjects willingly admit the reign of 
moral law. Yet, human nature is weak and man can be beaten by his desires, 
appetites or inclinations. Thus, even if every man is doomed to act morally and 
thus, has a right to be secure and to possess, still there can be some man who 
would act against the command of the moral law. Hence for the external 
consequences of the Willkür, we need laws to assure that people act in accordance 
with the moral law whose external support is law or justice. 
2) The regulation of justice is supplied by the social contract (an idea of 
reason) and the transcendental principle of right. Thus, these sterile abstract 
principles are supposed to regulate all kinds of actions in the empirical world.   
3) Politics by definition presupposes endless relations within its dynamic 
structure. It requires more than to be regulated by some transcendental principle or 
concepts. Most importantly, the regulation, in the sense of Ideas of reason’s 
performing it, is not distinguished from determination. When Kant writes about 
the transcendental conditions of our experience, he also defines and determines the 
limits of cognition. Ideas of reason address to totality of experiences, the possible 
endless appearances of which is restricted or rather governed by various a priori 
elements of pure reason such as the categories and, space and time as pure a priori 
intuitions. These transcendental concepts and conditions are exposed as the 
governors of the experience. What this study intends to say is that to even if to 
regulate, govern or determine do have different meanings in Kant, they all remain 
in an ideal level. Without the mediation of the third Critique, political experience 
remains regulated by the Ideas of reason in an ideal fashion. Yet, the problem with 
political life is that it deals with real more than ideal. In the face of a necessarily 
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particularistic structure of political life Kantian Ideas are invited to “regulate” 
what cannot be regulated according to static structures.  
Jean-François Lyotard, who favors the Kantian Idea because of its 
regulative character, warns us that the notion of totality is problematic in the sense 
that it culminates in determination of content for the Idea which necessarily ends 
in terrorism. It is because of the fact that which obligates is always absolutely 
beyond the grasp of mind for Kant. In this sense, it remains transcendent and 
furthermore, to the prescriptive politics followed by the Idea that concerns all 
possible instances in a totality, transcendence is always immanent (1985: 72).26
 
 
In Kant’s philosophy, reason has always implied a transcendent authority. 
Kant’s “tribunal” of reason is indeed the “jurisdiction” of the realm of 
transcendence. It is this jurisdiction in which the moral law is comprehended in its 
impossibility of being comprehended. This, in turn, becomes the “condition of 
possibility of freedom” in Kant (Çırakman, 2005: 315-6). 
Reason with its ideal principles fails to regulate the real experience in the 
case of political experience. Yet, on the contrary, by claiming to achieve so, it 
extends the scope of its moral principles, thus it has to commit a transcendent 
attitude. To put it another way, the Kantian morality extends its exercising power 
in a fashion that can be called transcendent. Reason, responsible of the totality or 
unity of all possible experience, has to intrude into empirical world. Kant writes 
that in their relation to the sensible or empirical world, the ideas of reason remain 
transcendent. An Idea of reason does not affect immediate sense experience. It 
affects our knowledge in its totality pertaining to the objects of sense experience in 
                                               
26 In relation to prescriptive language games Lyotard continues by saying that “What is being 
called the transcendence of the prescriptive is simply the fact that the position of the sender, as 
authority that obligates, is left vacant. That is, the prescriptive utterance comes from nothing: its 
pragmatic virtue of obligation results from neither its content nor its utterer” (1985: 72).  
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their multiple appearing. At the theoretical level the possibility of the 
representation of the unconditioned totality of appearances is problematic. The 
representation of an unconditioned totality surpasses appearances and in this 
respect, it is transcendent. If we concern this impossibility in the realm of politics 
where the Idea of reason is responsible for regulating the progress of history by 
regulating the political life of man, we can easily see that an attempt of 
representing or in this case determining the content of the Idea is necessarily 
transcendent. In other words, as far as reason is considered the ultimate authority 
in the mechanism of political decision, it is unavoidable that political sphere is 
limited to rational causes that are defined necessarily by reason. In this sense, 
Kant’s wish to realize a moral-political order is an open attempt to “rationalize 
politics in the name of morality” (Cheah, 1995: 168). 
It is understandable that Kant seeks professed principles for man’s political 
life. Yet, he presents such a complex structure that in the end, in his political 
essays, as Elizabeth Ellis puts it rightly, what is defined is “a world in which the 
moral argument is ubiquitous, but inconclusive, concretely effective, but only 
indirectly” (2008: 3). According to Ellis, Kant himself was aware of the fact that 
the diversity of man’s practical action cannot be simply regulated by abstract 
principles. At this point, she presents a cogent opposition to the general assumption 
that Kant’s politics are solely grounded on his ethics which is often defined as a 
sterile abstract system of principles. According to Ellis, Kant’s political essays are 
not only about formalistic abstractions but they are also loaded with effective 
arguments on practice of politics. She summarizes these arguments as follows: 
how to trick the monarch into making himself obsolete; why permanent 
rule-giving of any kind is illegitimate; why freedom of expression matters; why 
gradualism is to be preferred to revolution; why intelligentsia should get special 
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rights; how regime change occurs; what institutions promote international peace; 
how one should treat of foreigners…(2008: 7).   
 
No doubt that these arguments are the main reasons of Kant’s allure to 
twentieth century political discourse. Furthermore, Ellis states that Kant knew the 
fact that even if all human agents are governed by the categorical imperative, in 
existing societies of the time the political authority can be different. That is why he 
applies to “asympotitic imagery to describe the human condition in which we may 
hope to approach ideals but never to achieve them conclusively” (Ellis, 2008: 2). In 
this attitude, Ellis sees a provisional insight and contends that Kant defends this 
provisional right which is the right that “applies in the absence of universally 
authoritative political judgment” when he writes that one should “always leave 
possibility…of entering a rightful condition” (Kant qtd. in Ellis, 2008:8). This 
attitude is significant for the present study in the sense that what Ellis draws 
attention to in Kant’s approach supports new readings of his ethics and politics.27 
What this study claims is that when his cosmopolitan approach is concerned, in the 
present time, his aesthetics has also a saying on politics. And this study contends 
that this can be uncovered by analyzing the sublime and, by following its altered 
version following the WWII in the 20
th
 century. His theory of the sublime, when it 
is analyzed in the contemporary fashion that it has appeared in, supplies an 
opportunity for Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal to be interpreted as provisional rather 
than inconclusive. In order to substantiate this claim in the following chapter the 
Kantian rendition of the sublime will be elaborated in detail. 
                                               
27 The claim that Kant’s ethics and politics distilled from his ethics are not necessarily sterile and 
empty abstract principles has also been supported by Christine Korsgaard and Barbara Herman.  
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CHAPTER III: 
 
KANT’S AESTHETICS AND THE SUBLIME 
 
 
Kant’s thoughts on aesthetics are found in his third and last critique. The third 
branch of Critical philosophy, the Critique of Judgment, was published in 1790. 
After scrutinizing the theoretical and practical uses of reason, in his last critique 
Kant focuses on reflective judgment which is for Kant, a shared terrain, and thus a 
possible bridge between the theoretical and practical realms. This feature of the 
critique made it controversial. The third Critique has attracted considerable 
attention from Kant scholars and has triggered endless discussions on the nature of 
aesthetic judgment in past decades. Scholars have suggested many different 
readings of Kant’s aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgment is subjected to the laws 
of sensibility as determinant judgments. Thus, transcendental conditions are also 
applicable to aesthetic judgment as well as they are applicable to determinate 
judgments. Yet, aesthetic judgments or judgments of taste are immune to 
Universals. Moreover, they have a partial autonomy of their own. This autonomy is 
grounded upon a particular singular aesthetic experience. Dealing with particulars 
impedes any determinate definition concerning the very nature of the particular. 
Due to this complex nature, the third Critique has attracted the attention of both 
structuralist and post-structuralists readers. 
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The systematic reading of the Critique is divided into three due to intentions 
of scholars. The first group scholars tend to read the third Critique in terms of 
Kant’s epistemology, thus, transcendental principles of ordinary empirical 
experience (Cassirer, 1938; Guyer, 1997; Matthews, 1996; Ginsborg, 1990; 
Gasché, 2003). The second group approaches the third Critique in an ethico-moral 
sense and tries to understand it as the actualization of freedom in accordance with 
practical reason (Henrich, 1992; Munzel, 1999). The third group of scholars claims 
that the two parts of the third Critique complement each other and they bring the 
nature and freedom together (Makkreel, 1990; Zammito, 1992).  
In the following sections of this chapter, the first Critique will be visited in 
order to address the unique structure of the aesthetic judgment. Yet, this study does 
not agree with the scholars who turn to CPR because, this study does not aim to 
subsume the reflective judgment into determinate judgments. The aim of the study 
is to investigate the undecidable structure of reflective judgment in order to 
evaluate its possible political repercussions. 
The fourth chapter focuses on Jean-François Lyotard’s work as a 
representative of the poststructuralist approach. Since Lyotard’s approach to the 
Kantian sublime is a fundamental inspiration for this study to investigate the 
potential of the sublime for politics, Lyotard’s approach will be mentioned in a 
more detailed fashion. 
 
3.1. Reflective Judgment and the Third Critique 
It is not easy to outline what Kant claimed for the third Critique. This is also 
detected by prominent Kant scholars. For instance, Guyer speaks of the third 
Critique as both “complex and “obscure” (2000: 32). Lindsay claims that judgment 
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“as elaborated in the third Critique is new” (1934: 222). Allison, on the other hand, 
affirms that the Critique carries “innovations” and “developments”, yet, states that 
this is not a deviation from the Kantian critical approach (2000: 79).    
The critique is divided into two main parts: The Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment and Critique of Teleological Judgment. The first, which is the main 
concern of the present study, deals with reflective judgment. In the preface of the 
first edition of the third Critique dated 1790, Kant writes that judgment appears as a 
middle term between understanding and reason and thus, between the faculties of 
knowledge and that of desire respectively. Since, understanding deals with the 
realm of natural concepts and reason with the concept of freedom, philosophy is 
divided into two realms, the theoretical and the practical. Accordingly, 
understanding is in charge of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature 
whereas reason does this by means of the concept of freedom. Since these two 
realms are distinct in their representation of their objects (sensible in the case of 
understanding and as supersensible in that of reason), there is no possibility of 
passing from one to another by means of theoretical use of reason. 
In the third Critique, judgment is introduced as a middle term. It is not 
defined as a faculty in the sense of prescribing laws but as having some principle in 
itself. The principle of judgment has validity in searching for subjective a priori 
laws. And in the Kantian understanding, it is combined with desire more than 
knowledge and its use makes the transition possible. We know that Kant mentions 
judgment in the first Critique as well. Yet, the judgment in its reflective capacity 
seems to be “new” (Lindsay, 1934: 222) or in other words, the reflective capacity is 
overlooked by Kant in the first Critique as he was occupied by the theoretical use 
of reason (Allison, 2000: 83).  
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According to Kantian philosophy, the first level of human cognition is 
appearances that are given by the sensibility. They are entitled as perceptions 
whenever the consciousness enters. As to apprehension (Auffassung, apprehensio), 
it is defined as the action of the imagination, “since imagination has to bring the 
manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the 
impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them” (CPR A120). Yet, 
this action of the imagination as apprehension does not entail determinate 
connections among appearances. This is due to the fact that apprehension is “only a 
placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition” and does not offer a 
“connected existence in space and time” (CPR B219). Thus, it is the “immediate 
awareness of an individual representation” (Cassirer, 1938: 231). 
Following this remark through the third Critique, we may say that 
according to Kantian philosophy, we apprehend objects of experience in two ways. 
In one, an object of an intuition can be apprehended with reference to some 
concept. Thus, to the given representations belonging to the object, the faculty of 
the understanding applies the pure categories and the manifold of representations is 
grouped under the concept of the object in question. Consequently, the judgments 
we pass on the object have a determinative character concerning the relation 
between the representations and the concept of it.  
The apprehension of the objects of intuition can also take place in mere 
apprehension in which the form of the object is apprehended without reference to 
any concept, thus, without an aim of definite cognition. Furthermore, if this mere 
apprehension of the form of the object pleases the subject then we say that the 
representation is referable to the subject (CJ VII). Basically, this is the state when a 
subject judges something as beautiful as a result of feeling a pleasure in the 
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presence of an object. To sum up, the feeling of pleasure, according to Kant, results 
from a mere apprehension of the form of the object without reference to the 
concept of that object and the representation of the object refers solely to the 
subject than the object itself. To put it differently, the pleasure does not result from 
sensation of the object. Its source is in the form of the object for “reflection 
generally”. Kant writes that “the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of 
the Object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgment, 
and so far as they are in play, and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the 
Object” (CJ VII). With the subjective formal finality, Kant means the finality that 
turns on “what is purely subjective” and in this sense natural beauty can be seen as 
the presentation of the concept of this formal (merely subjective) finality (CJ VIII). 
The feeling of pleasure is the source of four aesthetic reflective judgments 
which are: agreeable (iucundum), beautiful (pulchrum), the sublime (sublime) and 
good (honestum). All these are the judgments of taste and they have two necessary 
conditions: subjectivity and universality.  
Kant writes that as well as the determinate judgments which are necessarily 
have universal character, aesthetic reflective judgments demand universality. For 
instance;  
A singular empirical judgment, as, for example, the judgment of one who 
perceives a movable drop of water in a rock-crystal, rightly looks to every 
one finding the fact as stated, since the judgment has been formed 
according to the universal conditions of the determinant judgment under the 
laws of a possible experience generally. In the same way one who feels 
pleasure in simple reflection on the form of the object, without having any 
concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of everyone, although 
this judgment is empirical and a singular judgment. For the ground of this 
pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective 
judgments, namely the final harmony of an object (be it a product of nature 
or of art) with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition, (imagination 
and understanding,) which are requisite for every empirical cognition (CJ 
VII).  
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The conclusion derived from the example above is: 
The pleasure in judgments of taste is, therefore, dependent doubtless on an 
empirical representation, and cannot be united a priori to any concept (one 
cannot determine a priori what object will be in accordance with taste or 
not—one must find out the object that is so); but then it is only made the 
determining ground of this judgment by virtue of our consciousness of its 
resting simply upon reflection and the universal, though only subjective, 
conditions of the harmony of that reflection with the knowledge of objects 
generally, for which the form of the Object is final (CJ, VII). 
 
According to Kant, the judgment of taste is aesthetic due to the fact that in 
discerning what is beautiful or not we do not appeal to understanding or the 
representation of the Object but to the imagination, the Subject and the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure. According to Beatrice Longuenesse, (and apparently for 
Kukla who quotes her) this does not mean that judgment of taste is radical in the 
critical system. Longuenesse writes that judgment of taste is 
the culminating point of Copernican revolution that began with the first 
Critique. For the ground of the assertion of the predicate in the judgment of 
taste is intuited from of the object precisely insofar as it is synthesized by 
the subject, So in the object, what grounds the assertion of the predicate 
‘beautiful’ are just those features that depend on the synthesizing activity of 
the subject (qtd. in Kukla, 2006: 26). 
 
The theory of beautiful follows from the capacity of the faculty of taste to estimate 
aesthetically. In this “experience” of the estimation of the form of an object, the 
cognitive faculties, the imagination and the understanding celebrate the harmony of 
their temporary union on the form of the object. To put it another way, the harmony 
of the form of the object with the structure of our cognitive faculties is approved in 
the free play of the two faculties in question. It is the “intrinsic organization and 
orientation of human consciousness” that is revealed by this free play (Zammito, 
 73  
 
1992:  292).
28 
The harmony achieved by means of the form of the object results in a 
feeling of pleasure and as a result, the object is called beautiful.  
Kant gives the four crucial characteristics of the judgments of beautiful in 
four moments. They are respectively as follows: 
—“Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation 
by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest.29 The object of such a 
delight is called beautiful” (CJ 211: 50).  
— “The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally” 
(CJ 218). 
—“Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart 
from the representation of an end” (CJ 236)30. 
—“The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object 
of a necessary delight” (CJ 238). 
Other than the beautiful, the third Critique presents another kind of 
aesthetic judgment that is, the sublime. The Sublime appears first in comparison to 
the beautiful. It is defined as pleasing, too. It is not bounded by determinate but 
reflective judgments. Again as in the beautiful, in the sublime, the delight presented 
to the subject does not result from the immediate presentation of an object 
                                               
28 Posy insistently writes that “the harmony that Kant speaks…would be simply the natural 
cooperation between these faculties that occurs in ordinary perception: the understanding guiding 
the reproductive imagination in arranging the manifold and presupposing the productive 
imagination in expressing its rules” (1991: 38).
 
 
29  This feature is called disinterestedness and it has been the most influential among the other third 
characteristics of the judgment of the beautiful. It is cited by many scholars as much as the thinkers 
like Arendt and Lyotard. The notion has basically constructed the base for  the claim that the 
Kantian aesthetics can have a political import. 
 
30 In the third moment as to the concepts of end and finality Kant writes that “an end is the object of 
a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its 
possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its Object is finality (forma finalis). 
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(governed by the imagination) but from an “indeterminate reference” to some 
concepts. Yet, this time the reference is to the concepts of reason.  
Apart from the resemblances, the beautiful and the sublime differ in many 
aspects. First of all, the latter is all about the form of an object and it results from 
the harmony between the faculties of the presentation (imagination) and the pure 
concepts (understanding). Basically, the form of the object in question awakes the 
feeling of accord between the representation of the object and the very structure of 
the faculty of the understanding. In Kant’s language, the form of the object 
represents nature and the harmony between the two faculties of the mind designates 
that a form of nature is in accord with the structure of the understanding.  
In the case of the sublime, the form is not the issue, since in this case the 
representation of limitlessness is concerned. To put it another way, the beautiful is 
somehow limited, for it is concerned with the states of the faculties in relation to 
one another in the very act of mere representation of the form of the object. But in 
the sublime the relation of the faculties is issued without having recourse to the 
form of the object. Thus, in the case of the beautiful, the representation of an 
indeterminate concept of understanding arises while in the sublime that of reason 
does. Furthermore, the delight experienced escorts to a representation of Quality in 
the first and that of Quantity in the second.  
The most striking characteristic of the sublime is that even if it is triggered 
by an object of nature, it goes far beyond of the presentation of the object. Thus, 
Kant writes that for the sublime we must look for a ground “merely in ourselves 
and the attitude of the mind that introduces sublimity into the representation of 
nature” (CJ §23: 93). Therefore, the sublimity is something that can be discovered 
in the mind and the process is triggered by the object.  
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Recall that judgment is not a product of the third Critique solely. No doubt 
it is also vital for the first Critique, where it is responsible for knowledge claims. 
Thus, it always already exists as an element of cognition. However, when cognition 
is concerned, we are interested only in its cognitive or objective character. Yet, it 
can also be examined with respect to the mental state from which cognition arises.  
A similar case is valid for the faculties of the imagination and the 
understanding in judgment of taste. Kant writes that “one can also consider this 
relation of two faculties of cognition merely subjectively, insofar as one helps or 
hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the state of 
mind, and [is] therefore a relation which is sensitive (which is not the case in the 
separate use of any other faculty of cognition)” (CJ First Intro VIII)31. This is 
basically the sensation of the relation between the faculties (of the imagination and 
understanding) with regard to the mental state of subject within an act of cognition. 
However, put this way, it appears as if the aesthetic judgment is necessarily bound 
up with and follows from cognition. Yet, Kant also indicates that the reflective 
judgment corresponds to an independent feeling of harmony that is attained 
between the imagination and understanding in a mode prior to a conceptual 
employment. Thus, in this way, the reflective judgment emphasizes the relation of 
these two faculties with respect to the subject. 
 
3.2. The Kantian Theory of the Sublime 
The word sublime is derived from the Latin word sublimis (from sub: up to and 
limen: lintel) meaning look up to. In Oxford English Dictionary it is defined as “set 
                                               
31 All First Introduction references belong to the Critique of the Power of the Judgment translated by Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (2000, Cambridge University Press: New York). 
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or raised aloft, high up”. As a notion the sublime has its roots back to the 1st 
century. The word is known to be used firstly by Longinus,
32
 a teacher of rhetoric 
known to have written a treatise entitled On the Sublime in which he narrates the 
merits of good writing. As an adjective for a good writing it means delightful, 
inspiring and overwhelming.  
In the long history of the term (almost two thousand years), the 18
th
 century 
has been its golden age since both in Britain and Germany, theorists wrote on the 
subject recurrently. The reference of the concept of the sublime has changed by the 
18
th
 century. It has begun representing power or nature as a whole rather than the 
sense of power merely in the works of art. In debates, the focus of the aesthetics 
was “how we are formed as subjects and how as subjects we go about making 
sense of our experience” and these questions were taken to fall under the title of the 
experience of the sublime (Ashfield and De Bolla, 1996: 2). 
Kant’s thought on the sublime is influenced by some 18th century names 
such as Shaftesbury, Addison, Silvian, Pope, Dryden, Burke and Lord Kames 
(Coleman, 1974:121). However, Burke and Moses Mendelssohn are particularly 
significant names in relation to Kant’s use of the term. Burke was influential in 
British aesthetics and both senses of the sublime (nature as a whole and as 
emotional reaction) indicated above can be traced in Burke’s book A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (Kirwan, 
2005: vii). He writes: “ideas of the sublime and the beautiful stand on foundations 
so different, that it is hard … to think of reconciling them in the same subject, 
                                               
32 Because his first name is unknown, Longinus is sometimes referred as Pseudo-Longinus. Paul Crowther introduces these 
three texts as “arche-texts” on sublime, claiming that they are in commensurable in their treatment of the concept. See, 
Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism, 1996, Oxford University Press, USA, p.115. 
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without considerably lessening the effect of the one or the other upon the passions” 
(Burke, 1998:  103).  
As for German aesthetic theory in the same period, Mendelssohn publishes 
an article entitled “On the Sublime and Naïve in the Fine Sciences”, one year 
before releasing his detailed review of Burke’s work on the beautiful and sublime. 
By these two particular works, he is known to introduce the notion of the sublime 
to German literature. Yet, concerning the contemporary treatment of the concept, 
the three texts on the sublime are accepted to be written by Longinus, Burke and 
Kant.   
Kant’s theory of the sublime carries some elements from conventional view. 
According to John Zammito, Kant has already accepted the relation of the notions 
of unboundedness and infinity with the sublime after Longinus. Moreover, the 
psychological aspect of this experience is first postulated by Addison. Later, it is 
developed by Burke’s remark that it contains discomfort and gratification. This is 
accepted by Kant before he transfigures this theory and relates it to morality (1992: 
277). As for Kant’s contribution to the theory before his third Critique, we know 
that in 1764, he publishes Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the 
Sublime. The work is a short treatise. It deals with the sublime character of 
morality. Also the moral character of the beautiful and the sublime is emphasized. 
No doubt that it is a phase of transition with respect to Kant’s later work on the 
matter. Since the history of the notion of the sublime is vast and not directly 
relevant to the purposes of present study, for now it is sufficient just to note that 
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even long before Kant and especially among the 18
th
 century thinkers the sublime 
has already been a popular subject of discussion.
33
 
As for the rating of the notion in more recent times, Rudolf Makkreel in 
1984 writes that the concept of the sublime is neglected in the contemporary 
aesthetic studies, yet it was of great interest in the eighteenth century (1984: 304). 
However, in the following years, around 1990s, the notion of the sublime becomes 
a matter of discussion and research again by the raise of the post-structuralist 
current. Many aspects of the notion have been reanalyzed by prominent Kant 
scholars. In particular, the role of the imagination and the two modes of the 
sublime in their relation to the different faculties of the mind and the notion of a 
supersensible faculty introduced in the third Critique are focal points of 
interpretations.  
The theory of the sublime finds dissimilar interpretations among Kant 
scholars. This is most probably because of the indeterminate nature of reflective 
judgment that is open to interpretation more than any other Kantian notion. For 
similar reasons, the sublime in particular has been an object of interest. Its relation 
to morality and to the whole critical philosophy is analyzed by many scholars. 
There seem to be three poles in the interpretation of the sublime. Some scholars 
tend to read the sublime from a perspective closer to a moral point of view 
(Crowther, Crawford) and some approach the notion of the sublime from a more 
aesthetic point by seeing it as a judgment of taste like the beautiful (Kirwan, 
Matthews, Guyer, Makkreel). Some interpret it as having a potential for more than 
aesthetical realm (Lyotard). There are also several scholars who have invented new 
                                               
33 One of the early debates on the eighteenth century aesthetics concerned the development of the particular Kantian sublime. 
In 1960, Samuel Holt Monk wrote that the British debate on the sublime has paved the way for the Kantian “autonomy of the 
subject”.  For more on the debate and contributors see, The sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic 
Theory by Andrew Ashfield and Peter De Bolla. 
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notions out of the theory of the sublime, such as “moral sublime” (Clewis), “noble 
sublime” (Myskja), and a new sublime in relation to mental states (Allison, 
Clewis). In addition to its return to the discussions of the Kantian aesthetics, the 
sublime has broad repercussions in literary theory. Although what is claimed in 
discussions of the notion in literary criticism have little do to with what Kant has 
intended, the sublime has been popular for some time.  
Other than its aesthetic character, particularly after the Second World War, 
the theory of the Kantian sublime has been visited by political intentions. The 
images of war as they are represented by the media have started a discussion 
generally entitled the aesthetization of politics.  
This study contends that a theoretical discussion of the sublime can uncover 
an alternative layer for the possible political character of the Kantian aesthetics. 
The query on the elements of the sublime must be theoretical which means to say 
that in order to investigate the potential of the sublime we must apply to the first 
Critique. It is mainly because of the fact that for Kant it seems that the aesthetic is 
just the subjective side of human experience. This means that in the aesthetic what 
changes are not the structures of the faculties but just the relation between them. 
However, a close analysis of the sublime suggests the possibility of a change in 
regimes of some faculties such as the imagination. In order to expose this state, it is 
best for our purposes to unstitch the net that constitutes the theory of the sublime in 
order to knit it again in a reconstructive mode.  
To accomplish this aim, the first Critique will be visited in order to 
elaborate the elements of the sublime in comparison to their appearance in the first 
Critique. A return to the first Critique seems inevitable since Kant himself uses 
terms from this critique when he describes the mathematically sublime. Therefore, 
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there seems to be no better way to visit the first Critique from time to time, since -
not surprisingly -the object in the sublime “experience” is subject to the 
determinant or a priori conditions of the first Critique even though the sublime is 
not a determinant judgment.  
The judgment of the sublime is controversial when it is evaluated in terms 
of the theoretical reason. The value of it as an ordinary experience seems to compel 
Kant’s metaphysics. In an aesthetic mode it exposes a unique relation between the 
faculties of thinking imagination and reason. Following this path would pave the 
way for the present study to claim a contemporary return of the sublime in a more 
complex fashion in which politics can be addressed.  
In the last chapter, the contemporary return of the sublime in relation to 
international politics will be elaborated. Yet, it must be noticed that the 
appropriation of the sublime by political sociologists as well as philosophers is 
mainly driven by the fact that the sublime is an unusual or extraordinary encounter 
with nature in Kant’s philosophy. This means that the sublime is already 
problematic and almost enigmatic for the Kantian thought. Therefore, in the present 
study the sublime will firstly be examined in terms of its value and place in the 
whole Kantian system. Since, considering the epistemological and metaphysical 
repercussions of this experience are significant to understand the contemporary 
sublime and its relation to political thinking in a cosmopolitan way. 
In the following sections, first, the two modes of the sublime will be 
elaborated in terms of aesthetic estimation they suggest. Aesthetic estimation in the 
third Critique will be compared to mathematical estimation in the first Critique. 
Since the sublime is also an experience of subject, by taking recourse to some 
notions of the first Critique such as magnitude, intuition and apprehension, the 
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aesthetic estimation and the experience that the sublime suggests will tried to be 
evaluated.  
Secondly, the faculty of the imagination will be elaborated in detail. In 
order to expose the alterations in Kant’s employment of the faculty, the functions 
of the faculty in the first Critique and the later appearance of the faculty in the third 
Critique will be examined. This rather long section tries to reveal the significance 
of the imagination in aesthetic estimation as a faculty that can and thus, its potential 
for a political mode of thinking that might be grounded on the Kantian aesthetics. 
Lastly, the controversial relation between the morality and the sublime will 
be taken up. Although the present study does not necessarily reads the sublime in 
relation to the Kantian morals, the connection of the sublime to moral self is 
significant for comprehending the contemporary relation of the Kantian 
cosmopolitanism and the sublime detected upon the social disasters of this century.  
 
3.2. 1. The Mathematically Sublime (das Mathematisch-Erhabene) 
The delight in the sublime has four modes. It is universal in its Quantity; it is 
independent of any interest in its Quality; it is subjectively final in its Relation; and 
it is necessary in its Modality. All four modes apply to each kind of the sublime.
34
 
Different from the state of the mind, that is in restful contemplation in the 
beautiful, the sublime implies a mental movement (CJ §24). This mental movement 
is the movement of the imagination and it is either towards the critical reason 
                                               
34 Allan Lazaroff in his “The Kantian Sublime: Aesthetic Judgment and Religious Feeling” contends 
that there are two different kinds of sublime. Furthermore, he claims that they are distinct in their 
structural elements. Mathematically sublime carry the relations of quality and quantity and 
dynamically sublime those of relation and modality. 
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(faculty of cognition) or the practical reason (desire). The former corresponds to 
the mathematically sublime, and the latter to the dynamically sublime.
35 
 
In the third Critique, the section that deals with the mathematically sublime 
is opened with the definition of the sublime. Absolutely great is the phrase Kant 
uses to define it. Then, he continues: “that is sublime in comparison to which all 
else is small” (CJ § 25).  Following this definition, Kant distinguishes the state of 
being great from the state of being a magnitude as well as differentiating being 
great from being absolutely great. The latter equals to a non comparative magnum 
which indicates something that is “great beyond all comparison”.  
The act of defining something as absolutely great is not grounded upon the 
understanding because this requires a concept of such an object that can be 
compared to the object that is absolutely great. Even if we do not seem to easily 
decide whether it connotes a pure concept of understanding, an intuition or a 
concept of reason, according to Kant, we must be sure that assertions of being 
great, small or absolute are necessarily concepts of the judgment and “must 
introduce as basis of the judgment a subjective finality of the representation with 
reference to the power of judgment” (CJ §25). Therefore, absolutely great is 
necessarily an issue for judgment and an object for the aesthetic estimation. Still, 
there is no doubt that in the foundation of it resides the notion of magnitude. 
Therefore, to make an elaborate analysis of the mathematically sublime let us 
summarize the notion of magnitude and the mathematical (logical) estimation and 
the aesthetic estimation respectively. 
                                               
35 Allison claims that if the sublime is founded in the predisposition of the moral feeling, then not 
only the dynamically sublime but also the mathematically sublime should be underlined by the 
moral feeling. See, Allison, 2001, p. 335. 
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The notion of magnitude (quantum) appears in the discussion of the 
application of the pure concepts of the understanding to possible objects of 
experience. Kant writes in the first Critique that the synthesis of pure concepts of 
the understanding can be applied either in a mathematical or a dynamical 
employment. With respect to these employments, there are four principles of pure 
understanding. They are; axioms of intuition and anticipations of perception which 
are subsumed under the mathematical employment and; the analogies of experience 
and postulate of empirical thought in general which are registered under the 
dynamical employment.36 For the sake of simplicity, in this section only the 
mathematical employment and its two principles will be analyzed. 
The mathematical employment of the synthesis of the pure concepts of 
understanding is concerned with intuition. The principles of mathematical use of 
the concepts of pure understanding are unconditionally necessary because they 
indicate the a priori conditions of intuition which are in the end the necessary 
conditions of experience in general (CPR A160 B200). Thereby they suggest 
intuitive kind of certainty. 
The first principle, the axioms of intuition suggests that “all appearances 
are, in their intuition, extensive magnitudes” or in other words, “all intuitions are 
extensive magnitudes” (CPR A162 B202). Magnitude (quantum) refers to the 
consciousness of the synthetic unity of a manifold in intuition. A magnitude is 
entitled extensive when the representation of the parts enables that of a whole with 
respect to the intuitions of an object of experience. Concerning an extensive 
                                               
36 For the application of the mathematical and dynamical principles to aesthetic judgments there are 
many different views. For instance, Lewis Beck claims that “aesthetic judgments do not employ the 
dynamical categories and principles of substance, causality and existence…But the mathematical 
categories and principles certainly do apply…The concepts which Kant holds do not play a role in 
the construction of (pure) aesthetic experience are not categorical concepts but empirical” (1978: 
45).  
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magnitude, the mind can proceed from parts to whole by successively advancing 
from one part to another in time. In the successive progress from parts to whole, the 
mind treats these appearances as aggregates thus, the apprehension proceeds in a 
cumulative manner in which each part is necessarily linked to the previous one. In 
this regard, mathematical synthesis in its relation to extensive character of a 
magnitude is a composition (compositio) consisting of homogenous units.  
The second part of the principles regarding pure understanding is grouped 
under the title of anticipations
37
 of perception.
38
 These principles offer that “in all 
appearances sensation, and the real which correspond to it in the object (realitas 
phenomenon), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree” (CPR A166 B208). In 
the Proof of the argument, Kant writes that as the objects of our perception, 
appearances are different from space and time (i.e., pure forms of intuition) 
because in addition to intuition, they contain “the real of sensation as merely 
subjective representation, which gives us only the consciousness that the subject is 
affected, and which we relate to an object in general” (CPR A166 B207). Kant 
suggests that sensation is not something represented in itself. Moreover, its 
magnitude is not extensive but intensive. In the act of apprehension, the magnitude 
of a sensation can be the object of empirical consciousness in a particular time. 
When this happens, the magnitude of a sensation, which equals to zero before it is 
presented in consciousness, increases to a given magnitude. This potential feature 
of sensation is entitled intensive magnitude which is a “degree of influence on the 
sense [i.e. on the special sense involved], must be ascribed to all objects of 
perception, in so far as the perception contains sensation” (CPR A166 B208). To 
                                               
37 Kant writes: “all knowledge by means of which I am enabled to know and determine a priori what 
belongs to empirical knowledge may be entitled an anticipation” (CPR A166
 
B208). 
 
38 “Perception is empirical consciousness, that is, a consciousness in which sensation is to be found” 
(CPR A166
 
B207).
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put it another way, all appearances as far as their sensation (i.e. their reality) is 
concerned, has intensive magnitude that refers to a degree of reality.  As for the 
proper definition of an intensive magnitude, Kant writes that a “magnitude which is 
apprehended only as a unity, and in which multiplicity can be represented only 
through approximation to negation = 0” is an intensive kind of magnitude (CPR 
A168 B210). 
Following the two principles above, Kant concludes that all appearances are 
continuous magnitudes in themselves with their extensive magnitudes (with regard 
to their intuition) and intensive magnitudes (with regard to sensation and so their 
reality).  
The extensive quality of a magnitude presupposes a specific number of 
homogenous units. In the case of estimating the magnitude of an object of intuition, 
there are two basic elements that we employ: multiplicity (number) of units and the 
magnitude of the unit (the measure). The exact result of how great something is can 
only be achieved by logical or mathematical estimation (estimation of magnitude 
with recourse to the concepts of number). For the process, the estimation of the 
magnitude of a unit which is used as the measure is a necessary first step. The very 
act of defining a unit as a measure is tricky because it would mean infinite regress 
if we consider that for each unit we must find a smaller unit to be its measure, thus, 
we can never pass to the estimation of the object that we desire in the first place. 
Therefore, we need to apply comparison, and thus, judgment in each intuition to 
find the fundamental unit, since the magnitude of a unit or the measure is not some 
constant from which we can build up an absolute concept of magnitude. 
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Comparison is performed by an aesthetic kind of estimation which relies on an 
immediate grasp and comparison of some magnitudes familiar to subject.
39
   
The assignment of finding a measure for the estimation of the magnitude of 
an object is not an essential act merely in an aesthetic estimation. All mathematical 
(numerical) or logical estimation is also grounded on aesthetic estimation because 
of this fact. In the very act of logical or mathematical estimation, the needed 
estimation of the fundamental unit must, therefore, lies in the immediate grasp of it 
in intuition, and the use our imagination can put it in presenting the numerical 
concepts: i.e. all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is in the last resort 
aesthetic (i.e. subjectively and not objectively determined) (CJ §26).  
Mathematical estimation, after finding a measure or a base unit, can be 
limitless since it works with numbers and obviously numbers can go infinite. 
However, aesthetic estimation cannot progress infinitely because it is grounded on 
judgment. In aesthetic estimation, the measure is found by a comparison between 
units formerly known to subject. This very feature of aesthetic estimation is what 
causes the feeling of the sublime in the first place.  
Aesthetic estimation is defined as the estimation of a magnitude in mere 
intuition which is performed by eye. Thus, it surely has a limit and  
where it is considered as an absolute measure beyond which no greater is 
possible subjectively…, it then conveys the idea of the sublime, calls forth 
that emotion which no mathematical estimation of magnitudes by numbers 
can evoke (unless in so far as the fundamental aesthetic measure is kept 
vividly present to the imagination): because the latter presents only the 
relative magnitude due to the comparison with others of a like kind, 
whereas the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can 
grasp it in an intuition (CJ §26).    
                                               
39 In the case of an intuition where we are to decide something is great, basically the comparison of 
the possible measures known to subject are at work. Following this, the peculiar feature of the 
judgments upon the greatness of a subject is that the very act of comparison claims for the 
universality of the judgment concerning merely the aesthetic estimation of the greatness.  
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To sum up, in the very act of estimating the magnitude of any object, the 
faculty of the imagination goes through two phases namely, apprehension 
(Auffassung, apprehensio) and comprehension (Zusammenfassung, comprehensio 
aesthetica). In the former phase, in order to estimate the magnitude of the object 
the imagination decides a quantum (a fundamental unit) to use as a measure. The 
first base (apprehension) is of an aesthetic kind and it indicates a mere intuition by 
the eye. Later, in the second, the (cumulative) estimation(s) of the magnitude in 
question are gathered to access the final decision on the estimation of the 
magnitude of the object. Generally, mathematical (or numerical) estimation is 
achieved in this manner. However, with the mathematical sublime which is 
concerned with the size of (a piece of) nature, we see that apprehension goes to 
infinity in giving the consecutive intuitions on the magnitude of the object. Yet, the 
comprehension of these continuously registered intuitions cannot be aggregated 
into a single intuition. In the helpless state of the imagination, reason still requires 
totality in the case of the presentation of infinite as it does for all other 
representations. Lyotard writes that the trouble of the imagination is not because 
the mathematical composition fails but because the outcome of the composition 
appears unpresentable for the imagination. “The mathematical synthesis creates a 
problem, not in itself once again, but because it is supposed to be doubled by an 
“aesthetic” synthesis: the presentation of the infinite” (AS 92-3). 
This demand for the presentation of the infinite or even to think it, Kant 
writes that some faculty which necessarily “transcending every standard of sense” 
is required (CJ §26). This faculty must be a supersensible faculty in that it allows 
the mind to think the “given infinite without contradiction” by passing beyond the 
narrow limitations of human sensibility. Put otherwise, the presentation of a given 
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infinite is not possible but by the mediation of a feeling of a supersensible faculty it 
can at least be thought.  
In the following lines, Malcolm Budd’s remarks on the representation of a 
given infinite in Kant’s aesthetics will be taken up in order to reflect more on the 
mathematically sublime. 
Budd recalls the definition of space in the first Critique where Kant writes: 
“space is represented as an infinite given magnitude” and also it can be thought as 
“containing an infinite number of representations within itself” (CPR B40). Budd’s 
point is successful in exposing that in Kant’s system we can speak of the 
representation of a given infinite contrary to what he suggests in the case of the 
mathematically sublime. Yet, we should also remember that the representation of 
space as a given infinite or its being thought as containing infinite number of 
representations is possible due to its being represented as an a priori intuition, not 
as a concept or a representation. Thus, in the case of the mathematically sublime, 
Kant seems to suggest us that other than representing the object which claims 
infinity in its size as an a priori intuition, we do not have a chance to represent the 
infinite size of it in one single intuition. The reverse would be similar to 
representing an object entailing infinite number of intuitions within itself —which 
is impossible and contradictory in Kant’s understanding. Now, Budd seems to be 
aware of this fact but he still asks his question which actually has quite a point:  
Given that I am concerned to form an aesthetic estimate of the magnitude of 
an object that confronts me, why should its immense size impose upon me 
the requirement to attempt to estimate aesthetically, not its own magnitude, 
but an infinite magnitude, a task that requires an impossible aesthetic unit of 
measure and so violates the imagination? (2003: 128). 
 
This point seems crucial but it is not elaborated by Kant in length. We just 
know that Kant warns us that any object of nature cannot be called the sublime but, 
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“instead of the object, it is rather the cast of the mind in appreciating it that we have 
to estimate as sublime” (CJ §26). Budd is quite right in his point but it should not 
be forgotten that from the side of mathematical synthesis, the immense size of the 
object is not impossible to estimate. On the contrary, a mathematical synthesis can 
go to infinity since it operates with numbers. That is, if we are dealing with the 
exact estimation of the object, it is not a problem at all. However, what Kant writes 
is that the mathematical composition obtained by the successive addition of the 
units reaches very great magnitudes. In this state, the subject both fails to find a 
fundamental aesthetic unit which is normally found by comparison of the possible 
measures known to the subject and to represent this continuously growing 
composition in one single intuition.
40
 In the face of this difficulty, it is the 
sensation
41
 felt by the subject paves the way for the idea of the infinity. Therefore, 
it is not the estimation of a magnitude but the sensation that evokes in subject is the 
cause of this need for the estimation of an infinite.  
The fact that the sublime cannot be attributed to the object necessitates 
calling it a feeling. Kant clearly states that neither the form nor the greatness of the 
object is in question in the sublime. As to what happens, Kant writes that our 
faculty of representation is compelled to transcend its own limit during its attempt 
to represent the object that is absolutely great. This struggle or mental movement is 
present because the imagination must progress ad infinitum in accordance with the 
wish of reason that always seeks for the absolute totality. Kant writes: 
                                               
40 Lyotard contends that the meaning of the word “measure” is different in aesthetic estimation from 
mathematical estimation. In the former, for imagination it designates the maximum magnitude 
presentable at once. In the latter for understanding there is no maximum numerical magnitude. 
Understanding can process through very large numerical magnitudes (AS 102). 
 
41 Lyotard indicates that the concept of sensation is changed through the third critique and it no 
longer carries an empirical content about an object. It indicates the state of the subject in the 
occasion of the object (AS 9).
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Precisely because there is a striving in our imagination towards progress ad 
infinitum, while reason demands absolute totality, as a real idea, that same 
inability on the part of our faculty for the estimation of the magnitude of 
things of the world of sense to attain the idea, is the awakening of a feeling 
of a supersensible faculty within us; and it is the use to which judgment 
naturally puts particular objects on behalf of this latter feeling, and not the 
object of sense, that is absolutely great, and every other contrasted 
employment small. Consequently, it is the disposition of the soul evoked by 
a particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective judgment, 
and not the Object, that is to be called sublime (CJ §25).   
 
The feeling of the sublime is a feeling of pain in respect of the inadequacy 
of the imagination. On the other hand, it is a feeling of pleasure as to its implication 
that in comparison to the ideas of reason everything is insignificant. According to 
Kant, 
the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense to serve 
for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with 
reason’s laws, and a displeasure that makes us alive to the feeling of the 
supersensible side of our being, according to which it is final, and 
consequently a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility falling short of 
the ideas of reason (CJ §27).  
 
As for the relation of the imagination to reason pointed out above, it is 
obvious that the failure of the imagination and the discomfort comes with it must 
not be a surprise. Moreover, it is final for the imagination to fail. Ideas that are 
present for reason cannot be represented by a faculty with a finite limit. Therefore, 
the sublime experience does not annihilate mental capacities of subject or does not 
mean that the critical system has derailed. Since reason is aware of the limit of the 
imagination and still requires it to represent the Ideas (in this case the absolute 
whole), we should think that the sublime does not signify a destructive force or 
moment for subject but on the contrary, it paves the way for realizing the 
omnipotence of reason and its Ideas. In this sense, the mathematically sublime can 
be seen as final for theoretical reason and the dynamically sublime, as we will soon 
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suggest, is purposive for the practical reason.
42 
This claim briefly grounds on the 
fact that the former is concerned with the size and thus concerns theoretical 
thinking and the latter with the might of nature and the faculty of desire with 
recourse to the notion of free causality. 
 
3.2. 2. The Dynamically Sublime (das Dynamisch-Erhabenen der Natur) 
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunder-clouds piled up the 
vault of heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all their violence 
of destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in their track, the boundless ocean 
rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, 
make our power of resistance of trifling moment in comparison with their might 
(CJ §28). 
  
According to Kant, nature when experienced as described above triggers the feeling 
of the sublime. As obvious, this time it is not the size but the might of the nature 
leads us into this feeling. Nature is represented in such a manner that it appears as a 
source of fear. It is this representation of nature that Kant calls dynamically 
sublime.  In Kant’s words “nature considered in an aesthetic judgment as might 
that has no dominion over us, is dynamically sublime” (CJ §28).  
The difficulty confronted in the aesthetic estimation of the extensive 
magnitude of an object regarded as the mathematically sublime is that of finding a 
measure for the estimation of the size which is judged as absolutely great. In the 
case of the dynamically sublime, the formless object is judged as the absolutely 
strong. Moreover, this time it is not the absolute whole but the absolute causality is 
implied by Idea of infinity.  
                                               
42 Generally this view is accepted by most scholars. Yet, Patricia M. Matthews in her article entitled 
“Kant’s Sublime: A Form of Pure Aesthetic Reflective Judgment” asserts that both modes of the 
sublime are purposive for the practical reason (1996: 168). Paul Crowther also suggests that 
mathematically sublime is purposive for the practical reason as dynamically sublime, see his 
Kantian Sublime, p. 119. 
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The fact of the dynamically sublime is that “in the immeasurableness of 
nature and the incompetence of our faculty for adopting a standard proportionate to 
the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its realm, we found our own 
limitation” (CJ §28).  
The crucial point of this experience is that the subject has a sensation of the 
“beyond” of cognitive limits. In this peculiar circumstance, there exist two kinds of 
absolute: the absolute limit of aesthetic comprehension and the absolute that is 
required to be represented. For the sake of the unity of the subject, these two have 
to be synthesized. Yet, it is obvious that the imagination is incompetent to do so 
and more importantly these two absolutes cannot be reduced to one another. 
Lyotard warns us that if we are to understand the alleviation of this potentially 
destructive moment in the form of a dialectical frame, we are doomed to a kind of 
transcendental illusion in the Kantian sense. It is because the solution necessitates a 
dynamical synthesis. This kind of synthesis suggests discursive certainty pertaining 
to the objects of experience. The dynamical employment of the synthesis is 
concerned with existence, that is, it deals with existence of possible objects of 
empirical intuition which are accidental by nature. The necessity of it is occasional 
and thus, it can be employed mediately and indirectly (CPR A160 B199/200). It 
entails the principles of the analogies of experience and postulate of empirical 
thought in general which allow discursive certainty. 
In this fashion, dynamical synthesis implies a nexus that is imposed on 
phenomena in order for relating the phenomena into a systematic whole. Different 
from mathematical synthesis which is concerned with the homogenous units of an 
object of experience, dynamical synthesis temporarily unites two phenomena that 
are not necessarily exist or appear together.  
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Back to the discussion of the dynamically sublime, Lyotard suggests us a 
reading of this experience as a dynamical synthesis of the two absolutes that are 
absolutely heterogeneous. The reason why he rejects a possibility of a dialectical 
solution for the difficulty in this specific sublime mode is that such kind of a 
presupposition culminates in the relativization of the absolutes and in a 
transcendental illusion in the end. Instead, he suggests that the heterogeneous 
absolutes that cannot be reduced to one another can be synthesized by a dynamical 
synthesis without annihilating the Kantian schema (AS 130-1).
43
 
The fear and exaltation felt in the dynamically sublime are also signs of this 
two heterogeneous absolutes and their synthesis respectively. The fear in the 
moment of confronting the Idea of absolute causality that is present in reason and 
that is required to be represented by the imagination on the demand of reason is 
coupled with a feeling of adoration in the subject when it is realized that it is no 
business of faculties of human mind to represent the unintelligible cause of 
phenomena, i.e. the absolute first cause.
44  
 
Nature as a “power which is superior to great hindrances” (CJ §28) 
becomes an object of attraction when we realize that we are secure that is, when it 
is felt that this might of nature has no dominion over us. We confront our own 
limitation and a pre-eminence over nature even it seems immeasurable. Thus, 
nature is called sublime because it “raises the imagination to a presentation of those 
cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the 
                                               
43 This remark is valuable in that the notion of a dynamical synthesis might aid to rescue Kant from 
the accusation of suggesting new authority to imagination that are never existent in the first critique. 
See chapter five in AS for Lyotard’s argument in which he refuses a dialectical approach in the 
solution of the crisis in the dynamically sublime deserves attention.  
 
44 It is important to keep in mind that for Kant absolute bears no relation to anything than itself.  In 
this sense it is categorical. It is in this sense that the absolute limit of imagination and the absolute 
first cause cannot be relativized, fused or related.
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sphere of its own being, even above the nature” (CJ §28). Then, what the object of 
nature that evoke the sublime feeling does is to “raise the forces of the soul above 
the height of vulgar common place, and discover within us a power of resistance of 
quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves against 
the seeming omnipotence of nature” (CJ §28).  
It is not appropriate to treat the two modes of sublime as excluding each 
other even if they differ in many respects. Whether from the perspective of 
theoretical reason or that of practical reason, the result of the sublime feeling is the 
appreciation of the superiority and omnipotence of reason and its Ideas. 
Furthermore, if we recall that sublime is considered as final for reason, it is seems 
quite right to ask that why do we bother to look for some other implications than 
witnessing the power of reason. The point is that without the purposive character, 
the sublime would refer to the annihilation of the human mind, since the 
imagination fails and subject feels pain and displeasure. Yet, in the end, subject 
overwhelms the difficulty without a change in the capacities of mind. In this 
process, it is the how that matters for the whole critical thought. In each mode of 
the sublime, the failure of the imagination to represent the absolute and its 
confrontation of its own absolute limit imply two valuable results for the whole 
critical system. The first one is that the failure of the faculty of representation can 
be read as the sign of its existence. In other words, when something cannot be 
represented and this causes displeasure or pain for subject, it means that before this 
moment subject has a faculty of representation that works well. Since Kant is 
usually accused of pre-determining or presupposing the transcendental faculties of 
the mind before experience and thus, failing to escape from the trap of the question 
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of ontological existence, the failure of the imagination can be read to imply an 
indirect evidence for the existence of this faculty.  
The second result is that as mentioned above, in each mode of the sublime 
there exist two different absolutes which, in the end, are synthesized for the sake of 
the security of the subject. In the mathematically sublime, the absolute measure of 
the imagination and the absolute whole that the representation of which is required 
by reason from the imagination; and in the dynamically sublime, the absolute limit 
of the imagination and absolute causality are synthesized. Lyotard suggests that it 
is a dynamical synthesis in which two heterogeneous objects can be related with 
recourse to a nexus that is imposed upon them. In reflective judgment which is 
liberated from determinant or objective structure, subject finds a possibility to think 
reflexively. In other words, in the judgment of sublime subject does not represent 
or think objectively but feels and thus judges lawlessly. Since the object of thinking 
is the absolute which bears no relation to anything other than itself, the subject 
cannot think but feel.  
 
3.2. 3. On the Role of the Imagination 
John Zammito in his extensive work on Kant’s third Critique, The Genesis of 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, rightly puts that the place of third Critique within the 
whole critical philosophy requires an examination of its innovations in relation to 
the first Critique and the limits that is defined as constraints of reasoning. It is true, 
as Mary Gregor (1985)
45
 once has written that the third Critique evokes a feeling as 
if Kant had never read the first Critique. It is just this feeling that makes one 
wonder whether the innovations, as Zammito puts, suggested by the third Critique 
                                               
45 See Gregor’s “Aesthetic Form and Sensory Content in the Critique of Judgement” in The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant , 
ed. Richard Kennigton, pp.185-99. 
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are contradictory or developmental (1992: 45). Keeping this question in mind, in 
this chapter of the present study, the elements of the Kantian sublime will be 
focused since the thesis claims that the answer does not exclusively contain one or 
the other but it necessitates a possibility that keeps both at the same time. To put it 
otherwise, the negative answer would be the annihilation of critical frame whereas 
the positive answer would be ungrounded with respect to what Kant writes in the 
third Critique. However, it is the violation and affirmation that immediately 
follows it, are what constitutes the power of the sublime for this study.  
In order to substantiate this claim, the notion of imagination will be 
analyzed. In the first part, the faculty of the imagination will be traced back through 
the first and third critiques. In the light of these observations, by comparing the 
roles that are given to this faculty in each critique the potential of the sublime 
through this faculty will be uncovered.  
Imagination as a faculty or a simple function of the mind has been a great 
deal of discussion long before Kant. In particular in the eighteenth century, similar 
to the notion of the sublime, many words have been written in the aim of 
assessment of this faculty. Kant’s treating of the imagination has also been 
discussed by many scholars. It seems that for the significance and the exact role of 
the faculty it is hard to reach a determined consensus.  
It is not wrong to think that the popularity of the faculty in Kant’s wake has 
accelerated ever since its unique disposal in the third Critique. Many scholars 
elaborated its place both in cognition and aesthetics due to its new appearance in 
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the third Critique since, in this last critique it is almost an equal of understanding or 
reason.
46
  
In this section, the pre-conceptual or rather non-conceptual realm addressed 
by the aesthetic experience of beautiful and the sublime is analyzed by tracking the 
two different states of the imagination corresponding to judgments of taste. It is 
also believed that the relation of the imagination with the other faculties namely, 
understanding and reason might enlighten the task of judgment as a mediator 
between the theoretical and practical aspects of human mind.  
Regarding both the A-edition of transcendental deduction in the first 
Critique and also its role in the third Critique, some thinkers claim that the 
imagination should be accepted as a faculty. For instance, Martin Heidegger 
defines the imagination as a “common root” between the sensibility and the 
understanding. Rudolf Makkreel, following his analysis of synthesis through 
critical philosophy, states that the imagination of the third Critique should be 
treated separately from that of the first Critique. Sarah Gibbons writes that 
“(i)magination, in its connection with understanding and reason, is a 
characteristically human capacity, and therefore a clarification of its functions and 
of reason’s dependence on it allows us to characterize a distinctively human kind of 
knowing” (1994: 2). Lastly, Jane Kneller suggests that the creative power of the 
imagination can be used to realize the highest good that morality requires. 
Although there are several other scholars engaged in the discussions on the 
                                               
46 See especially Makkreel’s Imagination and Interpretation, Peter Strawson’s “Imagination and Perception” in Ralph C. S. 
Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); J. Michael Young, “Kant’s View of 
Imagination”, Kant-Studien, 79 (1988). Also see Carl J. Posy’s “Imagination and Judgment in the Critical Philosophy” in 
Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Ralf Meerbote (1991) in which he claims that the imagination of CPR in its objective, “earthbound 
regulated” sense applies also to Kant’s aesthetics as well as his ethics (in Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Ralf Meerbote).  
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imagination and its role, these names will suffice for the sake of simplicity of the 
present argument.  
The following section will turn to the first Critique in order to remind the 
mission of the mentioned faculty in cognition. After that, the third Critique will be 
visited in order to look closer to the position of the faculty in aesthetic realm. 
Beneath the comparison of different appearances of this faculty lay the aim to 
compare cognitive experience and aesthetic “experience”. The section that deals 
with the third Critique consists of two sections. In the first section, the role of the 
imagination regarding to arts will be visited and then, the state of the imagination 
in the judgments of the sublime will be taken up. In this section, Rudolf Makkreel’s 
and Lyotard’s analysis of the imagination will be considered in order to denote the 
differences as well as the parallel points of a transcendental and poststructuralist 
approach. This is because within this brief comparison the present study shall 
contend that declaring the sublime as an elevation above the sensible limit 
following imagination’s failure is a misinterpretation which culminates in 
overlooking the potential of aesthetic reflective thinking. From this ground the 
ground to discuss the anti-humanist aspect of the sublime can be found.  
   
3.2.3.1. The Imagination in the first Critique 
The notion of imagination as a faculty or a simple function of the mind has been a 
great deal of discussion in the Kantian scholarship. Although in The Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781) Kant never dedicates a separate section to the imagination, the 
section entitled The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding47 is accepted 
to entail much of his view of the imagination. Kant revised this A-edition of 
                                               
47 Hereafter Deduction. 
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Deduction in the second edition of the Critique in 1787 and, in the late, i.e. B-
edition of Deduction, omitted almost the entire earlier edition. 
Before focusing its preliminary functions, it is useful to remember that Kant 
defines it as one of the “three original sources of the soul”. As the others are sense 
and apperception, together with imagination these three sources entail the 
conditions of all possible experience.  
Roughly put, the first faculty is sense that is responsible from receiving 
stimuli in the form of raw material. Apperception involves the consciousness of the 
received and processed intuitions in a subject. Imagination, regarding its function, 
stands between the two and has a central role in cognition. Furthermore, as sense 
and apperception, it cannot be derived from any other faculty of the mind and it has 
both an empirical and transcendental employment. It is responsible for the 
synthesis of the manifold, a priori synopsis of which is the function of sense (CPR 
B127). In the following lines, we will recall its position in the Kantian 
understanding of cognition.  
Now, we see that in the A and B editions of the Deduction, Kant takes up 
the function of the imagination in the process of fabricating knowledge. First of all, 
the very process of producing knowledge is led by the synthesis which is the staple 
of cognition. Kant writes, “by synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the 
act of putting different representations together, and of grasping (begreifen) what is 
manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (CPR A77 B103). This act of 
synthesis of a manifold that can be empirical or a priori is the first level of human 
knowledge and it is a result of the faculty of the imagination, “a blind but 
indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge 
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious” (CPR A78 B103). 
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According to Kant, representations would mean nothing to each other in the 
absence of a synthesis that the imagination enables. The synthesis is the essential 
operation appealing to the representations of both empirical and a priori. It is “the 
act of putting different representations together, and of grasping (begreifen) what is 
manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (CPR A77 B103). Synthesis is the 
staple of cognition and it is a result of the faculty of the imagination, which is, 
according to Kant, “a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which 
we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever 
conscious” (CPR A78 B103). It compares and connects the representations given 
by sense in the form of a synopsis. The synthesis is achieved in three different 
forms. They are respectively, the apprehension of representations as modifications 
of the mind in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in 
a concept (CPR A97). 
 The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition entails the synthesis of a 
manifold of intuitions into a single representation. To put it another way, it is the 
synthesis of apprehension that represents a manifold as a manifold. In Kant’s own 
words: 
Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a 
manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of 
one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is 
contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In 
order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in 
the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. 
This act I name the synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed 
immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a 
manifold which can never be presented as a manifold, and as contained in a 
single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis (CPR A99). 
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Hence, the synthesis in apprehension serves as the first ordering of the 
manifold of intuitions. It does not entail any connection or necessity. In 
apprehension, empirical intuition is just placed together.  
The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination is the ability of recalling past 
representations in imagination. The various representations of an object are 
connected in a synthetic unity in such a way that the representation can be 
reproduced or made vivid again in the imagination. Indeed, the reproducibility of 
appearances is a requisite for the experience to have a sense. Otherwise no 
experience would be possible. Kant writes: 
When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon 
to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, 
obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be 
apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to 
drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, 
the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order 
represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that 
follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the 
above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary 
representations of space and time, could arise (CPR A102). 
   
Following the paragraph, Kant writes that the two kinds of synthesis, 
namely that of apprehension and reproduction are dependent on each other. Since 
the synthesis of apprehension constitutes the transcendental ground of the 
possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever—of those that are pure a priori 
no less than of those that are empirical—the reproductive synthesis of the 
imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall 
therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination (CPR A 102).  
The reproduction of the past intuitions has no root in empirical realm. By 
this means, reproduction appears as an a priori act which by being a priori implies 
immediately a transcendental character regarding Kant’s understanding. Hence, its 
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transcendental employment is a necessity in the construction of a concept which 
can be defined as a representation related to the understanding. 
The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept implies the unity of synthesis 
that enables us to think concepts. The representations regarding the object are 
subsumed under a concept and only by this means we can think of an object and 
have knowledge of it. Different representations of the object are identified as 
belonging to the same object by this very unity of synthesis. The act of counting is 
given as a proper example: While counting we add a unit to another successively 
and without this unity of synthesis we would not be able to proceed. The concept of 
the number is built upon the “consciousness of this unity of the synthesis”.  As for 
the notion of “concept” Kant also writes that 
All knowledge demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed, be quite 
imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something 
universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for instance, as the 
unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our 
knowledge of outer appearances. But it can be a rule for intuitions only in so 
far as it represents in any given appearances the necessary reproduction of 
their manifold, and thereby the synthetic unity in our consciousness of them. 
The concept of body, in the perception of something outside us, necessitates 
the representation of extension, and therewith representations of 
impenetrability, shape, etc (CPR A106). 
 
The notion of the concept as the most convenient means of our knowledge 
necessitates the unity of the representations belonging to the same object under a 
general category. In this process, the faculty of the imagination appears as the 
primary faculty as it enables understanding to operate by subsuming the diverse 
representations of an object of experience under the concept of the object.  
 Kant never writes on the faculty of the imagination at length in any of his 
works. Nevertheless, we see that the imagination rules in the first Critique more 
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than in any of the other two critiques. The section above is based on a summary of 
the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding A.  
The B section of the Deduction is the one that is restated in the second 
edition of the CPR. In this section the imagination is defined as the “faculty of 
representing in intuition an object that is not itself present” (CPR B151). As to its 
relation to sensibility Kant writes that “Now since all our intuition is sensible, the 
imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the 
concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility” (CPR  
B151). Yet, in the following lines we see that the imagination can go beyond 
empirical laws:  
(i)n as much as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is 
determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is 
therefore able to determine sense a priori in the respect of its form in 
accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a 
faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of 
intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories must be the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination (CPR B151/ 2). 
 
The transcendental synthesis of the imagination is a deed of the 
understanding that it applies on the sensibility. Put otherwise, the transcendental 
synthesis of imagination implies the act of understanding in which it determines the 
sensibility internally (CPR B153). Due to its transcendental character it is the basis 
of all other possible applications of understanding concerning the objects of all 
possible experience.  
Following Kant in the B-edition of the Deduction Sarah Gibbons, in Kant’s 
Theory of Imagination, rightly puts that from A to B-edition “Kant ‘demotes’ the 
imagination from a ‘fundamental faculty of the human soul’ (A 124) to a mere 
function of the understanding” (1994: 37). Yet, Gibbons also adds that this is not a 
change of status but mostly that of a terminology. Here the point that concerns us is 
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that none of the sections of Deduction deals directly with the imagination. 
Furthermore, the role of imagination is much less emphasized in the B-edition.  It 
appears only when Kant explains the application of the categories (the pure 
concepts of understanding) to the possible experience. Generally Kant gives an 
account of the central importance of the synthesis and the imagination en passant. 
Nevertheless, if we consider the crucial role of both synthesis and imagination as 
the faculty which enables synthesis, then it is not unfair to say that the imagination 
provides the fundamentals of the human cognition in producing knowledge. 
The crucial function of the imagination is pointed out as mediation by many 
commentators of Kant.
48
 Heidegger makes the most interesting remark regarding 
the state of the imagination. He favors the A-edition of the Deduction so much that 
he claims to find the ‘first specimen of phenomenology’ in it (Llewelyn, 2000: 33). 
The imagination is the “common root but unknown” root of the “two stems of 
human knowledge”, that are the sensibility and understanding (Heidegger, 1990: 
110). 
Gibbons (1994) argues that the imagination has a much closer relationship 
with perception than it is usually treated by Kant. She drives attention to Kant’s 
definition of understanding with respect to the unity of apperception and the 
synthesis of imagination. Kant writes that “the unity of apperception in relation to 
the synthesis of imagination is the understanding” (CPR A119). Following this, 
Gibbons argues that apperception opens a space for the imagination to realize its 
function. This remark is noteworthy because it states that apperception might be 
another possible “common root” like imagination. This remark might not seem 
                                               
48 See especially Strawson’s “Imagination and Perception”, pp.82-89; J. Michael Young, “Kant’s 
View of Imagination”, pp.140- 64; Makkreel’s Imagination and Interpretation, , pp. 2, 153. 
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vital for our argument. Nevertheless, it is valuable at least to highlight some 
indeterminate-in the sense of unrestricted- uses of the imagination.  
The theory of the imagination in CPR provides us with two different kinds 
of uses of the imagination: the empirical use and the transcendental use. The 
empirical use of the imagination is also called the reproductive imagination. It 
entails the synthesis of intuitions in apprehension and reproduction. It is necessary 
for the continuity of knowledge because experience necessitates the 
“reproducibility of appearances” (CPR A101). Kant mentions about this 
reproductive character of the imagination also in his Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. He writes that imagination can be reproductive, when it 
is a “faculty of derivative presentation of the object (exhibition derivativa), which 
brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously” (Kant, 
2006:60). 
The transcendental use of the imagination resides in its function in the act of 
schematizing. When imagination is responsible for producing a schemata in order 
to subsume the intuitions (particulars) given by the sensibility under a concept 
(universal), it is called the productive imagination or “figurative synthesis” (CPR 
B151). We learn about this productive side of the imagination when Kant seeks for 
the answer of the question: “How…is the subsumption of intuitions under pure 
concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible?” The application 
of a category to appearances requires for a third kind of representation which must 
be homogenous both in category and appearance. Moreover, it must be in one 
aspect intellectual and in another aspect sensible. Kant calls this kind of a 
representation the transcendental schema (CPR A138 B177). The transcendental 
schema is a product of the imagination. It is not equal to an image of the object. It 
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is universal and, it can never be represented in one single representation that has an 
image. To put it differently, the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the 
reproductive imagination whereas the schema of a concept is that of a priori 
imagination (CPR A141 B180). Following this, then, the schema of a concept is a 
means for us to subsume a particular representation under a specific concept of a 
thing. For instance,  
The concept of a ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which my imagination 
can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, 
without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or 
any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents (CPR 
A 141). 
 
Because of the unknown mechanism of this act of the schematization, Kant writes 
that schematism is “an art concealed in the depths of human soul” (CPR A141). 
The unknown portrait of the schematism causes the view that Kant’s usage of 
schema is sometimes ambiguous. For instance, Donald Crawford rightly asserts 
that “on the one hand it is characterized as both a product of the imagination and 
intuition, on the other hand, it is said to be a rule or universal procedure of the 
imagination which exists only in thought” (2003: 153). According to Jonathan 
Francis Bennett, Kant uses ‘schematism’ because temporality should be added to 
the concepts. By this operation schematism enables conditionality or “if-then-
relatedness”. Bennett writes that by applying schematism, Kant hopes to account 
for causality (1974:58-9). 
49 
On this controversial issue a very pretentious claim 
comes from Lyotard. He favors most the third Critique among Kant’s critiques. 
About the schematism and the hidden art of human soul he writes that
 “taste 
discovers the secret of the ‘art concealed in the depths of the human soul’ that the 
                                               
49 Indeed many scholars hold that schematism is either a sign of failure of Deduction or as unnecessary. This point is far 
beyond the remit of this paper, yet still Allison, Bennett, Guyer and also Wilkerson- who is most harsh on Kant on the 
subject where he writes: “the Schematism serves no useful purpose and can be ignored without loss” (1976: 95),- can be 
visited for the relevant discussion on schematism and Deduction.  
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schematism conceals and cannot reveal when the powers of thought are absorbed in 
the “serious” matters of knowledge” (AS 88). 
It is not easy to sum up the role of the imagination in the first Critique even 
if it has a function strictly determined. Its place in the cognitive hierarchy of the 
first Critique may be roughly defined inferior to understanding. However, 
synthesizing a priori intuitions i.e., space and time, the very conditions of 
experience, synthesizing the manifold of intuitions and producing images makes it 
hard to regard it as supplementary faculty. Furthermore, the categories are also 
situated high in this hierarchy, yet they have to employ synthesized intuitions to 
perform a proper cognition and in this sense the imagination’s function is prior and 
in this sense, more elementary than the categories (Schlutz, 2009: 85). 
Michael Young states that the imagination, besides its “being a necessary 
ingredient for perception itself (CPR A 120)” has a capacity to “see more than the 
eye meets”. In other words, the theory of the imagination in Kant does not merely 
entail mental imagining but also a capacity to interpret by which it can supply 
more than sensible awareness (1988: 142). Alexander Schlutz draws attention to 
another angle with respect to the imagination. Besides the positive, necessary and 
fruitful side of theory of the imagination, he reminds the violence that it brings 
down upon itself later in the sublime. Moreover, in Anthropology in § 28-36, Kant 
introduces a new power of the imagination called fantasy. This is a power of 
imagination when it produces images involuntarily. According to Schlutz, if we 
consider all the appearances of the imagination in Kantian philosophy, we realize 
that  
Simultaneously necessary and dangerous for the unity of the system in its 
synthetic and its disruptive function, imagination can thus only have a 
paradoxical and painfully conflicted position within the transcendental 
framework. At once the solution for the most vexing conceptual problems 
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and a dreaded intrusion of lawless irrationality into the court of reason, the 
faculty opens up a conceptual abyss that the Kantian system, in spite of its 
rigorous unifying mechanisms, remains unable to close (2009:139). 
 
The next section takes up the “perilous” side of the imagination which, in the end, 
can be read as an opportunity for the Kantian political subject that should be freed 
from any kind of unity for good. 
 
3.2.3.2. The Imagination in the third Critique
50 
Needless to say, in the third Critique the imagination has a much more substantial 
role. As the servant of understanding in cognition, the imagination is promoted to a 
more significant role in the aesthetic estimation of the object in the third Critique. 
In other words, the supporting role of the imagination in CPR is transformed into a 
one-to-one relationship with the faculties of understanding or reason. In the third 
Critique, imagination’s act of mediating between sensibility and understanding—
together with schematization and three syntheses which are always defined in a 
strictly determined objective fashion—turns into an indeterminate relationship with 
understanding. Furthermore, in the third Critique, a new occasion which can never 
hold for theoretical reason is introduced between the imagination and the highest 
faculty in the hierarchy of human mind namely, reason. Surely, these prefatory 
observations are mostly anticipated concerning Kant’s aim for unifying the 
theoretical and practical aspects of human mind or his notion of kingdom of ends. 
Yet, this fact cannot prepare a Kant reader to what s/he will find in the third 
Critique regarding to new appearances of the faculties in aesthetic reflection. 
                                               
50 In this section, I want to summarize two different views on the theory of the imagination. The 
analysis of its role in the judgment of beautiful will be analysed in the next chapter while the 
sublime will be claimed to be an anti-humanist point in the Kantian philosophy. In this section 
Makkreel and Lyotard’s approaches will be revisited as two representative examples of 
transcendental and poststructuralist interpretations of the imagination in the third Critique. 
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As we already know, in the first Critique imagination is defined as one of 
the three original sources of knowledge which are not derived from any other 
faculty (CPR B127). In this sense, imagination is given a high status with respect to 
sensibility. The duties of imagination in the first Critique seem significant in terms 
of their contribution to understand the subject in an objective fashion. Its tasks are 
backbones of production of knowledge. Since with Kant we merely deal with how 
we know and consequently with subject just in terms of the conditions given as 
response to this “how” question, the process of production of knowledge exposes 
us the structure of the mind and if it is not too much to say, of man in the first 
Critique. 
In the third Critique, in aesthetic reflection, imagination comes forth with 
its new face peculiar to aesthetic reflection. Briefly, the “lively play” that it 
performs in the judgment of taste, its productive and spontaneous, in Kant’s words 
“self-activating” (selbstthätig) mode and lastly, its being the “author of the 
voluntary forms of possible intuitions” in arts can support the argument that the 
tasks of the imagination altered and in a sense expanded in the third Critique 
(Makkreel, 1990: 46).  
 Considering the changes in its tasks, imagination seems freer under the 
reign of faculty of judgment. The freedom of this faculty is mainly attributed to its 
being independent of the concepts. In the very encounter with an object in aesthetic 
reflection, the imagination operates without appealing to either concepts or the 
categories. Since the imagination is solely concerned with mere form of the object 
no concepts are invited. This act of the imagination seems ambiguous in some 
respects. Kant’s treatment of the imagination in the faculty of judgment leaves us 
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in wonder in terms of the quality of this freedom. Referring to the relation of the 
imagination with concepts in terms of freedom Guyer rightly puts that  
It is not clear whether the mere presence of any concepts—the mere 
knowledge of their applicability to a given manifold, or even the mere fact 
of such applicability—is sufficient to constrain the imagination, or whether 
the imagination can always abstract from concepts known to apply to 
objects. In other words, it is not clear whether the freedom of the 
imagination is a negative condition, which obtains only if a given object 
presents or forces no concepts on the mind, or a positive condition, a power 
of the imagination by which it can actually free itself of the constraints of 
whatever concepts actually —and perhaps even obviously—apply to the 
given object (1997: 223).  
 
Even if the quality of the freedom is an open question, as regards to its being 
reproductive or productive in action, Kant explicitly writes that 
If, now, imagination must in the judgment of taste be regarded in its 
freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as reproductive, as in its 
subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an 
activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions) 
(CJ, General Remark following § 22). 
 
In the following lines of this paragraph, Kant warns us that in its free lawfulness, 
the imagination accords with the understanding. This is not to say that the 
imagination is autonomous because it is not self-determined or it cannot generate 
laws like understanding. For this reason, the free lawfulness means “conformity to 
a law without a law”. It is not an objective conformity but a subjective conformity 
of the imagination to understanding. 
If we recall the productive imagination from the first Critique, we see that 
in its productive function, the imagination operates in an a priori fashion. Similarly 
in the third Critique, the productive imagination generates new forms- even if how 
it does so remains to be a relevant question. The application of the notion of the 
productive imagination becomes clear in the sections where Kant deals with arts 
and genius.  
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As concerns arts, Kant withdraws himself from the rationalist tradition of 
the Enlightenment which claims that the aim of art is to contribute and indeed to 
provide the perfection of humanity (Kneller, 2007: 45).  Kant’s views on art are 
focused on the creation rather than the evaluation of art work. Yet this interest in 
the creation of art work is somehow “from outside, disengaged from immanent 
artistic process, and assessing it with “cold-blooded” detachment (Zammito, 1992:  
131).  
An art work is created by an artist/ genius who rules art. Art, nature and 
genius complement each other in Kant’s definition of genius as follows: “Genius is 
the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives rule to the art” 
(CJ §168).  The talent of an artist is an “innate productive faculty of the artist”. 
From this productive faculty of artist either a tasteful or a soulless work emerges. 
In the third Critique (section §49), the power of creation by the imagination 
(in its productive fashion) turns up as a 
(P)owerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material 
supplied to it by actual nature. It affords us entertainment where experience 
proves too commonplace; and we even use it to remodel experience, always 
following, no doubt, laws that are based on analogy, but still also following 
principles which have a higher seat in reason (and which are every whit as 
natural to us as those followed by the understanding in laying hold of 
empirical nature (CJ §49). 
 
Hence, the power to create “new” forms is indeed to remodel the registered 
content of experience. Nature’s given perceptions can be reorganized in a newly 
fashion by means of the employment of the productive imagination. And it is by 
this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law of association (which 
attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination), with the result that the 
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material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be 
worked up by us into something else—namely, what surpasses nature (CJ § 49).51 
An unnatural form can be grasped in this way and since its parts belong to 
nature; the production Kant talks about is more like a collage. At this point, what 
needs attention is not what the imagination can create but the free space to move 
that is bestowed upon the productive imagination in CJ. Even if it is not in an 
absolute sense, still we can talk about an extension in the function of the 
imagination.  
The performance of the imagination in arts is seen fruitful by some scholars 
on the matters of social life. Jane Kneller, for instance, sees the creative power of 
the imagination as a potential source for the realization of the highest good that 
morality required and asks: “Why not suppose, then, that the imagination, when 
allowed freedom in aesthetic reflection to produce what Kant calls the Aesthetic 
Ideas (“inner intuitions”; (CPJ, §49, 5: 314 [182]), may thereby capable of 
“schematizing” rational ideas like that of the highest good?” (1990: 227).  
Kneller believes that the power of the imagination in the third Critique 
deserves the adjective “transformative”. She focuses on the notion of aesthetic 
Ideas and suggests that the imagination, similar to its role in poetry,— which is 
trying to “give sensible expression to rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of 
the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation, and so on” (CJ §49)— can 
undertake a mission to realize the moral good. Yet, Kneller’s attempt is not blind to 
what Kant said concerning the representation of “moral condition of society”. She 
reminds the fact that Kant did say that morality can be symbolized by reflective 
judgment. However, it cannot be schematized in the form of sensible 
                                               
51 Zammito believes that this passage “unquestionably talking about the noumenal freedom of the subject” (1992: 284). 
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representations that would correspond to a representation of the moral world. For 
Kneller, Kant overlooks the power of the imagination in its free play where it can 
“portray moral Ideas”. The imagination only schematizes in the first Critique but 
Kneller, following Kant on arts, insists that an individual exhibition of the Ideal of 
beauty is accessible if artist can unite “pure ideas of reason” with a “very strong 
imagination”. To this, she looks as a possibility to achieve a non-symbolic portrait 
of moral world.  
If the Ideal of beauty can embody morality in individual human beings, then 
it should be equally possible (if not equally easy) to portray the social dimension of 
morality in the human community. If this is the case, then the imagination in its 
free reflection may be “applied” in the service of the ideal of beauty to enable us to 
believe in the possibility of the highest good as a result of human agency alone 
(Kneller, 2007: 55). 
As for the reason why Kant does not give the chance to the imagination, 
Kneller focuses on two possibilities. First is that Kant favors the interest in the 
beauty of nature as a sign of good morals but as to the interest in beautiful arts, he 
believes that it is not enough to designate being moral. Simply put, Kant misses the 
opportunity to assess the possible link (1990: 229). The second possible reason is 
Kant’s political views. Kneller writes that the notion of imaginative freedom would 
culminate in rebellion that Kant never favors, since he credits the motto of 
enlightenment that is, “Think for yourself!”. According to Kneller, if it is the case 
that “humanity progress morally even through such “evils” as revolution, it would 
be plausible for him to hold that human imagination is equipped to “envision” this 
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progress, that is, to exhibit it in the imaginative Ideal of a moral human 
community” (1990: 230).52  
Kneller’s suggestion, with its ideal of moral human community, puts a lot 
on the shoulders of the imagination as a faculty. Kant would probably find the 
potential freedom and the power of the imaginative freedom problematic due to the 
different appearances of the imagination in his philosophical system. Imaginative 
freedom would be akin to fantasy in Kant’s existing system. Moreover, Kneller’s 
suggestion seems to overlook the problematic structure of moral politics. Within 
Kant’s universalist frame, imagination would still be in the service of categorical 
imperative and thus, what it envisions as an ideal is necessarily pre-determined.  
The next section will search out the most intriguing appearance of the imagination 
in the third Critique: imagination in the sublime.  
 
3.2.3. 2.1. The Imagination in the Analytic of the Sublime 
This section claims that a detailed analysis of the sublime in the Analytic of the 
Sublime reveals that the sublime remains an anti-humanist moment in Kant’s 
humanist philosophy. To substantiate this claim, this section takes recourse to 
Makkreel’s and Lyotard’s analyses of the sublime in terms of the functions of the 
imagination.
53   
Makkreel’s approach represents a transcendental reading of the imagination 
in the sublime whereas Lyotard’s view on the matter exemplifies a poststructuralist 
                                               
52 Kneller’s argument on the importance and potential of the creative imagination is not the only 
one. Crawford also sees the theory of the creative imagination as central to Kant’s aesthetic theory.   
 
53 As Guyer reports, there are many different interpretations of sublime such as deconstructionist, 
psychological and ideological (1993: 188). See Paul de Man’s “Phenomenality and Materiality in 
Kant for instance. For a Marxist’s approach see also George Hartley’s Abyss of representation: 
Marxism and the Postmodern Sublime (especially chapter two where
 
Heartley asserts that “our 
experiencing of the sublime as a spatial problem is due to our being at base creatures of discourse”). 
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perspective. Makkreel elaborates the imagination in a strictly Kantian sense and in 
the end concludes that the imagination in the sublime addresses a transcendent 
metaphysics in terms of its use and appeal of the supersensible substrate for the 
unity of faculties. Lyotard’s approach leads us to a new reading of both the 
imagination and the reflective judgment. Through examining the power of the 
imagination in the sublime Lyotard reveals the political potential of reflective 
judgments. Comparing this approach to Makkreel’s, this study shall try to address a 
ground for reading the sublime as an anti-humanist moment.  
Let us begin by assessing the possible usage or non-usage of staples of the 
imagination’s acts i.e., synthesis, schematization, and categories in the third 
Critique are discussed in order to understand the imagination in the third Critique. 
On the applicability of the three syntheses in the third Critique there are different 
approaches.  
Makkreel states that since aesthetic apprehension is non-determinant and 
subjective, the synthesis cannot be applied by the imagination. Thus, non-
conceptual and reflective mode of thinking in aesthetic realm does not require any 
kind of synthesis. He writes that “Kant’s text supplies no direct evidence for 
equating the aesthetic apprehension of the imagination with the syntheses of 
apprehension and reproduction, for there is no mention of synthesis in his account 
of aesthetic apprehension without a concept” (1990: 50). Concluding his argument 
Makkreel asserts that synthesis should be excluded from the aesthetic apprehension 
since Kant himself writes in CJ (§22) that the imagination is not reproductive in the 
judgment of taste.
54
  
                                               
54 Makkreel also takes up the opposing views of Guyer and Allison. See Part two in his book 
Imagination and Interpretation in Kant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 45-67. 
 
 116  
 
In contrast to this view, Guyer thinks that the imagination can synthesize a 
manifold without applying a concept and, in this sense it is possible for the 
imagination to work by excluding the last level of the three-fold synthesis, i.e. 
synthesis of recognition in a concept (1997: 85-6). However, according to 
Makkreel, claiming that aesthetic judgment entails synthesis in order to preserve 
the cognitive import of aesthetic judgments will culminate in placing the “aesthetic 
imagination in a pre-cognitive sphere, contributing, in effect, an unconsummated or 
inferior mode of knowledge” (1990: 51). Makkreel supports his argument by 
stating that Kant does not apply “experience” but “apprehension” in aesthetic 
realm, and thus the three syntheses are not required in aesthetic apprehension.
55 
 
Makkreel refuses the notion of synthesis for reflective thinking and instead 
he contends that the categories remain relevant to aesthetic thinking yet, they are 
used differently. The imagination takes up a role of the presentation and 
specification of the categories. In an attempt of performing a transcendental 
interpretation of the tasks and deeds of the imagination, he suggests that the 
imagination does not synthesize but “specify the categories reflectively to organize 
pure mental contents” (1990: 53).  
The use of categories in judgments of taste has been a matter of discussion. 
Makkreel claims that in aesthetic comprehension mathematical categories are still 
relevant (1990: 71). He reports that Mary Gregor also contents that mathematical 
categories are applicable because we can still speak of measurableness and form of 
                                               
55 Makkreel’s this argument is indeed a response to Crawford’s claim (in Kant’s Aesthetic Theory, 
1974) which suggests that experience of art object is not different from the ordinary experience in 
application of the reproducibility of apprehension and therefore, it is problematic for Kant to argue 
that aesthetic imagination is not reproductive. For Makkreel, in the aesthetic realm it is not 
experience but apprehension is what is at stake. For details see page 50 in Makkreel. 
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the object in judgments of taste. Lewis White Beck writes that only mathematical 
but not dynamical categories are applicable.
56
 
A sound criticism to Makkreel’s transcendental approach is Lyotard’s claim 
that the three syntheses are applicable and indeed are presupposed by the axiom of 
composition that is the basis of objects of experience. Makkreel assumes that 
reflective judgment is not precognitive at all but, following Kant, it necessarily 
relates cognition in general.
57
 Conversely, Lyotard admits a pure subjective 
synthesis and the “comparisons” that are used to regroup the purely subjective 
syntheses by simple reflection. He follows Kant in the first Critique where Kant 
defines reflection (reflexio) as the “state of mind in which we first set ourselves to 
discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at 
concepts” (CPR A260 B316). Reflection requires in every instant that we compare 
things. In its operation reflexive headings are four in number: identity/difference, 
inner/outer, determinable/ determination and agreement/ opposition (CPR A263 
B319). These four headings are the core of reflective judgment and they are 
distinguished from categories by the fact that they do not present the object 
according to what constitutes its concept (quantity, reality), but only serve to 
describe in all its manifoldness the comparison of the representations which is prior 
to the concept of things (CPR A269 B325). 
As for the other task of the imagination that is given by theoretical reason, 
namely schematizing Makkreel quite rightly draws our attention to the fact that 
                                               
56 See Gregor in “Aesthetic Form and Sensory Content” in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, ed., 
Richard Kennington, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985);p.195; 
and Beck in Essays on Kant and Hume, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978), p.56.  
 
57 For Makkreel’s detailed argument see p.50-6 and for Lyotard’s claim see AS 105. Following the 
sentence, Makkreel writes that “the non-synthetic functions of the imagination developed in relation 
to aesthetic consciousness and reflective judgment disclose unexpected cognitive implications” 
(1990: 51).  
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schematization- since it is the act of subsuming intuitions under the concepts by 
means of schema of a concept provided by the imagination- is left out in the case of 
reflective judgments. Both Lyotard and Deleuze seem to agree with this point. 
Deleuze writes that imagination schematizes only when understanding presides, or 
when understanding has the legislative power. It schematizes only in the 
speculative interest. When the understanding takes up the speculative interest, that 
is, when it becomes determining, then and only then imagination is determined to 
schematize (Deleuze, 1984: 18). 
Even if they differ deeply in their fundamental assertion relating to 
transcendental character of the aesthetic judgments and their place in the critical 
framework, according to both transcendentalist and poststructuralist approaches the 
role of imagination and its import in the third Critique deviates noticeably from 
that of the first Critique.   
The difference between the transcendental and poststructuralist view of the 
sublime is exposed clearly in the action of the imagination concerning the sublime. 
The operation of the imagination in the aesthetic apprehension of the object called 
sublime needs attention and a delicate analysis due to the fact that Kant’s 
examination of this operation carries the risk of an earthquake for the critical frame.  
The key passage is where Kant writes that “Measurement of a space (as 
apprehension) is at the same time a description of it” and thus, it is an “objective 
movement in the imagination” and it is a “progression” (CJ §27). Yet, following 
these lines Kant continues by stating that when we consider “the comprehension of 
the manifold in the unity, not of thought, but of intuition, and consequently the 
comprehension of the successively apprehended parts at one glance,” we register 
“a retrogression that removes the time-condition in the progression of the 
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imagination, and renders co-existence intuitable” (CJ §27).  Intuiting co-existence 
by removing the time condition would mean one thing for Kant’s system: 
disturbance of inner sense. According to Kant, “the time-series is a condition of the 
internal sense and of an intuition” and hence, by rendering co-existence intuitable 
by removing the time condition, the imagination performs subjectively and it “does 
violence to inner sense—a violence which must be proportionately more striking 
the greater quantum which the imagination comprehends in one intuition” (CJ 
§27). 
To elaborate the effects of this alteration of function of time, we need to 
consult CPR again. As we already know the imagination and its transcendental use 
which is called the productive imagination is responsible from the production of a 
priori intuitions that govern the whole possible experience, i.e., time and space. 
Time is “the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our 
inner state” (CPR A33/ B50). Under its authority, imagination intuits in a 
successive mode. For instance, in counting I am aware that each time I add a unit 
successively and by the consciousness of the unity of synthesis I know the number. 
The imagination operates in a successive or serial manner and this is given as the 
ordinary function of it in the first Critique. Conversely, a possibility for intuition of 
coexistence (Zugleichsein) is given in the section that deals with aesthetic 
apprehension of an object in the third Critique. 
In CPR in the section where Kant deals with Third Analogy, the notion of 
coexistence proposes that “things are coexistent when in empirical intuition the 
perceptions of them can follow upon one another reciprocally” (CPR A211 B257). 
Hence, coexistence means that two manifolds of intuitions exist at one and the 
same time. However, due to the basic fact of the imagination that the appearances 
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are apprehended successively under the necessity of time, it is not possible to intuit 
two appearances at one time as perceptions. Instead, the imagination apprehends 
them in sequence and the understanding comprehends their relation as coexistence. 
Following from this, it is easy to derive that coexistence is a link not intuitable but 
only comprehensible, thus in Kant’s theoretical reason it is from a higher degree 
and can have nothing to do with the imagination. 
Nevertheless, while the apprehension in the first Critique is necessarily 
successive, in the third Critique, the imagination can cease the progressive 
sequence of time and enable the intuition of coexistence. According to Kant, this is 
not a new function of the imagination. What we witness in the estimation of an 
object of nature is a subjective movement of the imagination. The intuition of co-
existence is a violation with respect to the inner sense which is conditioned by time 
sequence. Yet, Kant writes that the attempt of the imagination to apprehend a 
magnitude in a single intuition is a “mode of representation, which, subjectively 
considered, is contra-final, but, objectively, is requisite for the estimation of 
magnitude, and is consequently final” (CJ § 27). Therefore, in the subjective 
movement, the annihilation of inner sense is unavoidable for the sake of intuiting 
an object of nature that evokes the sublime feeling in us.  
On this notion of violation Makkreel makes a striking remark. He states that 
the violation of inner sense by the imagination is a “radical claim” that could mean 
to suggest a “mode of intuition that transcends time, then this would mean a 
violation of the critical framework” (1984: 308). This claim itself can be 
interpreted very well as radical depending on Kant’s views on time. He clearly 
states that all appearances are subject to time and it is time that can “determine 
them as existing in a twofold manner, either as in succession to one another or as 
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coexisting” (CPR, Proof of First Analogy). This fact is repeated in several sections 
by Kant and it is hard not to take the “violation of inner sense” as a violation to the 
critical thinking.  
Makkreel himself also does not favor this option. He prefers to interpret the 
“violation of internal sense” as a “possibility of negating mathematical or linear 
form of time”.  
Makkreel supports his argument by suggesting two kinds of corrections in 
the translation of some concepts. The first one is that the word Augenblick which is 
translated as “comprehension in a glance” (by Bernard and Meredith) should rather 
be translated as “comprehension in an instant”. Following Kant in CPR, Makkreel 
claims that the instant is a limit point for time line. Thus, the violation of inner 
sense by the imagination cannot be interpreted as transcendence but rather as a 
limitation of time. According to Makkreel, this limitation and the instant that 
represents it enable aesthetic estimation (1984: 308).    
Makkreel’s remark is worth noting because it addresses the sublime as a 
sign of the possibility of abandoning the linear kind of thinking. This remark is 
favorable because it can mean that the third Critique and the judgment-in their very 
mechanism- deny the linear or serial apprehension. This implies an alternative kind 
of thinking or comprehension. In such an alternative comprehension, a complex net 
of relation can be comprehended as co-existent in a non-linear fashion. 
However, this thesis does not read the regress of the imagination as the 
“basis for an integration of the faculties”, even though the idea of breaking from 
the perception of the linear time is alluring. Yet, Makkreel reads the regress of the 
imagination and the supersensible substrate implied in this moment as a 
“transcendental idea that allows us to assume the mutual purposiveness of nature 
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and the subject in aesthetic judgments” and in this sense, the “sublime points to the 
possibility of an overall integration of our faculties of the mind (1990: 83).  
The main reason why Makkreel admits a unity between the faculties of the 
mind is that he maintains that the aesthetic judgments are grounded in what Kant 
calls the “supersensible substrate of humanity” and through this concept of 
humanity in aesthetic judgments “form is elicited from the content of experience, 
rather than imposing upon it” (1990: 86). 
According to this schema, the sublime is unveils the relationship between 
the supersensible substrate of humanity and aesthetic judgments. A presupposed, 
thus, transcendental unity between the faculties is exposed best by aesthetic 
comprehension, since it signals a “unity between the finite and the infinite that 
characterizes the human subject in the feeling of the sublime” (Makkreel, 1990: 
87).  
On the opposite side, Lyotard in his close reading of the sublime presents a 
dazzling alternative analysis of it. He contends that the judgment of taste promises 
subject whereas the sublime threatens it. In the judgment of the beautiful, by the 
harmony of the faculties the subject is promised. Whereas in the sublime, the very 
conflict of reason and the imagination threatens the unity of faculties in such an 
extraordinary way—despite the fact that in this cruel conflict, in the end the subject 
appreciates the moral law within himself or herself. The pith of this remark lies in 
its repercussions for the Kantian subject. Viewed as above the subject is never 
given but promised.  
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In this section, I tried to emphasized that Kant’s aesthetic theory can be read 
both from a transcendental and poststructuralist perspective.
58
 If the sublime is 
handled in a transcendental manner, even if the transcendental approach provides a 
support for Kant’s intention for the wholeness of his critical philosophy, the 
possible political theory or approach that would flourish within this structure is 
necessarily moral if not unitary, universal or prescriptive. On the opposite side, 
what Lyotard proposes seems radical for Kant in terms of the relation of faculties. 
It would not be surprising to find that Kant would be upset in the face of such a 
suggestion. Yet, Lyotard in his close reading of the sublime presents a dazzling 
alternative analysis of it. His analysis is significant for this study especially with 
regard to what it proposes for the subject. 
 
3.3. The Sublime and Moral Feeling 
The objective of this section is to review the moral attitude of the mind evoked in 
the sublime and to underlie the distinctness of the sublime from the moral realm. 
The relation between morality and the sublime is controversial and, because Kant 
never gives a proper account of it, there are different interpretations regarding this 
relation. For instance, Crowther contends that the notion of sublimity is grounded 
on moral ideas. Indeed, he writes: “Kant’s first formulation of his mature theory of 
the sublime is to be found in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1795) 
and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788)” (1989:19). Furthermore, he contends 
that Kant “reduces sublime to a kind of indirect moral experience” (1989:166).  
                                               
58 I am well aware of the fact that Lyotard is not the only post-structuralist thinker who has written 
on sublime. Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Paul de Man and John Sallis and 
several other names can be raised in such a discussion. I must declare that I do not intentionally 
exclude their remarks. However, these remarks are peripheral to the present discussion. For the sake 
of simplicity, I shall merely refer to their arguments en passant in relevant sections. 
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Robert Clewis is another scholar who attributes a significant value to this 
relation. Admitting that he diverges from the traditional view on the Kantian 
sublimity, he claims that “moral sublime” might be a third kind of sublime other 
than the mathematically and the dynamically sublime. Clewis indicates that Kant 
himself gives a sign of moral sublime when he writes that the sublime represents 
the moral law aesthetically better than the beautiful does. He defines moral 
sublime as  
the effect on consciousness when the moral law, or some representation or 
embodiment thereof, is observed or perceived aesthetically rather than from 
a practical perspective. That is, an experience of the sublime is one of the 
moral sublime if and only if something moral, such as an idea, object, 
mental state, act, event or person, elicits the sublime in an aesthetic judge 
who observes, imagines, hears or somehow reflects on that object (2009: 
84). 
 
According to Clewis, the moral sublime leads the subject to reflect on freedom 
more directly than the other two types of the sublime do. What Clewis suggests 
with moral sublime is interesting in the sense that it is defined as a reaction to a 
mental state with moral content. For instance, according to Clewis, “responding 
aesthetically to the mental state of a righteous anger” can be an example pf the 
moral sublime (2009: 84). 
It is well known that both modes of the sublime imply a particular nexus 
with reason. The relation experienced is complex because a) with respect to the 
leap of the imagination, the hierarchy of the faculties is somehow violated and, b) 
as a result of the encounter of the imagination with reason’s enforcement, the 
subject discerns the existence of a supersensible faculty that can transcend every 
standard of sense. The more complex matter is the relation of this newfangled 
supersensible faculty with the moral end of reason because we know that it is not 
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quite equal to reason. Yet, somehow it supports the awakening of the subject to the 
moral ideas.  
When Kant speaks of the supersensible faculty he speaks of some faculty 
that he does not often mention. He distinguishes this faculty from reason and writes 
that it cannot be determined. Consequently, it is not something that we can cognize. 
Yet, we can think it as being evoked in mind by the imagination’s reaching its limit 
in the act of aesthetic estimation of an object. In sublime reason compels the 
imagination to estimate the object in singular intuition. This command is not 
peculiar to aesthetic estimation. We know from the CPR that reason always craves 
for the absolute. Reaching its limit when aesthetically estimating the object, the 
imagination is strained. In the case of the mathematical sublime, the strain of the 
imagination is extension and, in the dynamical sublime it is the might. Now, 
ambiguity of the relationship between reason and this supersensible faculty appears 
when Kant writes that the feeling of the sublime requires an “attitude of mind 
resembling the moral” (CJ, General Remark following §29). Although both share 
the characteristic of “exceeding the realm of nature”, Kant never states that they are 
the same. Indeed, he makes a quick explanation to ward off the doubt that even the 
feeling of beautiful resembles the moral feeling because of the fact that the 
“immediate pleasure in the beautiful in nature presupposes and cultivates a certain 
liberality of thought”. However, Kant reminds us that in the case of the beautiful, 
the represented freedom is like that of a play rather than the freedom of “exercising 
a law-ordained function” in view of the fact that the only freedom allowed by the 
law is the freedom of reason to “impose its dominion upon sensibility” (CJ, 
General Remark following §29). 
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This is a minute point with an intense content. Kant reminds us that the 
enthusiastic notion of free play between the faculties can be deceitful and to claim 
for the autonomy of the imagination grounded on this notion would not be quite 
incorrect. Since, in the case of cognitive judgments, the faculty of the imagination 
is always bounded by the understanding whereas in that of the judgment of the 
sublime by reason.  Yet, the position or the mode of this faculty slightly changes in 
the sublime following the fact that it represents the dominion of reason. To put it in 
Kant’s words, the dominion of reason is “exercised through the imagination itself 
as an instrument of reason” (CJ, General Remark following §29).  
In the act of estimation the particular call by the imagination in vain is a call 
for reason to step forward. This takes place when the enlargement of empirical 
thought is attained by the imagination: “Reason inevitably steps forward as the 
faculty concerned with the independence of the absolute totality, and calls forth the 
effort of the mind, unavailing though it be, to make the representation of sense 
adequate to this totality” (CJ, General Remark following §29).  
In another passage, Kant interprets the intrusion of reason as the revelation 
of the moral law to us aesthetically. In the end, a reference to the supersensible 
faculty is also revealed. To put it another way, the “intellectual and intrinsically 
final (moral) good” is revealed by the sublime.59 
In order to see the details of the relationship of reason (as the faculty of 
Ideas) and the sublime, it is necessary that we examine the modes of the sublime in 
terms of this relation. Firstly, we recall that each mode of the sublime refers to the 
relation of the imagination with different aspects of reason. The mathematically 
sublime is related to the faculty of cognition (theoretical reason) and, the 
                                               
59 Kant thinks that rather than beautiful, the moral law can be represented by the sublime. 
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dynamically sublime is related to that of desire (practical reason). In the former, the 
imagination fails to estimate the magnitude of an object which evokes the Idea of 
the absolute whole. Reason demands this idea to be represented -in the form of a 
totality of the intuitions given by apprehension (the primary function of the 
imagination). Now, if we recall that Ideas are the “concepts of pure reason, in that 
they vision all knowledge gained experience as being determined through an 
absolute totality of conditions” (CPR A327 B383), then, the failure of the 
imagination to represent the Ideas which are always already present to reason is not 
a surprise either for the imagination or reason. Yet, reason still demands. In this 
insistent desire of reason, we are to find the reflective judgment that appears as a 
complement to theoretical reason. It is complementary to the whole critical 
philosophy in that it reconciles the two distinct faculties of the mind in a non-
cognitive and temporary way. This capacity of reflective thought will be revisited 
in the later parts of the study.  
In the dynamically sublime, this time the might or the power of the object is 
troublesome for estimation. In this particular difficulty, the imagination strives for 
representing the form of the object in one single intuition. Through this struggle 
“[t]he proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime postulates the mind’s 
susceptibility for ideas, since it is precisely in the failure of nature to attain 
to these—and consequently only under presupposition of this susceptibility 
and of the straining of the imagination to use nature as a schema for ideas—
that there is something forbidding to sensibility, but which, for all that, has 
an attraction for us, arising from the fact of its being a dominion which 
reason exercises over sensibility with a view to extending it to the 
requirements of its own realm (the practical) and letting it look out beyond 
itself into the infinite, which for it is an abyss. In fact, without the 
development of moral ideas, that which, thanks to preparatory culture, we 
call the sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying (CJ §29).   
 
According to this, in the absence of the presupposition that the feeling of 
the sublime necessarily depends on the moral ideas, therefore, the practical reason, 
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the sublime appears as an appalling experience for the subject by making him feel 
miserable and stressed. Yet, following Kant’s view that the feeling of the sublime 
changes from repulsion to attraction, we may well say that this feeling of terror is 
somehow the next feeling of the sublime that is followed by attraction.
60 
 
For the sake of the clarity of the argument, we must ask why we need this 
dependence on moral ideas in the sublime experience to ease the stirred soul. The 
sublime is basically experienced in an instant
61 
and within this instant first, the 
imagination fails to estimate and then, reason supports it to restore the order by 
enabling the imagination to proceed to its limit. When the maximum capacity of 
the imagination is not enough, in other words, when the imagination reaches its 
cognitive limit (or absolute limit), a sensation evokes pertaining to which we can 
speak of the tendency to feel or hear the call of the moral ideas. This means that in 
imagination’s failure the subject feels pathetic whereas in the face of the absolute 
idea, it develops an awareness of the might of reason which it can never grasp 
cognitively.  
In this particular awareness, an emphasis or insinuation is made within the 
enthusiasm of this experience: The mind entails a faculty that transcends “every 
standard of sense” and the sublime appears as a “mere capacity of thinking which 
evidences” this fact (CJ §25). The phrase “mere capacity” of thinking deserves 
attention in the sense of its possible relation to the reflective thinking. It seems that 
this mere capacity signals a new aspect of the mind. Recalling that unlike beautiful, 
                                               
60 Indeed Kant mentions the feelings of repulsion and attraction as arising simultaneously rather 
than successively (CJ §27).  
 
61 I use the word instant in order to indicate that I do not presuppose duration between the attempt of 
imagination and the intrusion of reason in the mentioned state. To put it another way, I think that 
their successive appearance can be ignored or better should be treated as if coexistent. 
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the sublime does not have an object, we can say that it is indeed such a capacity 
that it can operate without an object. 
Parallel to the feeling of pain and pleasure in the subject, Kant mentions 
about a moral feeling that arises in the sublime. Now, we know that Kant equates 
the moral feeling with the respect for the moral law (Guyer, 1993: 358). As the 
respect for the moral law, the moral feeling is defined as an interest in acting 
accordingly as the law commands (Kneller, 2007: 64). However, the feeling of the 
sublime “does not produce an interest and thus, does not immediately involve 
agency, or the incorporation of an incentive into a maxim of action” (Clewis, 2009: 
133). 
According to Clewis, “practical reason naturally takes an interest in what 
can (indirectly) promote morality by revealing freedom. Reason’s interest in 
sublimity thus derives from the latter’s basis in human freedom” (2009: 135). This 
is another way of saying that wherever the notion of freedom appears we have to 
think of the practical freedom as its source. Yet, the moral law is determined and 
the subject is free as long as s/he acts in accordance with this law. Different from 
the sublime, the good is grounded on a conceptual base. The good and thus, the 
moral behavior come with a determined kind of freedom, limits of which is 
determined by the supreme moral law. But, the sublime benefits from the 
advantage of standing between the sensibility and the practical reason—as Kant 
states so for the faculty of judgment and its applications. The reason and its ideas 
receive a reference that makes the subject rediscover the fact that reason dominates 
sensibility. This is the basic or cursory definition of the state in the sublime. 
On the matter of the relation of the sublime feeling to the moral feeling, 
Lyotard has a striking argument. He accepts the affinity of the moral feeling and 
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the sublime considering the absolute idea (idea of causality) in the dynamically 
sublime, but he also contends that Kant should have added the faculty of desire to 
the discussion of the sublime. He states that Kant addressed this relation many 
times, but somehow he acted shy to assert it and also that such a move may have 
enabled the reader to understand the foundation and the power of the sublime in a 
better way (AS 118).  
Respect is the moral feeling that is felt in the sublime. Yet, no doubt Kant 
does not intend to equate it with the sublime feeling. Lyotard, as many Kant 
scholars, does not suggest otherwise and he emphasizes this difference as follows: 
“The sublime feeling is an emotion, close to unreason, which forces thought to the 
extremes of pleasure and displeasure, from joyous exaltation to terror; the sublime 
feeling is as tightly strung between ultraviolet and infrared as respect is white” (AS 
228). According to Zammito, respect is felt because moral feeling “attends the 
subjective supersensible directly, while the sublime involves a “subreption”, 
whereby it seeks it in an object of nature” (1992: 300). What makes the sublime 
unique for this study is that it basically commences as a simple estimation of an 
object and ends in the revelation of feeling of a supersensible faculty which 
transcends every standard of sense. Its potential to reach out the moral ideas and 
respect is also another significant feature of the Kantian sublime. In its Kantian 
rendition, it is a though but in the end a positive experience because it reminds to 
the subject the power of faculties of human mind with respect  to and in the face of 
sheer power of nature.  
The reference of the sublime to a supersensible faculty, moral ideas or the 
feeling of respect is abandoned, when in the 20
th
 century the sublime is recalled in 
descriptions the extreme violence perpetrated on human beings in the social 
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disasters such as the Holocaust and Hiroshima. As we will see, the contemporary 
sublime is a morally crippled experience. However, interestingly, the lost moral 
connection of the sublime is supplied by a new kind of experience of cosmopolitan 
thinking. This study entitles this new experience “cosmopolitan aesthetic 
experience”. In the next chapter the relationship of the classical sublime and this 
cosmopolitan aesthetic experience will be elaborated. But before this, there are 
other inferences to make on the sublime while it is still in its Kantian rendition. 
 
3.4. Anti-humanist Sublime 
If he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master…But 
this master will also be an animal who needs a master 
Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” 
 
 
To breed an animal with the right to make promises— 
is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself 
in the case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man? 
- Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals II, § 1 
 
I am myself by inclination a seeker after truth. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge and 
a restless desire to advance it, as well as a satisfaction in every step I take. There was a time when I 
thought that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I despised the common man who 
knows nothing. Rousseau set me right. This pretended superiority vanished and I learned to respect 
humanity. I should consider myself far more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe 
that one consideration alone gives worth to all others, namely, to establish the rights of man. 
(Remarks on the “Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime” XX: 44) 
 
This section analyzes the sublime in terms of its value as an experience and 
evaluates the possibility of a theory of the sublime. The sublime is a complex and 
almost a cryptic moment in a system like Kant’s. It is such that the fundamentals of 
the Kantian philosophy cannot remain untouched when we dare to analyze it. The 
notion of time as well as the binary couples like internal/ external; phenomenon/ 
noumenon; and subject/ object lingers in an odd position in this aesthetic 
“experience”.  
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 We know that from Hegel and on, the analytical and thus, Kant’s strictly 
positive attitude has been severely criticized by many thinkers (Nietzsche, Adorno, 
Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida). His restless attempt to delineate the limits of 
knowledge left him in a world firmly described on its positive side but haunted by a 
negative existence i.e., noumenon. Despite the incredible burden that the notion of 
limit puts on his shoulders, Kant denies the knowledge of the existence of a 
“beyond”. The divided world of human being is defined by the very conditions of 
the appearances of some unknown entity. His insistent belief in epistemology 
instead of ontology drags Kant into a problem in which he occasionally confronts 
the question of the position of noumenon in his philosophy. His perspective does 
not let him to evaluate the possible value of the notions like limit, externality and 
negativity. Considering that especially the notion of negativity has almost driven 
the whole history of thought after Hegel, it is obvious that Kant can only have little 
to say in politics driven by this notion. The modern mind and its appeal to 
universalistic and descriptive analytical frame in politics have been abandoned long 
before. Therefore, a return to Kant’s suggestions that were promising back then is 
an only hopeful try. Yet, in a meticulous attempt, the notions like negativity, non-
identity, difference and plurality can be traced back to the Kantian aesthetics. With 
this belief in mind, it is again the Kantian aesthetics where we can find a ground to 
discuss the relationship of subject-object in a non-cognitive “experience” that will 
help thinking in a different way than the universalistic perspective. In this sense, 
the Kantian sublime offers and affords a non-Kantian reading that would enable 
Kant to return to political discussions from a very different angle than he is 
identified with in his life time. Since the progress of history of thought is towards a 
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more particularistic mode, a rereading of the Kantian sublime may suggest an 
alternative thinking. 
The subject of the first and the second critiques are always defined in terms 
of a priori elements of human mind such as inner sense, categories and many other 
transcendental principles in the first Critique. The freedom of subject is determined 
with respect to the categorical imperative and its voluntary realization in subject’s 
deeds.
62
 Until the third Critique the subject has experienced himself or herself in an 
objective manner. In this sense, it can clearly be stated that for Kant aesthetic 
equals to the same thing as subjective.   
In Kant’s aesthetics, the mental state of subject in relation to sheer form of 
the object culminates in a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This does not indicate 
a new territory but a change in the perspective that has been objective so far. The 
aesthetic and thus, subjective state requires its own mode of thinking which is 
declared to be reflective. It is significant to recall once more that although the 
aesthetic experience differ from ordinary experience with respect to the interactions 
of the faculties of mind,  similar to the ordinary cognitive experience, in aesthetic 
experience objects of experience are still treated as having a form and content. 
However, in aesthetic and hence, reflective thinking, we are only interested in the 
form but not by any means in the content which necessarily calls for the categories 
of understanding. In this sense, the encounter with an object in aesthetic experience 
entails a concern merely on the form of the object. The result of this reflective 
mode for subject is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure that paves the way for a 
judgment of taste.   
                                               
62 “Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through senses, knows himself
 
also 
through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot 
regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the 
other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of 
sensibility, a purely intelligible object” (CPR A546-7 B574-5). 
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The sense of negativity we pursue here is taken as it appears in the Kantian 
texts; from a perspective that entails temporary disunion of faculties, failure of the 
imagination, and ceaseless desire of reason (when it demands the representation of 
an idea) and, the feeling of pain and fear. It is significant to note that for Kant these 
discontinuities or short-circuits are in service of a strictly positive, thus, 
determinate aim in the end. In other words, disunion or failure does not remain as 
such but they are always final for a higher end: Unity.    
As we have seen earlier, these negative and upsetting chains of events are in 
continuity with their opposites by the help of a supersensible substrate/ faculty in 
us. Recall that this supersensible is the principle of humanity and, the negative side 
of the whole sublime instance is final for human mind within the perspective of this 
principle. In the end, interpreted as above, the sublime is like a masochist festival 
in which as subjects we cherish our mental capacities.  
In the encounter of an Idea of reason either in the form of absolute whole or 
absolute causality, our mental capacities meet and know their own finite limits and 
feel the beyond. As a result of this- inability of knowing but- feeling, we appreciate 
our capacities as human beings by developing an awareness of the supersensible 
substrate of humanity. But we must not forget that the short circuit of the 
imagination is resolved by the violation of inner sense. Kant never gives a clear 
account of his notion of inner sense. However, he writes that inner sense is related 
to the temporal relations of the representations. Thus, it is related to time which is 
the “form of inner space” and thus, “the formal a priori condition of all appearances 
whatsoever” (CPR A33/ B49). Following this, when the imagination extends itself 
in the sublime, it damages time and its successive structure. It is only after the inner 
sense is annihilated that the imagination is capable of intuiting co-existence. This 
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point is significant in reading the sublime in a quite different fashion than it is 
suggested.  
In the moment of crisis, which is not due to the dissemination of faculties 
but the difficulty to relate them, the only way out is to destruct the ordinary 
structure of inner sense which progresses successively. We know that inner sense is 
the very basis of the subject since it is the governor of the possible sense 
experience and a priori structure of mind. Furthermore, we know very well that 
neither the first nor the second Critique can admit or even imagine of a violation of 
inner sense. Yet, in the third Critique, annihilation of inner sense is the only way to 
reconcile the faculties under the rubric of a supersensible substrate. In this sense, 
we can rediscover the fact that in the objective aspect of experience that covers the 
experience of the form (mathematical categories) and the content (dynamical 
categories), the inner sense operates necessarily and non-alternatively in a 
successive manner. Whereas in the aesthetic, thus, subjective experience, the 
ordinary (objective) operations, the inner sense, the imagination and even reason 
are derailed. 
It would not be too much to argue that the subject of Kant’s critical 
philosophy cannot be separated from a priori elements of mind. As a priori 
intuitions, space and time surely are the fundamentals of empirical experience 
together with pure concepts of understanding, i.e. categories. Following Kant from 
the first to the second Critique, it is detectable that these a priori elements govern 
theoretical and practical aspects of human subject. If man or human subject is 
defined with regard to faculties of the mind in their strictly determined ways of 
functioning in the first Critique, which is the case here, then what the sublime 
depicts in relation to the state of subject is inhuman or anti-human.  
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The central significance of this implication is that Kant is not a philosopher 
who could tolerate a transcendent moment in his system and so, when the sublime 
is introduced as a failure of faculties and a moment of silence in the eyes of 
objective frame, it is the principle of humanity that comes to rescue the Kantian 
frame.  
The problem of the philosopher is his absolute rejection of a possibility of 
transcendence in the immanency of his system. In other words, he does not 
acknowledge the possibility that the sublime might be a transcendent moment in 
the whole Kantian philosophy because it is in its very structure non-objective. It is 
not surprising to notice that if Kant would ever to consider this possibility he might 
have used the word transcendental instead of transcendent. But in that case, the 
sublime should have been determinable or at least graspable by faculties of mind. 
Yet, the sublime is again a wet blanket. The result is: Kant presents a principle of 
humanity in order to reconcile with the inhuman character of the sublime and the 
implications it carries. This “transcendental” principle supplies the union of realms.    
It is already stated that in this particular study, two main stream readings of 
the sublime is of interest. It can either be read by keeping the transcendental frame 
in which the failure of faculties is interpreted as final for encountering the faculty 
supersensible (in the form of principle of humanity) and the union of faculties as 
supplied by reflective judgment. Or a poststructuralist stand can be taken and it can 
be argued that the disunion of faculties is the disclosure of their being distinct from 
each other in such a way that they cannot be united at all.  
The political ground that is sought for today cannot flourish from the first 
approach since it suggests that we should read the sublime in affinity with the 
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respect for moral law. Hence, in this picture a prescriptive and thus, Universalist 
politics would necessarily be arrived at. 
It is the second approach that seems to promise for fruitful grounds for an 
alternative political thought. Employing Lyotard, this opportunity can be found in 
the mode of reflective thinking and in the implications of the sublime for the 
Kantian subject.  
If we consider that the Kantian subject is defined unavoidably referring to 
its mental capacities, then the failure of the imagination and it’s doing violence to 
inner sense address a pre-cognitive and thus, an anti-humanist instant. To make one 
thing clear, the sublime is not issued here as an authentic experience in which 
subject externalizes itself. Neither it indicates a transcendent place/ space/ area that 
is discovered. In the sublime, thinking reflects on itself by means of its reflective 
capacity. The mind has to reflect on itself in its inability to represent either the size 
or might of nature or on its awareness of the failure of the capacity to represent. 
Sublime is not addressed here as an authentic experience but still in the end, the 
failure of the imagination, awareness of mind’s power, the feeling pain and 
pleasure all address an experience.  
Kant does not suppose a “before” of the subject. The subject cannot be 
separated from the a priori transcendental elements that are, space and time. 
Moreover, through inner sense we intuit ourselves and our inner states and thus, the 
subject without inner sense is not subject at all. Kant writes that  
whatever the origins of our representations, whether they are due to the 
influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether 
they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must 
all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense (CPR A98–9). 
 
Then, when we are talking about the annihilation of inner sense or failure of the 
faculty of representation, we cannot simply ignore these unusual alterations 
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assuming that they are final for some supersensible substrate without falling into 
the trap of metaphysics.63
 
To put it another way, since in the two other critiques 
Kant designates different and new divisions of human mind, form the third Critique 
a reader familiar with the Kantian system would expect that the sublime discloses a 
potential capacity which stays dormant. It would be a capacity to feel existence of 
the moral which is intelligible but cannot be known. However, the sublime unearths 
both the weakness and the power of subject with respect to the supreme moral law. 
In a sense what the sublime describes is a painful encounter with an Idea of reason 
which cannot be represented by the faculty of representation. The most painful 
moment of this uncanny experience is mediated by a supersensible faculty which 
appears in the form of supersensible substrate of humanity. In this way, the conflict 
or dissensus of the faculties of reason and the imagination is resolved. With 
recourse to the supersensible substrate which is a transcendent authority that cannot 
be known, the union of the faculties is assured. 
The claim of the present study that the sublime is anti-humanist moment in 
Kant’s philosophy does not mean that the sublime insinuates a “going beyond the 
human condition”. Such a claim would inescapably culminate in metaphysics 
because for Kant the human condition which defines and limits human subject 
cannot be surmounted or trespassed. Therefore, sublime does not address a beyond 
or beneath of human condition.  
What do we mean by anti-humanist, then? It is useful to remind that Kant’s 
subject is necessarily rational in its cognitive self. In other words, rational reason 
                                               
63 This line of thought is supported by Guyer (1997) and also by Zimmerman (1963). They both 
claimed that Kant’s application of supersensible faculty is a sign of his attempt to find a 
metaphysical ground for the judgment of taste. Indeed, for Zimmerman metaphysics of Kant is 
much more central as writes: “it is essential to bear in mind the metaphysical significance of  
aesthetic experience in order to make sense out of  the so-called “four moments” of aesthetic 
judgment” (1963:333). 
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presents itself in the form of two complementary realms; theoretical and practical. 
If we consider that the sublime belongs to neither, then the very experience of the 
sublime seems questionable. Since it is an aesthetic experience, it is not exactly a 
rational or cognitive experience.  
According to Kant, experience is not something “given”. We know that “all 
cognition commences with experience but it does not all…rise from experience” 
(CPR B1). It means that in Kant’s rendition of the notion, experience is grounded 
on both the raw sensory data received by sensibility and the active process that our 
mind performs on this raw data by its a priori laws. An ordinary sense experience, 
thus, is triggered by the raw sense data supplied passively by sensibility and the 
cognition of the objects of sense is reached at the end of an a priori process of the 
understanding. Yet, in the sublime the raw data supplied by sensibility transcends 
any measure that human imagination has. The trigger of the sense experience in the 
sublime is nature’s sheer might or size which disrupts the ordinary order of the 
faculties of the mind. Moreover, we know that in the sublime no knowledge of the 
object is produced by understanding and its a priori laws, since the sublime 
belongs to reflective thinking. It is pre-conceptual and it describes a reflective 
performance of the mind which is enacted on the mind itself. Again no knowledge 
arises from this self-reflection. In this sense, we can either call it pre-cognitive or 
non-cognitive but one thing is clear that the sublime does not belong to the realm of 
cognition. It is this sense of the sublime that this present study calls non-objective, 
non-experience. In the very act of reflecting on itself, the human mind awakens to 
the very power of itself which implies the world-constitutive power of human 
mind.  Yet, it is significant to note that the sublime is also the experience where 
subject feels the incomprehensibility of moral law. Therefore, the sublime does not 
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make itself equal to the allowed comprehension of this incomprehensibility. It is 
not a claim for transcendence or any kind of externality in a metaphysical way 
since a metaphysical postulation or principle is sure of the existence of its object as 
an empirical reality. Assuming otherwise would be claiming that the imagination 
trespasses the very border of phenomenon vs. noumenon distinction. 
According to Guyer, for Kant the popular idea of the sublime is a means to 
“symbolize the secure dominance of reason in human life” and, furthermore, the 
limits that are set and experienced in the sublime do not restrain the comprehension 
but indeed they “reveal the extent of reason’s power of comprehension (1993: 
191).
64 Now, it is this “secure dominance” and the assumed infinite power of 
reason is what is problematic as we have seen earlier. The sublime, as long as it is 
read as the encounter with the incomprehensibility of the moral law falls into the 
trap of metaphysics. Furthermore, to attribute a metaphysical content to the sublime 
for the sake of suggesting a new realm for political thinking would be a futile 
attempt.  Now, then what does it mean to claim that the sublime is anti-human in its 
pre-conceptual and thus pre-categorical mode?   
Paul de Man, in his article “Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant” asserts 
that the sublime can neither be a transcendental nor metaphysical principle, since it 
is a linguistic principle. To assume otherwise means to lose the “inherent 
coherence” and to resolve in the “aporias of intellectual and sensory experience” 
(1995: 342). The pith of this remark is that the sublime, viewed as a linguistic 
principle, can supply an opportunity in language in which we can interrogate the 
very concept of man. The insistence of this present study on the anti-humanist 
                                               
64 Guyer writes these lines in opposition to psychoanalytical and ideological interpretations of the 
sublime. In the former interpretations, he writes, sublime is seen a “symbol of the inevitable 
manifestation of the irrational forces suppressed by the superego of human rationality” and in the 
latter it is a “tool to teach the individual fear and submission…” (1993: 189-90). 
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aspect of the sublime mostly grounds on this possibility. The sublime and its anti-
humanist feature are supported by its aesthetic character. The deviations of limits 
and abilities of the faculties can easily be attributed to the aesthetic. Yet, left at this 
point the Kantian aesthetics is doomed to be analyzed through the first and second 
Critiques. Thus, the third Critique can rightly be comprehended necessarily with 
regard to or in comparison to the cognitive or practical realms, since Kant himself 
explicitly indicates that judgment is expected to supply the unity of kingdom of 
ends in its mediating fashion. If we are to understand the aesthetic as absolute or as 
bearing no relation to anything other than itself, then we must attribute new 
functions and even names for the faculties involved. But if we are to understand it 
merely appealing to the first and second Critiques, in other words, to the objective 
and practical realms then, the clashes of functions or operations of the faculties that 
are involved is inevitable. In this sense, the Kantian aesthetics bears serious 
problems. The most vital point to emphasize must be that aesthetics necessarily 
implies subjective or subject related state in aforementioned aesthetic encounters. If 
we are to define an aesthetic experience different from ordinary experience defined 
in the first Critique, then in a Kantian universe we have to describe the 
transcendental conditions of this experience. Since there is no sufficient evidence to 
claim so, we have to admit that aesthetic “experience” is a non-cognitive 
“experience” of the faculties of mind. It is a stretching of the mind in the form of 
reflective thinking. It is in no way a permanent elevation (Erhebung) above the 
limit of sensibility or as an experience of a transcendent space. In this very 
subjective state, the sublime insinuates an anti-human, non-cognitive, non-
objective non-experience. The anti-humanist aspect of the sublime corresponds to 
this moment of ectasis. 
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The Kantian sublime in its negative and challenging aspect opens the way 
for a contemporary approach to Kant’s philosophy for its possible political import. 
Within its unique position in the Kantian system, the sublime in its negative mode 
of pleasure offers a path to follow in today’s political discussions. This is not to say 
that Kant had already shown the way long before. What is intended here is that in 
the light of the alterations in world history, the political discussions, for instance, 
those on democracy, have long been influenced and somehow regulated by the 
notions of negativity, non-identity and plurality rather than some analytical and 
historical theories such as the social contract theory. In such a complex web of 
discussions, Kant’s political essays written in the Age of Enlightenment are 
unfortunately inconclusive in their prescriptive character. The most significant and, 
in our case, efficient aspect of the sublime lies in the possibility of reflecting 
aesthetically.  
In the next chapter, two representatives of the interest in the third Critique’s 
political potential will be visited. Both Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard 
suggest invaluable interpretations of reflective thinking and its possible role in 
future politics.  
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CHAPTER IV: 
 
POLITICAL IMPORT OF THE KANTIAN AESTHETICS 
 
 
Kant draws a sharp distinction between the disinterested aesthetic judgment and the 
impartial political judgment. The classical Kantian approach for impartial political 
judgment lost its only possibility to be realized- or rather became futile- after 1945. 
Yet, Kant’s aesthetics has become a popular theoretical framework in criticism.  
A significant early recourse to the Kantian aesthetics is performed by 
Hannah Arendt. She evaluated the judgment of beautiful in its many potential 
aspects through aesthetical to political. She decided to take the judgment of 
beautiful as a model for political judgment. The probable reason why she did not 
appropriate the judgment of the sublime instead of the beautiful might be that the 
beautiful applies to common sense which is for Arendt, a vital element in obtaining 
a consensus that would culminate in a just society. In this sense the judgments of 
the beautiful presuppose communicability. Whereas the sublime is strictly a 
subjective experience of the agent in solitude and in the end of which a respect to 
moral law arises. Since Arendt desires to derive a political approach from the 
judgments of taste for Kant, she focuses on the judgments of the beautiful.  
Before focusing on the political repercussions of the sublime, it is useful to 
visit Arendt’s thoughts on the Kantian aesthetics. Her attempt is significant because 
it emphasized the futility of laws constituted according to universals. The way 
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Arendt discusses the action of judging helps comprehend the urge to find a 
universal-free principle for politics. Hence, Arendt’s analysis of the judgment of 
taste and that of beautiful in particular is crucial, even if the main focus of the 
present study is the sublime.  
As to Kant’s theory of the sublime, following 1945s, it has abandoned its 
classical Kantian load, the reference to moral law. And it has begun to refer to the 
horrific historical violence acts. Initially, the Holocaust and Hiroshima are called 
the sublime. Such a reading is suggested by some poststructuralist thinkers such as 
Jean-François Lyotard and Theodor Adorno. The present study will take recourse 
to Lyotard’s approach to the sublime. This approach entails a meticulous analysis 
of the sublime as an experience and a moment in Kant’s philosophy. Lyotard 
evaluates the sublime in terms of its possible ontological and epistemological 
repercussions for Kant’s Critical philosophy.  
The notion of the sublime has been taken up not only by philosophers.  In 
contemporary discussions in the field of international relations the concept is used 
to refer international terror attacks. A recent example known as 9/11 is the attack 
on the World Trade Center on September 2011. These specific examples will be 
considered in the last chapter, thus, the present chapter will evaluate the approaches 
that investigate the possibility of a sublime politics or a politics of the sublime.  
 
4.1. Freed Doxa: Hannah Arendt on Judgment of Taste 
Hannah Arendt was one of the influential political theorists of the 20
th
 century. She 
is well known with her remarkable claims on totalitarianism, anti-Semitism and 
crimes against humanity. She writes that her work and essays aim to: 
…gain experience in how to think; they do not contain prescriptions on 
what to think or which truths to hold. Least of all do they intend to retie the 
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broken thread of tradition or to invent some newfangled surrogates with 
which to fill the gap between past and future. Throughout these exercises 
the problem of truth is kept in abeyance; the concern is solely with how to 
move in this gapthe only region perhaps where the truth eventually will 
appear (1993: 14). 
 
The importance of her thought for the present study resides in her remarks on the 
Kantian philosophy, in particular the Kantian aesthetics which she applies in order 
to account for her understanding of politics. She is known to praise Kant for 
robbing man of his security by destroying the unity of thought and Being. She 
contends that after Kant, the reality of things except that of individual has become 
questionable. The universal values and the notion of absolute are shaken so terribly 
that, like once Shelling indicated, no universal can subsist anymore. The emphasis 
is on the individual intent upon establishing the autonomy or, in Kant’s terms, the 
dignity of man. For this, the philosopher of the French Revolution is a well merited 
name for Kant who freed the subject from the theory of pre-existing essences. 
However it may be, Arendt also thinks that Kant failed to further his attack against 
the unity of Being because he did not get rid of the concept of Being as a given. Put 
otherwise, in the Kantian philosophy the concept of Being is reintroduced again to 
philosophy as the ultimate source of human cognition.    
Reviewing Arendt’s political thought is significant in order to comprehend 
her appropriation of the Kantian aesthetics. The peculiar feature of her political 
thought is that she refuses the interest of political philosophy in “man in the 
singular” and claims that her work was concerned with man in a plural sense. 
According to her, men appear as individual in many roles- for instance, the 
philosopher, the scientist, the artist, the historian etc… but when it comes to 
political commitment, human beings need to be taken in their plurality because the 
modes of human existence lived in solitude do not provide a political stance on 
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their own. Therefore, politics should consider man necessarily with respect to his 
mutual relations with others.  
Arendt’s political thinking is mostly marked by her criticism of modern 
politics. Politics originally always wishes to work with impartial opinions of 
different individuals which can co-exist even if they are diverse in themselves. Yet, 
Arendt thinks that modern politics lacks this attitude. She holds the Greek 
philosopher Plato responsible for this and announces him ‘the original sinner’. 
According to her, Plato who preferred truth over opinion (doxa) altered the 
structure of politics forever. She states that in the ancient times, physical violence 
in the mutual relations of the citizens of the polis was prevented by method of 
persuasion. Persuasion was effective and it was also free from the ‘non-violent 
coercion’, i.e. truth.65 Arendt develops the contrast between truth and opinion in her 
essay “Truth and Politics”. According to the essay, the binary opposition of truth 
versus opinion has its roots in the ancient world. In Gorgias, Plato postulates an 
antagonism between communication by dialogue and by rhetoric. The philosopher 
ie., the truth teller, communicates by means of dialogue, while the demagogue, the 
persuader communicates by rhetoric (1993: 233). In the mentioned piece, Plato 
declares the superiority of truth over opinion. Arendt believes that truth is 
compelling and has a despotic feature.  From the perspective of politics, the 
compelling or despotic character of truth comes from its wish to be acknowledged 
and to set aside debate which is the very essence of politics. Arendt writes: 
The modes of thought and communication that deal with truth… are 
necessarily domineering; they don’t take into account other people’s 
opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly 
political thinking (1993: 241). 
                                               
65 According to Arendt, we can classify truth as rational and factual. The former consists of 
mathematical, scientific and philosophical truths. The latter concerns the human affairs and also it is 
political by nature (1993: 241). 
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In this picture, agreement is forced by truth. Consequently, as the elements of 
political thinking, neither judgment nor decision is possible for humanity in a 
community where the notion of truth is in charge. What is striking in Arendt’s 
remarks on the position of truth in modern politics is that truth presents itself in the 
form of “it seems to me”. Thus, it pretends to be the opinion of people but actually 
what is at stake here is the transformation of factual truths into alleged opinions of 
people. In other words, factual truths can manipulate the opinion of peoples. They 
can seem as real or as free opinions of peoples. According to Arendt, this feature is 
of factual truths which have relevance to immediate or common political reality 
(1993: 236-7).  
In summary, in Arendt’s understanding, truth is the concern of the 
philosopher whereas opinion, related to politics, is the concern of the citizen. To 
put it differently, in the case of philosophical truth man is treated in his singularity 
but truth in this fashion is unpolitical in its nature. In contrast to truth, opinion is 
formed by discursive and representative thinking and it is valid by free agreement 
and consent (Arendt, 1993: 247).  Not surprisingly, in the case of man’s political 
life, this coerciveness of truth culminates in a compulsory agreement on the matters 
whereas the plural character of humanity necessitates respect for different opinions 
of different individuals.  
Following all above, decent politics can be achieved only by free speech 
and action that would reveal the opinion of the individual which is formed in an 
impartial process led by the act of representative thinking, that is, “thinking in the 
place of everybody else”. To achieve a free and thus the best decision of the 
community in the form of a judgment is only possible in this way. What Arendt 
seeks and- at least partially- finds in Kant is that the Kantian aesthetics presents an 
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opportunity to communicate or to exchange opinion with others which is treated 
equal to the ability of thinking by the philosopher (1993: 234). Pertaining to Kant’s 
aesthetic judgment Arendt writes: “I form an opinion by considering a given issue 
from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those 
who are absent; that is, I represent them” (1993: 237). However, we should note 
that representation here is not simply adopting other’s views or developing 
empathy. The diversity of the viewpoints that one can imagine in mind provides a 
rich capacity in order to represent other’s views in a more valid way. The more 
points of view considered, the more valid the opinion is (1993: 241). According to 
Arendt, this corresponds to the nub of Kant’s ‘enlarged mentality’, possible 
political inferences of which are not recognized by the philosopher.  
Kant’s influence on Arendt is obvious in her concedence of the existence of 
the faculties. She determines the three faculties of the mind as thinking, willing and 
judgment. She asserts that all faculties relate to each other but thinking and 
judgment has an internal link in judging right from wrong since judgment prevents 
man from doing evil (1978: 1, 5). It has the capacity to make us take a break and 
think what is going on around us. In this sense, it supplies awareness. However, it 
has also a destructive side, an inclination to nihilism. In particular, it has a 
“destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements 
for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in 
morals and ethics” (Arendt, 1978: 1, 175). In its close relation to judgment, 
thinking paves the way for judgment. However, when its capacity of destruction is 
concerned we should know that it needs judgment to save it (Fine, 2007: 121). 
As regards to willing, Arendt was uncomfortable with the identification of 
freedom with free will. According to her, freedom was a product of politics and in 
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contrast to the faculty of will it is not a modern phenomenon but had its origin in 
ancient polis (Fine, 2007: 122). In addition, Arendt admits that Nietzsche is right in 
saying that “to will is to command”. Thus, she sees a domineering aspect in willing 
without forgetting its important relevance to some modern conceptions like 
morality, right and responsibility. 
Parallel to her ideas on the faculty of willing, Arendt is critical of Kant’s 
free will arguing that the alleged “free” subject of the Kantian morality is not free 
indeed. It is claimed by Kant that individual as a moral being is ultimately free in 
deciding his actions whereas the actions as the results of individual’s own will are 
necessarily subjected to the causal laws of nature. In this sense, according to 
Arendt, the freedom of human individual given by Kant is somehow an “unfree 
freedom”. She is convinced that 
(A)t the same time that Kant made man the master and the measure of man, 
he also made him the slave of Being….Just as man comes of the age and is 
declared autonomous, he is also utterly debased. Man never seemed to have 
risen so high and at the same time to have fallen so low (2005: 171). 
 
According to Arendt, the above problem results from Kant’s treatment of freedom 
in his ethics. In Kant’s ethics, freedom that is mentioned is primarily an individual 
concern that excludes the existence or the opinions of others. It is related to use of 
one’s own reason and action that result from individual’s free will. In this sense, in 
his ethics, Kant emphasizes the subject as an individual and mentions of freedom 
as the freedom of the individual. However, in Kant’s essays recognized as political, 
freedom appears as making “public use of one’s reason at every point”.66 Yet, 
Arendt thinks that freedom is closely related with action and it is never just the 
expression of an individual’s opinion on a political instant. Hence, for Arendt there 
                                               
66 “What is Enlightenment?” (p.4-5).  
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is no point to appeal to Kant’s political essays or his ethics for a political 
philosophy. Instead, according to Arendt, in the CJ,   
freedom is portrayed as a predicate of the power of imagination and not of 
the will, and the power of imagination is linked most closely with that 
wider manner of thinking which is political thinking par excellence, 
because it enables us to “put ourselves in the minds of other men” (1982: 
102). 
 
This definition of freedom fosters what Arendt wishes as a ground for decent 
politics. Freedom which is an artifact of politics is exercised by reflective thinking 
which is a peculiar kind of thinking where imagination can enable us to consider 
opinions of others. This is the nub of Arendt’s political approach: to take others 
into account.  
The strength of the reflective judgment resides in the potential consensus to 
be arrived. In this sense, reflective thinking differs from speculative thinking. In 
contrast to the latter, it is grounded on common sense. It requires communication 
and agreement of others in the end such that it is “one, if not the most, important 
activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass” (Arendt, 1993: 
221).  
Besides this notion, the charm of the Kantian aesthetics for Arendt comes 
from the thought that the judgment of taste is immune to the coercive character of 
universal concepts. It can work without appealing to a concept or a universal in a 
particular occasion relating to an object.  
Arendt asserts that for Kant’s real political philosophy, one should turn to 
the third Critique, reminding that Kant himself also mentions of his political essays 
as “play with ideas” or “mere pleasure trip” (1982: 7). The concepts or notions of 
the third Critique such as sensus communis, enlarged thinking and exemplary 
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validity are the favorite Kantian elements for Arendt to structure a path in her 
account of how politics must be performed.
67
 
It is mentioned earlier that in the core of Arendt’s political view lays the 
notion of man in the plural. In her analysis of the concept of man, she applies to the 
Kantian philosophy on the matter. In her “Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy” 
Arendt’s pursues a close reading of Kant’s aesthetics. One of the fundamental 
questions of her endeavor is the question of man in Kant’s philosophy.  
In Lectures on Logic, Kant writes that the “philosophy in the cosmopolitan 
sense of the word” can be summarized in four questions: 
  What can I know? 
  What ought I to do? 
  What may I hope?  
  What is man? 
 
According to him, the relevant answers lie respectively in metaphysics, 
morals, religion and anthropology (1992: 538). Following this claim, Arendt 
retraces three different perspectives of man corresponding to the first three 
questions in the works of the philosopher. Her original claim is that none of these 
questions can lead us to the answer of what zōon politikon, a political being is. 
Moreover, the question “How do I judge?”, which obviously has a strong link to 
the concept of action, should have been the main focus of the interest in the third 
Critique simply because this is the only possible question that really concerns the 
“condition of human plurality” (Arendt, 1982: 20).  The notion of plurality is also 
implied in the second Critique, since it deals with what a human being ought to do. 
There cannot be any sense to conduct our behavior unless there are other men. Yet, 
the answer of the question concerns all intelligible beings for those that moral laws 
                                               
67 Arendt in her essay “The Crisis in Culture” gives a detailed account of her reasons for seeing taste 
as relating to politics. See Between Past and Future, pp.197-226. 
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are valid for. In other words, the sense of plurality that the second Critique implies 
does not necessarily and merely concern human beings in particular. It is for all 
intelligible beings. Furthermore, according to Arendt, besides the fact that the 
second Critique, the practical reason, insists on imperatives, it is not concerned 
with the “public content” which is decisively what distinguishes politics from 
morals (1982: 18). It privileges individual and, the proper way of conducting the 
self suggested in the Critique lefts the notion of human plurality in a second order 
relevance. In this sense, the Kantian subject of the practical reason appears too 
much self-interested for acting politically. 
Arendt focuses on the question “How do I judge?” and she claims that the 
answer of the question concerns only human beings but not all intelligible beings. 
She also contends that for the possible answer of this question in Kant’s 
philosophy, we should turn to the third Critique. According to Arendt, in the CJ, 
man is given neither as an intelligible nor as a cognitive being. The first part of the 
critique concerns men in the plural and the second part concerns the human species 
in general (1982:13). Therefore, Arendt insists that this question should have been 
raised in the CJ (1982: 20).  Following this, Arendt summarizes the approach to the 
concept of man in the whole Kantian system as follows: 
Human species = Mankind = part of nature = subject to “history”, nature’s 
ruse = to be considered under the idea of “end”, teleological judgment: 
second part of Critique of Judgment. 
 
Man = reasonable being, subject to the laws of practical reason which he 
gives to himself, autonomous, an end in himself, belonging to a 
Geisterreich, realm of intelligible beings = Critique of Practical Reason 
and Critique of Pure Reason.  
                 
Men = earthbound creatures, living in communities, endowed with common 
sense, sensus communis, a community sense; not autonomous, needing each 
other’s company even for thinking (“freedom of the pen”) = first part of the 
Critique of Judgment: aesthetic judgment (1982: 26-27). 
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In the light of the above schema, Arendt argues that as an end in himself the 
individual is merely interested in himself or herself and the moral achievement. 
Thus, the existence of other people serves like a limit according to which the 
individual conducts his behavior. In this sense, there is no ground for Arendt to 
attach Kant’s political philosophy to the moral law, since apparently the individual 
of the second Critique is more concerned with his individual self than the others. 
Moreover, as the moral principles are defined as being a priori, they are 
independent of individual’s will, in other words, they come naturally with reason as 
the conditions attached to the core of being human (Arendt, 1982: 20).   
In her essay entitled “What’s Existential Philosophy?” Arendt makes a 
sharp inference on the concept of self that 
…if since Kant the essence of man consisted in every single human being 
representing all of humanity and if since the French Revolution and the 
declaration of the rights of man it became integral to the concept of man 
that all humanity could be debased or exalted in every individual, then the 
concept of self is a concept of man that leaves the individual existing 
independent of humanity and representative of no one but himself of 
nothing but his own nothingness. If Kant’s categorical imperative insisted 
that every human act had to bear responsibility for all of humanity, then the 
experience of guilty nothingness insists on precisely the opposite: the 
destruction in every individual of the presence of all humanity. The self in 
the form of conscience has taken the place of humanity, and being-a-self 
has taken the place of being human (2005: 180-1).  
 
In the paragraph above we can easily follow the core of her critique of the notion of 
human dignity grounded on an individual’s uniqueness. The essence of man 
necessarily excludes man’s sociability when it is grounded on the concepts of 
inherent value or dignity as in Kant’s approach. To put it differently, valuing man 
on the grounds of his individuality and privileging the individual will eventually 
lead evil doing in politics. Instead, Arendt, as mentioned earlier, favors the notion 
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of taking as many viewpoints as possible in deciding about political matters in 
particular. Similarly, in her essay “The Concept of History”, Arendt writes that 
Kant’s postulation, saying that the agent of moral realm, who is free in his will, 
does not appear in the phenomenal world, is “pitting the dictate of the will against 
the understanding of reason” and more importantly it establishes moral law as 
distinct from natural laws. As a consequence, instead of purging the greatest evil, 
i.e., the thought, this kind of postulation “makes freedom disappear quite apart 
from the fact that it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose 
essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of 
freedom” (Arendt, 1993: 145).  
When considered like this, the Kantian moral act appears as legislation and 
likewise the criteria of being a “man of good will” seems to legislate rather than 
obey. This aspect of the Kantian morality together with reason and its unshakable 
authority serves the ideal of truth in its imperative mode and, it cannot offer a 
fertile ground for political development of man. Moral subject is surrounded by 
dictates of the reason and he does need to do what is commanded out of necessity. 
In these circumstances, there is no room for decision on a political action. This is 
merely because politics by definition assumes that man is a part of a society or 
community. Thus, in Arendt’s understanding there can be no possible gate for 
politics in Kant’s authoritarian ethics. Hereby, Arendt turns her attention to the 
Kantian aesthetics in which she sees the real ground for Kant’s politics.  
To begin with, in the third Critique, a judgment of taste requires that the 
subject necessarily visualizes herself or himself as a member of aesthetic 
community. Arendt implies that being political and acting accordingly needs much 
more willing and consciousness than simply having some moral principles that are 
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bestowed to man as the very conditions of being human. Aesthetics is similar to 
politics, since   
in aesthetic no less than in political judgments, a decision is made, and 
although this decision is always determined by a certain subjectivity, by the 
simple fact that each person occupies a place of his own from which he 
looks upon and judges the world, it also derives from the fact that the world 
itself is an objective datum, something common to all its inhabitants 
(Arendt, 1993: 222). 
 
Arendt thinks that despite the affinity between aesthetics and politics, Kant 
does not take action into account in any of his works. In her third lecture on Kant, 
she points out that the needs of man such as to communicate, think publicly and 
publish freely are mentioned in Kant’s critiques whereas the question of political 
action is never asked (1982:19). The mentioned needs of man correspond to in 
sociability, the primary principle of any political encounter.  
The principle of sociability is central to Kant’s aesthetics, since it provides 
the legal ground to call something beautiful. When we deal with the object that we 
are about to call beautiful, the imagination makes the other subjects present in mind 
by “enlarging the thought” in such a way that we actually think as if we are in 
public and moreover, as if every individual is in agreement with us. In other words, 
we call something beautiful by thinking that it is beautiful for all.  
The principle of sociability or publicness applies also to the Kantian 
morality since the philosopher declares that “withdrawal from the public realm is 
evil”. Thus, we can say that publicness is actually the “transcendental principle” 
that rules all of human actions in Kant’s philosophy. In practical philosophy the 
publicness in mind is of actor’s, who should necessarily operate in accordance of 
this fact, whereas in aesthetic realm, the essential condition for a beautiful object is 
the communicability. By this means, it is the judgment of the spectator which 
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“creates” a “space” for communicability (Arendt, 1995: 63). For Arendt this clearly 
means that the public realm is formed by spectators not by actors.  
The Kantian subject has a moral duty to conduct his behavior for good. 
Moreover, the categorical imperative
68
, the highest principle of morals, compels the 
individual to act with the awareness of the others’ existence. Yet, this is in a form 
of command. In this sense, as Arendt rightly puts, the Kantian moral subject does 
not actually or empirically recognize the others as individuals while s/he has the 
awareness of the others. This is rather a matter of assuming the existence of 
“others” in a very general sense rather than recognizing individuals. Thus, in the 
Kantian morality we must always keep in mind that there are others so that our 
behavior can become a maxim for all, at least in principle. For Arendt, this high 
form of morality and the notion of publicness it employs cannot cope with the 
diverse and ebullient character of political life. She thinks that if there is ever a key 
for decent politics, it is grounded on mutual recognition of one another as 
individuals and also on acting according to the quintessential realm of Humanitas.  
The Roman term Humanitas is of great importance to understand what 
Arendt had in mind for her understanding of political subject. It refers to the 
highest level of being human, the noblest personality which is extant or everlasting 
in one’s self. This personal element is activated necessarily in public space. It is not 
something to be controlled, or something to be acquired in solitude. It requires the 
public space and it can be acquired by the one who throws “his life and his person 
into the venture of the public realm—in the course of which he risks revealing 
                                               
68 
It commends that one should always act in such a way that the act can become a general law. In 
Kant’s words: “I am never  to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law”.
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something which is not “subjective” and which for that very reason he can neither 
recognize nor control” (Arendt,1995: 73-4).  
Apart from its ambiguous content, the concept Humanitas together with 
communication- in the sense that Karl Jaspers uses- constitute pretty much the core 
of the formula that Arendt had in mind. The dynamism and diversity of human 
world cannot be governed with some a priori principles. For a decent practice in 
politics which will aim at perpetual peace, public realm plays a fundamental role by 
conducing the emergence of the very humanness of human beings.  
The evident difference between Kant’s and Arendt’s approaches on the 
dignity of man appears as follows: Arendt refuses the dignity that is bestowed on 
man but holds that in the world of human affairs; in mutual relations what is noble 
is acting respectfully. In this sense, we do not inherit the dignity but we earn it. 
Whereas according to Kant, man has dignity as a result of his incommensurable 
value. This difference is the principal motivation of Arendt’s interest in the third 
Critique. She criticizes Kant for being deeply attached to a tradition that regards 
philosophy identical with contemplation. In this sense, it is understandable that the 
promise of a political philosophy cannot be more than chasing eternal and valid 
principles for the account of present political incidents. Yet, “politics deals with 
men, nationals of many countries and heirs to many pasts; its laws are the 
positively established fences which hedge in, protect, and limit the space in which 
freedom is not a concept, but a living, political reality” (Arendt, 1995: 81-2). For 
this reason, Arendt invites us to turn our focus and energy to the judgment of taste 
which is by definition supposes a space for the subject and community at the same 
time.  
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The judgment of taste is one of reflective judgments, so first of all, it is free 
from or out of the reign of any concept. Moreover, we necessarily reflect upon the 
possibility of the agreement of others with our judgment, even if the experience 
takes place in solitude. The agreement of others is found in the imagination’s 
enlarging the thought. In this way, both existence and opinion of others-on the 
form of the object- are taken into account in a form of communicability. This 
communicability is called sensus communis. In aesthetic experience of the subject, 
it appears as if a sensation affecting our judgment of taste makes us feel that on the 
form of the particular object that we are about to call beautiful, we have everyone’s 
approval. Following this, it is clearer why Arendt privileges the third Critique over 
the second in her remarks on Kant’s political views. It comes from her insistent 
belief that judgments which depend on moral principles are not “real” judgments, 
since moral principles are bestowed on us simply by being human. Moreover, 
morality is a realm of the individual qua individual. Thus, there is no room for a 
political community in morality.   
Judgment, on the contrary, is the faculty which necessarily assumes man in 
community. By applying “enlargement of thought”, it thinks from the standpoint of 
other men (CJ §40). Moreover, it is a distinct capacity of our minds which deals 
with particulars and finds some exemplary in these particulars to subsume them 
under a universal.  
In the light of these points, since thinking is applying universals upon the 
reflected thing, Arendt favors judgment “as a peculiar talent which can be practiced 
only but cannot be thought”. Hence, what Arendt declares is that judgment, if it can 
deal with the particular qua particular, does not need “regulative ideas of reason” to 
 159  
 
operate. It can successfully deal with contingencies or with unique, particular 
incidents of history; it can judge and give verdict. She writes that:  
most concepts in the historical and political sciences are of... restricted 
nature; they have their origin in some particular historical incident, and we 
then proceed to make it “exemplary “- to see in the particular what is valid 
for more than one case (1982: 85). 
 
As for the use of judgment of taste in politics, unlike Kant, Arendt thinks 
that taste
69
 is not necessarily and merely attributed to aesthetic judgments. It can 
also be applied to judgments of political scope in order to judge about a political 
action’s being right or wrong.  
The assumed relevance of the judgment of taste resides in the operation of 
the imagination that can recreate representations free from a concept. Without 
appealing to a concept, representation enables a disinterested position for the 
viewer. For Arendt, this disinterested position of viewer is the key to a non-
subjective political judgment because by this means, sensations are turned into 
disinterested re-presentations.  
The next step is reflecting on the pleasure and displeasure that is caused by 
these representations. The very state of feeling pleasure or displeasure by a 
representation can itself be pleasing or non-pleasing. On this level what is at stake 
is not the disinterested representation of the object but the judgment of the feeling. 
This is approbation or disapprobation, and it is an afterthought. This decision is 
made according to the criterion of communicability or publicness (Arendt, 1982: 
69). 
The idea of publicness or communicability is grounded on sensus 
communis, the guide of all men in the universe. It reminds each individual that man 
belongs to a community and hence s/he must judge with awareness of this fact.  
                                               
69 Arendt quotes from Kant that taste is the “feeling of contemplative pleasure” (1982: 15). 
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For the sake of clarity, Arendt’s argument can be summarized as follows: 
Both because of divergences among persons and the various possibilities for 
political events or occasions, the domain of politics should always be open to 
revision. Yet, a universally controlled or regulated kind of history is not an 
alternative for politics because it is doomed to end in tyranny. In this regard for 
Arendt, the Kantian universal politics necessarily culminates in repression. 
However, the Kantian reflective judgment is valuable since it promises an escape 
from universal politics and its totalitarian inferences. She appeals to the judgment 
of taste where she finds a space to make her own remark on politics. She writes that 
The activity of taste decides how  this world, independent of its utility and 
our vital interests in it, is to look and sound, what men will see and what 
they will hear in it. Taste judges the world in its appearance and in its 
worldliness; its interest in the world is purely “disinterested”, and that 
means that neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests 
of the self are involved here. For judgments of taste, the world is the 
primary thing, not man, neither man’s life nor his self (1993: 222). 
 
In the representation of an object supplied by the imagination without 
reference to a concept, a disinterested pleasure or displeasure arises. The judgment 
relating to this feeling is that of taste. When the subject reflects upon this feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure the feeling is judged according to the principle of 
communicability. In other words, we judge and evaluate this feeling by relaying on 
sensus communis that always reminds us to be a member of a community. This 
schema provides Arendt with a model for the mechanism of sound political 
judgment.  
The reflection upon an action which pleases or displeases necessitates 
considering public good and, in this way, the results of an action can be properly 
judged. The disinterestedness as the principle of political judgment can provide the 
non-subjective ground for decision. To judge as a member of community and to 
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decide considering the public good will bring about consensus and thus, the justice 
to society. 
Arendt’s motivation for judgments of taste lied in her belief that a new and 
urgent set of laws should be sought for the well-being of humanity. In the preface 
to the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism she wrote: 
Antisemitism, imperialism, totalitarianism-one after the other, one more 
brutally than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new 
guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new 
law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of 
humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and 
controlled by newly defined territorial entities (1958: iv). 
 
The difficulty of realizing such a project can be seen in the diversity of the 
modern and postmodern approaches to the ancient ideal of the cosmopolitanism as 
we have indicated in the second chapter of this study. Arendt’s call for a new set o 
values regulated by common reason of all the people in the world is the most right 
principle in terms of human rights. Yet, the search for such principle carries the 
danger of the falling the same trap that the world once experienced in WWII. Such 
a cosmopolitan approach may always entail the risk of being regulated by some 
particular authority. In the last chapter, we will search for a contemporary mode of 
cosmopolitanism which is experienced in an individual level. 
 
4.2. Lyotard and the Kantian Sublime 
Like Hannah Arendt, Jean-François Lyotard refuses the application of universal 
norms. He founds the roots of this thought in political realm of the Ancient Greece. 
His search for a politics free from coercive, norm-based universal laws and grand 
narratives directs him to the Kantian aesthetics and reflective judgment in 
particular. Yet, unlike Arendt, he refuses consensus based politics by claiming that 
it culminates in terrorism. He states that “consensus is a component of the system, 
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which manipulates it in order to maintain and improve its performance. It is the 
object of administrative procedures” (1993: 60-1).  
Lyotard’s interest on political judgment revolves around Kant’s third 
Critique and particularly around reflective judgment. He thinks it can be taken as a 
model for political judgment since the third Critique reveals the heterogeneous 
structure of discourse. In this way, it presents an alternative to terroristic attempts 
of language in which new ideas are silenced.  The charm of the reflective judgment 
and that of judgment of taste is grounded on the fact that they work with 
indeterminate concepts instead of some universal or a priori ones. In particular, 
judgment of sublime is free from any notion of consensus or common sense. 
Lyotard interprets this feature of the sublime as respect for heterogeneity. In 
Instructions Païennes, Lyotard announces himself as a “Kantian” but “not the Kant 
of the concept or the moral law but the Kant of the imagination, when he cures 
himself of the illness of knowledge and rules” (36) (qtd. in Carroll 1987: 173).70  
This is because Kant would never consider aesthetic judgment for a mode of 
political thinking. However, for Lyotard, aesthetic judgments can be a model for 
understanding justice in postmodern times in which it seems hard to follow a single 
universal law among different phrase regimes. In this sense, in Lyotard’s 
understanding judgment must correspond to “the way our faculties interact with 
each other as we move from one mode of phrasing to another, i.e. the denotative, 
the prescriptive, the performative, the political, the cognitive, the artistic, etc.” 
(Aylesworth, 2005). 
                                               
70 Carroll continues by writing: “In Le différent, Lyotard clearly identifies with the Kant he 
characterizes as a “critical watchman” who maintains at all costs the distinction among the 
cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic realms and resists the temptation to derive the latter from the 
former. Such derivation is the principal symptom of the “illness of knowledge”, and in the ethical-
political realm, Lyotard argues, it has often been fatal”.   
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To discover Lyotard’s position with respect to the politics, it is useful to 
remind that he favors heterogeneity and, he is opposed to politics based on 
consensus. Lyotard rejects any kind of determinate knowledge pertaining to ethics 
or politics. As Readings explains that Lyotard denies cognitive description in case 
of politics. He believes that political realm is “an uncertain process of 
indeterminate judgment”. Following this, according to Lyotard, justice cannot be 
something authoritative and it cannot be grasped once and for all. Thus, Lyotard 
does not favor the attempt to define the political but instead he focuses on “a 
politics of difference” when he tries to “determine the identity of the political” 
(Readings, 1991: xvi). 
For the possible grounds of politics, Lyotard goes back and forth between 
the position of a pagan as in the Sophists and that of the Kantian Idea as it appears 
in the third Critique. For the possible common ground of the two approaches 
Lyotard says: 
There is no reason of history. I mean that no one can place himself or 
herself in the position of an utterer on the course of things. And therefore 
there is no court in which one can adjudicate the reason of history. This is a 
Kantian position if one thinks of the second Critique, or even the third 
Critique. It is quite apparent what Kant is attempting to bring out in the 
second Critique: it is a language game that would be completely 
independent of that of knowledge. There is no knowledge in the matters of 
ethics. And therefore there will be no knowledge in matters of politics. That 
is also the Sophist’s position (1985: 73). 
 
Following this assertion, Lyotard reemphasizes that no determinate knowledge of 
practice exists: “there are contingencies; the social web is made up of a multitude 
of encounters between interlocutors caught up in different pragmatics. One must 
judge case by case” (1985: 73-4). What is called “conventionalism” in Sophists’ 
thought states that something is judged as just when it is convened that it is just. 
Although the philosophy of opinion is free from “rationalist terrorism”, the law of 
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convention may culminate in admission even of Nazism. In the face of this horrible 
risk Lyotard turns to the Kantian notion of Idea. He favors it by stating that a 
Kantian Idea is not equal to the notion of concept or opinion but it corresponds to 
judgment in reflective use, to the “maximization of concepts” outside of sensibility. 
Lyotard emphasizes that he does not suggest a rational politics. He explains the 
possible reason for this as follows: 
… rational politics, in the sense of the concept, is over, and I think that that 
is swerve of this fin-de-siècle. We have had an attempt, since the Jacobins, 
to elaborate and implement a rational politics; this attempt has been pursued 
throughout the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth; it is presently 
collapsing (1985: 75). 
 
Seeing this collapse as an opportunity, Lyotard explains that his aim is to find a 
way to articulate the philosophy of opinions and the Kantian notion of Idea which 
has an unlimited use. The Kantian use of Idea as a regulator, even if it does not 
allow us to decide in every particular event, can prevent us from the perils of the 
philosophy of opinion. “It is not even able to give us contents for prescriptions, but 
just regulates our perspectives, that is, guides us in knowing what is just and what 
is not just” (Lyotard, 1985: 77). There is one significant point remains unsaid that 
Lyotard concedes the usage of the Kantian idea under one condition that it should 
give up the claim of totality. The notion of totality is what drags the notion of Idea 
into the discourse of metaphysics (Lyotard, 1985: 88).  
Keeping this point in mind we can say that the combination that “doing a 
politics of opinions that would give us the capacity of deciding between opinions 
and of distinguishing between what is just and what is not just; and to have this 
capacity of deciding, one must effectively have an Idea” (Lyotard, 1985: 88) seems 
what Lyotard argues for today’s politics which has already given up the 
rationalistic attitude for good.  
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According to Lyotard’s assessments of the CJ, he suggests that reflective 
judgment can also be applied to politics and in this sense; politics does not require 
another critique but an additional third part to the third Critique (1985: 88). It is 
basically because a fourth critique that particularly deals with politics would be 
reducing the heterogeneity of political judgments. In Différend, Lyotard attributes 
the lack of a fourth Kantian Critique to the radical heterogeneity of the political. He 
writes that:  
The Critique of political reason was never written. It is legitimate, within 
the particular limits that remain to be determined, to see in the  dispersion 
of the historical-political texts of Kant a sign of the particular heterogeneity 
of the political ‘object’” (1988:130).71 
 
Lyotard writes that the third Critique unearths the striking fact that 
understanding, reason and judgment are phrase
72
 genres that have différends 
between them. In other words, they cannot be unified or completely translated into 
one another as the Kantian philosophy desires. In this respect, the third Critique 
implies also the failure of Universalist approach. In Lyotard’s thought it is the 
sublime that is taken into serious consideration in order to denote différend and its 
political implications in particular.  
Lyotard claims that politics appears as a genre but it is not a genre at all. 
When it takes place as a genre it differs from one authorization to the other 
according to the “normative prefix” that determines the authorization type. Yet, 
politics is not at all a genre, “it bears witness to the nothingness which opens up 
with each occurring phrase and on the occasion of which the différend between 
                                               
71 Here after the references to Différend will appear as D. 
 
72 Phrase is French term same as the phrase in English. Yet, it is not a grammatical—or even 
linguistic—entity (it is neither the expression of a complete thought nor the minimal unit of 
signification), but a pragmatic one, the concern being with the possibility (or impossibility) of what 
can (or cannot) be “phrased”, of what can (or cannot) be “put into phrases” (Glossary of French 
Terms, Différend: 194). 
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genres of discourse is born” (D 141). In other words, politics is not a genre but “the 
threat of the différend… It is the multiplicity of genres, the diversity of ends, and 
par excellence the question of linkage… (It) consists in the fact that language is not 
a language, but phrases, or that Being is not Being, but There is’s” (D 138). 
As a clear example of what Lyotard calls différend the case of plaintiff is 
striking. The example refers to the argument that claims the existence of gas 
chambers in Auschwitz. According to the court, the only legitimate proof of this 
claim can be supplied by an eye-witness. In the absence of the eye-witness the 
crime cannot be proved. Yet, the existence of a living eye-witness means that the 
crime is not committed. In the face of this situation, the plaintiff becomes the 
victim because s/he cannot argue the case in the system of court. Lyotard calls the 
case a différend where the “plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes 
for that reason the victim” (D 9). According to Bill Readings, what the différend 
needs is not a new trial, “but an as yet unthinkable tribunal” (1991: 124). 
The necessity of judgment appears in these cases of différend where the 
plaintiff is forced to silence. Since judgment makes the passage between 
heterogeneous genres of the phrase, it gives the voice to the différend. For the 
faculty of judgment —even if Lyotard is not sure that it is a faculty at all— and its 
mediation between two faculties he uses the archipelago as an analogy, where  
each genre of discourse would be like an island; the faculty of judgment 
would be, at least in part, like an admiral or like a provisioner of ships who 
would launch expeditions from one island to the next, intended to present to 
one island what was found (or invented, in the archaic sense of the word) in 
the other, and which might serve the former as an “as-if intuition” with 
which to validate it. Whether war or commerce, this interventionist force 
has no object, and does not have its own island, but requires a milieu—this 
would be the sea—the Archepelagos or primary sea as the Aegean was once 
called (D 130-1). 
 
 167  
 
As for the sublime and its political import, Lyotard writes that the sublime 
indicates a différend which occurs in silence. The pleasure and the pain in the 
sublime feeling imply the inability of expressing the wrong [tort]
73
 of the différend, 
and the possibility of creating new phrases of discourse respectively. Hence, we see 
that he does not read the sublime necessarily as a political moment but as an 
example of differend which constitutes the basis of political realm. To support the 
main argument of this study, his thoughts and assessments on the sublime will be 
revisited soon in order to expose the anti-humanist aspect of the sublime. However, 
now the focus will be on his Lessons on the Analytic of Sublime. 
In his book Lessons on the Analytic of Sublime
74
, Lyotard goes over the 
sections § 23-29 of CJ with his fine comb in order to “isolate the analysis of a 
différend feeling in Kant’s text, which is also the analysis of a feeling of différend, 
and to connect this feeling with transport that leads all thought (critical thought 
included) to its limits” (AS x). Through the pages striking and rousing arguments 
are revealed. Most important of all for this project is the one where Lyotard asserts 
that the sublime is the signal of the failure of Kant’s intention of unifying the whole 
critical project. This is roughly because the sublime reveals that faculties are never 
to be unified. The third Critique does have an import more than it is known to 
have.  
Lyotard refuses the main stream interpretation of the role of the CJ.  He 
thinks that if CJ ever achieves unification as Kant aimed, it is not due to 
teleological principle (the objective finality of nature) but necessarily due to the 
reflexive mode of thinking which comes into the open in aesthetical realm. He 
                                               
73 A wrong [tort] is defined as damage [dommage] accompanied by the loss of the means to prove 
the damage” (D 5) as in the case of the plaintiff. 
 
74 It is a collection of lectures that Lyotard gives on the Analytic of the Sublime. Here after AS.
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argues that the aesthetic judgment reveals the original mode of the critical thought. 
The reflective manner of judgment makes a non-prejudged thinking possible. This 
is the only accurate way to interrogate the critical system; reflecting without 
appealing to concepts or a priori conditions. Lyotard mentions of this approach as 
being open to a feeling. He writes that, “the mode of critical thought should be by 
definition purely reflective. Moreover, aesthetic judgment reveals reflection in its 
most “autonomous” state, naked, so to speak” (AS 6). This character of reflective 
judgment implies and opens a space for different types of determinations or 
descriptions other than those of the understanding. This type of thinking is free 
from the bind of knowledge and rationality.  
The reflective judgment which promises a non-prejudged approach has two 
kinds of unique operations; heuristic
75 
and tautegorical. The heuristic aspect of the 
reflective judgment indicates a transcendental pre-logic which cannot be placed in 
a genealogy. Lyotard writes that “Much more than a genealogy, one should see in 
the reflexive moment a kind of anamnesis of critical thought questioning itself 
about its capacity to discover the proper use of the transcendental locations…(AS 
33). Thus, in its heuristic mode, reflection discovers the legitimate uses of the 
categories of the understanding. It is emphasized that taste can reveal itself by 
escaping the logic of the categories since reflective judgment does not think nor act 
but merely focuses on the states of itself. In the aesthetic way, it is not the object 
that is thought but instead the feeling of the subject or the very state of feeling is 
what is attended.  
The heuristic aspect of reflective judgment as a transcendental activity 
makes it prior to the categories of the understanding. However, it is not valid to say 
                                               
75 The term has its root in Latin word heuristicus; to discover. 
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that reflection produces the categories. On the contrary, in its heuristic function; 
reflective judgment discovers some modes of purely subjective synthesis, that is, 
the “comparisons”. These are called “headings” and grouped as follows: identity/ 
difference, agreement/ opposition, inner/ outer, determinable/ determination. These 
headings are the modes of the reflection which are similar to the categories of the 
understanding. Hence, these general aesthetic titles- are the means of reflection 
that- assist thinking which needs a “principle of differentiation that has only a 
subjective value but with which the use of the category is made possible and 
legitimate” (AS 38).  
The second, tautegorical function of reflective judgment operates as 
follows: The sensations in question inform the mind of its own state. These 
sensations operate as tautegory which involves the immediate awareness of 
thinking of its own state of feeling. Thus, the subject feels pleasure or displeasure 
and at the same time is aware of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure without 
counseling understanding. In this function, reflective judgment does not look for 
any discovery, unlike the case of heuristic function, it does not contribute to the 
knowledge of an object either but it indicates the state of subject in relation to the 
object. The reflective character of the judgment provides both the awareness of (1) 
the [action of] feeling and (2) the state of feeling pleasure or displeasure.  
The tautegorical
76
 character of reflective judgment is also significant 
because according to Lyotard, it is that which is misunderstood as the autonomy of 
the subject by many authors including Hannah Arendt. He rejects all sociologizing 
and anthropologizing readings of Kant’s aesthetic common sense and states that the 
promise of communicated happiness cannot be grasped logically. What judgment 
                                               
76 Lyotard writes that the term tautegorical  “designates the identity of the form and the content, of 
“law” and “object”, in pure reflective judgment as it is given to us in the aesthetic” (AS 13). 
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of taste detects and Kant tries to address by the term “free play” is the optimal 
agreement between the faculties of the understanding and the imagination only 
outside of the scope of knowledge or rationality or morality. The awareness of this 
state is occasional and never determinable. He writes the “union of the faculties is 
felt on the occasion of a certain sunset, on the occasion of this particular Schubert 
Allegro” (AS 19). In this sense, the assertion that the judgment of taste is both 
universal and necessary appears as a severe error since this unison occurs each time 
as new and evaporates till another unpredictable occurrence of a form. The 
ephemeral character of this unity and, taste pertaining to this unity relates to the 
subject in such a way that it promises the subject.  
As Lyotard puts it, taste cannot be felt by the subject because the notion of a 
subject necessitates the unity of the faculties in their harmonious cooperation. In 
other words, taste remains outside of the system by preceding the subject and 
promising it. 
In the case of the beautiful, the unity of the faculties promises a subject that 
will come as a synthesis. However, in the sublime feeling, as a sensation no unity 
of subject or of the faculties is promised. In this condition, the subjective character 
of the sublime, as in the case of the beautiful, grounds on the act of judging of the 
very state of feeling in the singular occasion. Thus, in a word, for Lyotard, the term 
“subjective”-in the CJ- indicates a reflective thinking where thought is aware of its 
state. If the question is ever the subject, reflective thinking is the only means to 
continue the query. However, for aesthetic judgment the notion of the subject still 
makes no sense since judgments of taste precedes and promises the subject as 
synthesis, the unity of faculties, whereas the sublime “threatens to make him to 
disappear (AS 144).  
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According to Lyotard, the sublime feeling is vital for it designates the 
absolute limit of reflection (or the absolute limit of aesthetic apprehension 
performed by the imagination). As an aesthetic thinking it informs the subject of its 
own state which this time reports disunion, displeasure in front of a form that 
cannot be formed by the imagination. The desire of limitlessness is experienced 
and as a consequence the sublime which is defined as mere appendage “exposes 
the “state” of critical thought when it reaches its extreme limit—a spasmatic mode” 
(AS 56). According to Lyotard, the “legitimacy” of the sublime depends on a 
“double defiance” that the sublime presents. On the one hand, the imagination 
struggles to present what it cannot present. Reason, on the other hand, desires what 
is forbidden and seeks to find its Ideas in sensible intuition (as objects of 
sensibility). In these two attempts “thinking defies its own finitude, as if fascinated 
by its own excessiveness (AS 55-6). Sublime’s being a spasm corresponds to this 
double bind of inhibition-desire (for the absolute).  
Lyotard claims that the sublime feeling implies a différend. The différend in 
the sublime is due to the incommensurability of the finite and the infinite. The form 
(finite) “removes itself from its finality in order to try to put itself at the measure of 
another party” (the infinite). To this, Lyotard calls a gesture without which a 
différend never occurs. In the above gesture, what occurs is not that the imagination 
and reason cannot understand each other. On the contrary, both the imagination 
and reason can understand and know the idiom of the other. However, they cannot 
meet the demand of the other with its own idiom. The pain or suffering results from 
this kind of opposition of the faculties. However, the solution is never the 
communication of the two opposing parties. Therefore, according to Lyotard, the 
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negative presentation in the sublime is “the demonstration of the inanity of the 
demand that the absolute be presented” (AS 152).77 
 
4.3. The Transformation of the Kantian Sublime After 1945  
The current attempts that have been going on from the late 90s in order to revitalize 
the spirit of Kant’s writings in this age are doomed to fail, if they basically try to 
derive principles that would promise sheer consensus in today’s political conflicts. 
Kant belongs to the social contract tradition of early modernity to which the 
political theory of the time was formal and strictly analytical. In its rational 
grounds the political theory sought to deduce objectively correct principles for 
regulations of political life. In accordance with both this tendency of political 
theory and also with his epistemology, Kant’s political views insist on the progress 
of history. He interpreted the destructive forces that reigned over time such as wars 
as agents of progress. 
The Kantian aesthetics, on the other hand, is appreciated by its possible 
value for political thinking. I have cited Arendt for her valuable remarks on 
judgment of beautiful and, Lyotard for his striking and illuminating analysis of 
reflective judgment and the sublime. Arendt’s position is valuable in that it presents 
an approach that aims at a non-universalist but still prescriptive political formulae. 
Lyotard’s, on the other hand, suggests a debatable instruction in that we may 
                                               
77 In addition to its political implications, the sublime moment also addresses to avant-garde art. 
Lyotard thinks that the beautiful that refers to universal principles in art is left for the sake of 
sublime the “presentation of unpresentable”. He employs the Kantian sublime while he gives an 
account of the abandonment of the principle of “reality” in avant-garde art works. According to him, 
similar to the impossibility of representing the Ideas of reason, avant-garde painting presents 
“negatively” and “it will therefore avoid figuration or representation. It will be like Malevich’s 
squares; it will enable us to see only by making it impossible to see; it will please only by causing 
pain” (1979: 78-9). In this context the artist of today deserves the title of genius in the Kantian 
sense, as far as s/he creates without recourse to pre-established rules. Moreover, Lyotard sees the 
sublime as a necessity to “get an idea of what is at stake in modernism, in what are called avant-
gardes in painting or in music” (1991b: 135). 
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employ a mixture of the Kantian Idea and pagan politics. Among his propositions, 
that reflective judgment must be Kant’s precious means for a possible po litical 
view and that Kant needs not a fourth critique but a third section in the third 
Critique are especially noteworthy. His analysis of the analytic of the sublime is 
most attractive since one of the main concerns of the present study is to claim an 
anti-humanist title for the sublime in relation to its aesthetic value. Even if it seems 
as a remote possibility for Kant’s systematic philosophy, the sublime can supply a 
ground for reading the Kantian aesthetics beyond mere aesthetics. In an edited 
volume on Kant’s aesthetics, John McCumber writes: 
There are moments when even the most rarified philosophical texts betray a 
certain helplessness on the part of their creators-helplesness that is not mere 
confusion of folly, but a kind of rational desperation occasioned by the 
authors’ discovery that without their intentions, or even against their will, 
something foreign and unsought, yet intelligent, is surging into their 
philosophy (McCumber, 2006:266). 
 
This corresponds the exact feeling that motivates this study. The sublime holds a 
similar kind of moment since it surely carries some non-Kantian tenets. Yet, the 
notion of the sublime in Kantian rendition did not get the attention it deserves till 
1980s. For instance, Francis X. Coleman in 1974 contended that a twentieth-
century reader most probably sees the sublime as “irrelevant” (85). Paul Guyer was 
another name who found the Kantian sublime uninteresting for “modern 
sensibilities” in 1979. (Lap-Chuen, 1998: 23). A decade later, this line of thought 
was still popular among some scholars. On the matter, in 1984 Mary Mothershill 
noted that Kant’s sublime is not relevant to our times because of the very reason 
that it is not as a “standing” concept as beautiful is. This meant that beautiful is a 
concept like that of right or knowledge that resists time and interpretation. Whereas 
the sublime merely  
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picks out a collection of ideas which is basically local; the components 
hang together for a while…and are then dispersed. A philosophical theory 
that places any weight on such a collection will come sooner or later, to 
look dated and to resist interpretation” (Mothershill, 1984: 232-233). 
 
In a slightly different manner, Lap-Chuen supports the negative argument 
that the theory of the sublime is not possible and he writes that 
the very idea of a theory of the sublime runs against the generally accepted 
opinion that experiences or objects which have been referred to as sublime 
cannot be explained, not only because they lie beyond cognitive 
explanation, but also because they are of infinitely many and even radically 
different kinds such that the term ‘sublime’ serves only as a convenient 
umbrella label for them. Applicable to such a wide range of objects of so 
many different kinds at the limit of rational explanation, the term does not 
seem to admit of a general theory at all (1998: xiv). 
 
Similarly, Jane Forsey contends that if we are ever to theorize sublime, we are 
necessarily tied up with Kantian terminology. Then, the sublime cannot be defined 
as an object of experience, or it cannot be a description of the cognitive failure of a 
given subject. Moreover, if we are to consider the possibility of its being a feeling, 
then it cannot be theorized at all. In short, the theory of sublime is impossible in its 
historically defined form (2007: 388).  
All these arguments indicate the impossibility of a theory of the sublime in 
its Kantian rendition. From the point of view of the Kantian architectonic the 
sublime has a positive and supportive stand. However, we know that this line of 
thought is abandoned after an unexpected uptrend in the sublime. This is mostly 
due to the interpretations of postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard and Adorno. The 
postmodern query of the sublime is neither about what the radical sides of the 
sublime as an aesthetic experience are nor what the possible repercussions of the 
sublime for the whole Kantian system are. According to Lap-Chuen, “postmodern 
version of the sublime is treating human thought and culture as an essentially 
creative, inventive, constantly changing construction” (1998: xv). Its possible 
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relation to morality and epistemology are evaluated but it is new that the Kantian 
notion of the sublime is accepted to mean something other than aesthetics.  
In its Kantian rendition, the sublime promises very little to politics. 
However, it has become a valuable tool for implying the singularity of some 
political incidents in world history. Its possible potential for politics follows the 
discussions of the horrible aesthetic dimension of the Holocaust. The singularity of 
the event and the helpless state of human imagination in the encounter of it is tried 
to be addressed by recourse to the Kantian sublime. The measureless extent of 
terror and suffering of spectator’s imagination reminded this old category.78  
Dominick La Capra (2000) contends that modern thought has a tendency to 
link the traumatic events to the sublime by “transvalueing it and making it the basis 
for an elevating, supra-ethical, even elated or quasi-transcendental test of the self of 
the group” (93) and he thinks that this is exampled in the case of Nazi ideology. 
Similarly, Readings reminding Walter Benjamin’s famous saying, “all efforts to 
render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war”, contends that aesthetization 
of politics means to apply judgments of taste to politics. It functions as follows: It 
is aimed that the judgment and thus the idea of beautiful is to be realized in society. 
Yet, fascism makes a turn in this realization process and the sublime becomes the 
criteria (1992: 413). The sublime at stake here is the dynamically sublime.  
According to Readings, what Fascist politics of the sublime wishes is to 
“present the unpresentable” and furthermore, this corresponds to the attempt to 
represent all. This is the essence of totalitarianism and “fascism as a form of 
                                               
78 Indeed, the expression “Holocaust sublime” is applied to address the aesthetic dimension of the 
event. The expression is applied to the images of the Nazi camps by Carol Zemel. Zemel indicates 
that the term Holocaust-sublime and what it refers is raised by many thinkers such as Emil 
Fackenheim, Jean-François Lyotard and Eli Friedlander. See her “Emblems of Atrocity: Holocaust 
Liberation Photographs” in Image and Remembrance: Representation and the Holocaust, ed. 
Shelley Hornstein and Florence Jacabowitz, 2003, USA: Indiana University Press, pp. 201-19. 
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totalitarianism, presents an essentially Romantic politics of the sublime that 
replaces cognition by will: the just is derived not from objectively known truth… 
but from subjectively willed truth… (1992:141). In this case there can be no 
consensus, yet totalitarianism wishes to reach universal community. Thus, by 
applying to politics of the sublime, which can never supply consensus, all that the 
totalitarianism causes is terror and kitsch (1992:419).  
The different formulations of the sublime above addresses one question 
related to its political value: Should there be a politics of sublime or a sublime 
politics? According to Readings (1992), a sublime politics “would attempt to 
subject politics to the radical indeterminacy of the sublime as a questioning of rules 
and criteria”, whereas the latter “would be the attempt to construct a politics on the 
basis of the rules and criteria offered by a sublime aesthetic” (441). Politics of the 
sublime corresponds to the attempt in which the sublime is applied for a model. 
This is the endeavor of thinkers such as Jameson and Eagleton. Sublime politics, on 
the other hand, is defended by postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard. This attitude 
takes the sublime in order to indicate that any attempt to reach consensus is 
inconclusive because consensus requires identity. The bitter result of identity 
politics is clear and thus, the sublime emphasizes the unpresentable. Lyotard’s 
sublime, hence, is antitotalitarian, as the thought of social bond as hostage to a 
radical uncertainty. This addresses a politics of dissensus (Readings, 1992: 422-3). 
If we witness the raise of dialectics and negative politics in today’s political 
thought, Kant’s sublime seems to offer some fruitful ground for his proper and 
reasonable return. It is not his political views but the aesthetics of the sublime that 
promises at least a considerable sense of negation (with its non-synonymous 
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partners such as non-identity and plurality) instead of rigid positive analytical 
frame that has long been abandoned in the history of political thought. 
In contrast to these approaches to the sublime and its possible political 
repercussions, for Ned O’Gorman political sublime is an oxymoron. He admits the 
unorthodox character of the sublime yet he refuses it to be radical in the sense of 
producing differentiation. The sublime can “produce a kind of sheer difference, 
cannot produce differentiation, for the latter requires predication and modification, 
which the sublime precludes. The political sublime is therefore an oxymoron” 
(2006: 891). Furthermore, following Donald Pease, O’Gorman states that the 
sublime serves for “conservative purposes” and thus in this sense, it “has 
repeatedly represented a retreat from politics centered on historical, contingent, and 
relatively (in)determinant political processes, in favor of a historical and radically 
(in)determinant orientations” (2006: 891). According to O’Gorman, the 
significance of the sublime in relation to politics does not reside in any political 
vision but its “sheer rhetorical lure”. In this sense, for postmodern theorists the 
sublime corresponds to the “radical epistemological indeterminacy, interminable 
signification, extreme affective dislocation, indecipherable social networks, vast 
technological vistas, and disruptive ruptures” that addresses the “essence” of 
postmodern thought (2006: 893).  
Other than the discussions on the potential of the sublime as a theoretical 
ground or principle for a new politics, there is a line of thought that take recourse to 
the sublime as a tool for the analyses of some political incidents in history. In the 
next chapter, the focus will be the re-appropriation of the sublime as a tool for 
international politics. 
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CHAPTER V: 
 
KANT’S COSMOPOLITANISM AND SUBLIME TODAY 
 
 
This chapter shall try to disclose the relation of Kant’s cosmopolitanism to his 
theory of the sublime. Therefore, this chapter shall argue that in today’s political 
conjuncture the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism together with its close bind of 
human rights stand in an unusual relation with the sublime. This mentioned relation 
grounds on the feeling of distant suffering which is a well-known phenomenon of 
this century due to some unfortunate social disasters. The temporary relationship 
between cosmopolitanism and the sublime emerges usually in the encounters of 
international disasters in recent world history. The distant suffering that is caused 
by the exposure to the news of the disasters is known to trigger a contemporary 
cosmopolitan solidarity. This schema needs more attention since there is an uptrend 
in reading this relationship as a key path to contemplate the contemporary world 
politics. In international politics and theories Kant’s cosmopolitanism and his 
sublime are counted as valuable tools for analysis.  
If we can speak of a “cosmopolitan feeling” today, it is in the very moments 
of seeing the images of an international disaster, or of political incidents of 
enormous scale such as terrorist acts, mass demonstrations, popular protest, etc. 
There is no ideal determinable procedure at the end of which we will reach 
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cosmopolitanism as a rational end. It flourishes in our minds in the moment we 
receive the news of an event of sublime nature in the media. I would like to draw 
attention to the temporal, passing or ephemeral nature of this experience, which is 
formed by the media. I contend that it is this passing moment, the trace of this 
fading experience, which constitutes a paradoxical ground for all the philosophical, 
jurisprudential and political debates on cosmopolitan rights, laws or even 
government, and yet such debates and arguments completely overlook this 
momentary experience, except as rhetorical introduction or example.  
This study contents that cosmopolitanism is not an ideal to be achieved and 
rendered full in the future. Its only possibility of actualization is a moment of the 
sublime feeling. In the Kantian sublime, the subject is shaken to the bones and feels 
the power of the grandeur of nature. Yet, in the end we are soothed by the power of 
reason, which reminds us our own human power over nature. In the contemporary 
events of the sublime nature the awe and fear caused by excessive violence and 
atrocities are turned into a temporary feeling of world citizenship. Cosmopolitan 
feeling is caught in a fleeting moment.   It is this temporary moment in which idea 
of cosmopolitan is practiced momentarily.  
This last chapter seeks to disclose this present relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and sublime and the regained value of the Kantian philosophy in 
the face of a new world order. This relationship is addressed through examining the 
state of distant suffering in the face of social and natural disasters of 20
th
 century 
interpreted as sublime and its relation to ideal of cosmopolitanism.  
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5.1. Humanity in Crisis: The Sublime in the Twentieth Century 
As mentioned earlier, the Kantian sublime has been visited by a wide range of 
scholars from poststructuralist thinkers to some IR scholars for its possible political 
repercussions (Lyotard, 1998; Pease, 1984; Readings, 1992; Kearney, 2003; 
O’Gorman, 2006; Bleiker and Leet, 2009; La Capra, 2010).79 Although there are 
serious problems in defining its definite political stance, the Kantian rendition of 
the concept is accepted to be a valuable opportunity or a key moment for the nexus 
between politics and aesthetics.  
Since the concept has been recalled defining the malignancies of the 20
th
 
century, it turns out that in the 20
th
 century, it is not nature but the “traumatic 
power and the violence of social forces displace nature as the site and trigger of the 
sublime” and this meant that the very core of the notion has changed now (Ray, 
2009: 139).  
The trigger of the contemporary reflections on the subject started after 
WWII invalidated the assumption that by the authority of universal reason there 
exist universal political norms that provide the well-being of all peoples of the 
world. The ideal of humanity, respect for civil rights, and inherent dignity of 
humanity were all negated first by the news of the Holocaust and then Hiroshima 
towards the end of the war.  
After the Holocaust was known to the world, the shock was colossal. The 
chain of events was contrary to all kinds of humanistic ideals or the authority of 
                                               
79 The appropriation of the sublime is not limited to the names that are announced here. The 
contemporary reflection of the sublime has many other dimensions than aesthetic or political. See, 
Kenneth Holmqvist and Jaroslaw Pluciennick, 2002, “A Short Guide to Theory of the Sublime”, 
Style 36 (4): 718-37.   
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sound reason. It marked the epic failure of reason and universal thinking. Hence, to 
represent or even to speak of the event required a new set of criteria or concepts.  
At the end of the war, Hiroshima hit the human imagination deeply once 
more as the other incomprehensible disaster the war generated. After the 
Holocaust, the destruction caused by the atomic bomb Little Boy has represented 
the other event that changed the conception of extreme violence in modern history. 
According to Gene Ray, even if these two events are not identical or equivalent 
crimes, there is a “persistent linkage between the two names [that does] imply a 
shared political and ethical failure, as well as a common legacy of diminished 
human dignity and increased insecurity that all latecomers will have to bear” (2005: 
21). Not surprisingly, after almost seventy years, the effects of these events still 
linger and people are still trying to contemplate the unimaginable.  
In modern times the disappointment that these events cause on human 
imagination is best described by Adorno’s words on Auschwitz: 
Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of 
culture and barbarism. To write poetry after the holocaust is barbaric. And 
this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write 
poetry today. Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress 
as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. 
Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines 
itself to self-satisfied contemplation (1981: 34).  
 
Adorno also condemns the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
And in a radio talk he states that: “one cannot dismiss the thought of that the 
invention of the atomic bomb, which can obliterate hundreds of thousands of 
people literally in one blow, belongs to the same historical context as genocide” 
(Adorno qtd. in Ray, 2005:  21). 
Lyotard is another influential mind whose interpretation of Auschwitz is 
also razor-sharp as he writes: “The historian asks: What is human? What is 
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impossible? The question we must answer is: Do these words still have a 
meaning? Shouldn’t we believe the inhumanity reported by the testimonies of 
Auschwitz? (1988: 18). He refuses all possible narrative representations of the 
event and states that the name Auschwitz is surrounded by a silence, a silence that 
implies a différend, a wrong (tort) which by its nature cannot be put into words or 
cannot be attained other than a feeling (1988: 56). According to Kearney, 
Lyotard’s interpretation carries Adorno’s dictum a step further as the philosopher 
demands silence for the representation of incommensurable, unspeakable, 
unimaginable terror revealed in Auschwitz (2001: 494).  
Describing Auschwitz or Hiroshima as sublime in the strict Kantian sense 
would be a misinterpretation because the incidents did not carry any positive 
transcendental goal for moral self of subject as Kant’s sublime promises. Yet, in 
the above remarks of these two thinkers, the preliminary alterations in the late 
modern notion of the sublime could be noticed. The impossibility to comprehend 
and speak of the Auschwitz was the most challenging state for reason. In the 
encounter of the horrific images of the war, the shock and the helpless state of 
human imagination assigned a radical limit to the faculties of the imagination and 
judgment with respect to human inflicted violence. In attempts to express the 
effects of the event on human imagination, the notion of the sublime in its Kantian 
rendition supplied a theoretical ground to address that which cannot be conveyed 
by classical representation.  
In its classical version, Kant’s sublime entails a negative presentation which 
is neither a representation of a sensible nor the representation of nothingness. 
According to Kant, the sublime “must in every case have reference to our way of 
thinking” and the mode of presentation in it can only be negative with respect to 
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the sensible. The presentation of the infinite that the imagination desires in 
accordance with its wish i.e., “thrusting aside of the sensible barriers” could merely 
be a negative presentation (CJ §29). Therefore, if we are to talk about a 
representation in the sublime experience, it would not mean indicating or exposing 
an object of representation but merely addressing the existence of something that 
cannot be positively represented.  
The delicate representation of Auschwitz is thought in this way both by 
Adorno and Lyotard. According to Gene Ray, Adorno favored the Kantian sublime 
in terms of the negative presentation it offers because: 
For Adorno, [this] method of evoking without invoking, consistent with the 
traditional Jewish ban on images…would be central to his theorization of 
an “after Auschwitz” ethic of representation. It is thus one figure of 
thought in which he links, albeit indirectly Auschwitz and the sublime 
(2005: 22).     
 
For Lyotard, the negative presentation of Kant’s sublime suggested the fact that 
there is something that cannot be presented. According to Lyotard, “the silence 
that surrounds the phrase Auschwitz was the extermination camp is not a state of 
the mind, it is the sign that something remains to be phrased which is not, 
something which is not determined” (1988: 57). Thus, for Lyotard, the fact “that 
there is an unpresentable” can only be presented “negatively” (Ray, 2005: 22). 
In the particular example of Auschwitz, we can detect significant 
deviations of the late-modern sublime from the classical sublime. Firstly, the 
trigger of the sublime feeling is altered. It turns out that in the 20
th
 century, the 
“traumatic power and the violence of social forces displace nature as the site and 
trigger of the sublime” (Ray, 2009: 139). Therefore, it lacks the complementary 
part of the classical sublime that offers the reassurance of power of human reason 
and a feeling of pleasure. The feeling of absolute terror strips off the pleasure 
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principle. Secondly, the beholder in the classical Kantian sublime now 
corresponds to the spectators of distant disasters whose experience is indirect or 
mediated. Victims do not simply have the position to cherish their own capacities 
over nature like in the earlier version of the sublime experience. Due to the 
immense damage caused by social disasters, they usually suffer from a lethal 
impact as real witnesses. Therefore, the spectator is the only witness whose 
imagination is struck by the mediated images of the violence and terror released by 
the sublime event.  
In his discussion of Auschwitz, Lyotard takes up the difficult example of 
the victim who cannot offer the evidence of people put into the gas chamber 
because there is no eyewitness who is not dead and victim at the same time (1988: 
12). It also marks the shift from eye witness/victim to witness/ spectator. The 
spectators of this event who see the images of the camps as the evidence of extreme 
violence are as safe as Kant’s subject is in the encounter with nature that will lead 
to a judgment of the sublime. Kant writes in the third Critique that a lethal fear 
cannot be a source for the sublime feeling because “it is impossible to find 
satisfaction in a terror that is seriously intended” (Kant, 2000: 144). Following this, 
it is evident that what we mean by the sublime in social disasters does not 
correspond to the lethal terror that the victims suffered. Nor the thrill of the 
spectator culminates in a negative pleasure. In the twentieth-century sublime 
experience “the terror of the sublime becomes permanent ghastly latency, 
compounded by the anguish of shame” (Ray, 2005: 5). In this sense the sublime 
can only be a theoretical frame which can at best sympathize with the shock of the 
imagination in the encounter of such violence. Lyotard gives an account of this 
particular inability by the following example:  
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Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects 
but also the instruments used to measure earthquakes directly and 
indirectly. The impossibility of quantitatively measuring it does not 
prohibit, but rather inspires in the minds of the survivors the idea of a very 
great seismic force. The scholar claims to know nothing about it, but the 
common person has a complex feeling, the one aroused by the negative 
presentation of the indeterminate (1988: 56-7). 
 
This “complex feeling” is what constitutes the nub of Lyotard’s argument. I think 
in contemporary times this feeling corresponds to the power which transforms the 
spectators into cosmopolitan agents who, as the spectator of the mediated 
experience of social disasters, are eager to respond in cosmopolitan terms.   
 
5.2. Mediated Sublime: The Sublime in the Twenty-First Century 
As the compelling and rigid nature of universal laws was proved futile, in the 
postwar period, the social sciences had to question the fundamentals of universal 
politics. In the search for a new set of concepts, the Kantian rendition of sublime 
was one of the notions that are applied. Once it was applied to understand the 
horrendous aspect of the war and then, it is also referred in the discussions of 
nature of future politics. What presented an opportunity in this regard is the 
autonomous character of the sublime. The classical sublime escapes from the 
limitations of the universal laws of sensibility due to its aesthetic character. Yet, it 
has its own law, so it is not chaotic in the end. This feature of autonomy of the 
Kantian sublime has become essential in the contemporary political discussions. 
More recently, in the field of international relations, the sublime is applied 
as a framework to interpret international terror attacks. Amongst the unfortunate 
events contemporary global politics generated, the one that held the title “sublime” 
is the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. It is not the only 
instance of international terrorism but it is sorted the biggest in death toll among 
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recent attacks. Furthermore, the range of the shock is amplified by the fact that the 
attack was performed against the country with the most formidable intelligence 
services. The news of the attack had a broad repercussion in the press. Images of 
the collapse of the Twin Towers left the world struck with consternation. In the 
endless debates around the event, it is regarded as an instance of terror which has 
an effect on the imagination much like the sublime (Bleiker and Leet, 2006: 
Kearney, 2003; Ray, 2009; Silverman, 2002).  
The aesthetic aspect of this particular example was so strong that Silverman 
claimed that the attacks were “quintessentially sublime”. Furthermore, Karlheinz 
Stockhausen described the event as “the biggest work of art ever anywhere, for the 
whole cosmos” (qtd. in Battersby, 2007: 21). Clearly, the attacks can be described 
as the sublime however, if we consider Kant’s, it is not possible to describe them as 
proper examples of Kantian sublime (Battersby, 2003: 85).  
Several deviations from Kantian sublime can be registered in the particular 
example of the 9/11 attacks. To begin with, Kant writes in the third Critique that a 
lethal fear cannot be a source for the sublime feeling because “it is impossible to 
find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously intended” (Kant, 2000: 144). Yet, the 
use of the sublime in the 20
th
 century indicates three significant shifts in the 
appropriation of the notion. Firstly, the complementary part of the classical sublime 
that offers the reassurance of the power of human reason and a feeling of pleasure 
following it are lost forever. The feeling of absolute terror “becomes ghastly 
latency, compounded by the anguish of the shame” (Ray, 2005: 5). Bleiker and 
Leet do not seem to agree on this point as they write: 
(a)ll too often the experience of dislocation wrought by the sublime is 
countered immediately with heroic and masculine understandings of the 
political, which seek to mobilise the unleashed energy for projects of 
mastery and control. The sublime appears to invite its own dissolution as 
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whole nations attempt to obliterate the conditions of possibility of 
ambivalent experiences (2006: 714).  
 
Second, the position of the beholder in the classical Kantian sublime now 
corresponds to the spectator whose experience is indirect or mediated. In this 
century, due to the great damage caused by social disasters, the real witnesses 
usually suffer from a lethal impact. Therefore, as victims, they do not simply have 
the position to cherish their own capacities over nature or the evil act in the event, 
like in the earlier version of sublime experience. The spectator is the only witness 
whose imagination is struck by the mediated images of the violence and terror the 
sublime event releases. In his discussion of Auschwitz Lyotard takes up the 
difficult example of the victim who cannot offer the evidence of people put into the 
gas chamber because there is no eyewitness that is not dead but victim at the same 
time (D 12). This remark addresses also the shift from eye-witness/victim to 
witness/ spectator. As the only alive witnesses whose knowledge is mediated, 
spectators are the distant sufferers. This brings us to the third deviation. Now, the 
terror the victims suffered from is relived through mediated images staged by live 
broadcasts. The spectatorship of such events is inherent to today’s sublime feeling. 
For instance, according to Bleiker and Leet, the 9/11 attacks cannot be thought 
without the fact of its being “televised instantaneously around the world” (2006: 
715). This recognition corresponds to the significant role of the media in the 
discussions of contemporary sublime. Indeed, the media appears as a major field of 
cosmopolitan experience, which has three dimensions: this is an experience of 
sublime nature, which has to do with a distant suffering and a cosmopolitan feeling. 
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5.3. The Kantian Sublime and Distant Suffering 
The Kantian sublime is never a destructive moment in Kant’s system. It is a quite 
different kind of cherishing the cognitive faculties. The failure of one faculty is the 
means for a higher kind of wakefulness. Hence, the Kantian sublime is never about 
suffering from nature. Yet, in the vast history of the concept, there is one particular 
natural disaster that is accepted to have influenced the thought on sublime deeply: 
the Great Lisbon earthquake of 1755. It was a mega thrust earthquake with a range 
of 8.5-9.0 in magnitude and affected a large area causing the death of thousands of 
people. It was neither the greatest nor one of the greatest earthquakes in measure or 
in the size of destruction in the world history back then. However, it was the 
disaster which deeply influenced Europe and it is admitted to lead the emergence of 
seismology due to endless scientific speculations following the disaster (Larsen, 
2006; Ray, 2009; Sliwinski, 2009). 
Astonished by its might and effects, Kant wrote three separate essays on 
Lisbon earthquake. According to Larsen (2009), the earthquake has influenced 
Kant so deep that he not only have left theological accounts of the notion of infinity 
but also changed his value system. In the three essays he tried to explain the 
disaster scientifically rather than supernaturally. Thus, 
the speculative methods and sarcastic rebuffs of the logical deficiencies in 
the arguments of other scholars have disappeared in favour of meticulous 
reports on empirical details of the widespread effects of the disaster across 
the continent together with cautious suggestions of causal explanations 
(2009: 362). 
 
Abandoning any reference to providence, Kant has stripped the freedom of man off 
the divine intervention and designed it as limited only by incomprehensible nature. 
The notion of sublime and the free human subject who exercises his power in the 
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face of enigmatic and incomprehensible nature in the sublime experience might 
have well be grounded on the profound effects of the earthquake on the philosopher 
(Larsen, 2009: 365). Still, it is significant to note that Kant never described the 
Lisbon earthquake as sublime later in his third Critique. This attitude shows that let 
alone a social disaster, Kant’s sublime is never merely attributed to a natural 
catastrophe even if it is mighty enough to erase cities from the map. One possible 
reason of this is that perhaps the earthquake was seen by Kant as more of a 
destructive moment than a simple trigger of a feeling in subject. The might of it 
was so destructive that for the unfortunate people who witnessed the event, it was a 
complete defeat against nature.  
Kant seems to have overlooked the social consequences, since he was so 
engaged with the possible scientific explanation and future prevention from the 
earthquake. When the news has reached to other parts of the world, the immediate 
effect was a shock and following it, a distant kind of suffering. Sharon Sliwinski 
suggests that the Great Lisbon earthquake is the disaster that “marks one of the first 
instances in which subjects became spectators faced with the ethical and political 
implications of regarding distant suffering” in Europe and “the circulation of 
eyewitness reports and images appears to have produced an intense affective 
climate that provided fertile ground for the notion of a singular humanity” (2009: 
31).  
As a humanist, Kant focused on his novel notion of human freedom that is 
independent of providence. This particular disaster has led him from the idea of 
god to a potent incommensurable nature. However, he never wrote on the social 
aspect of the disaster and never explicitly linked it to his notion of sublime. More 
interesting than this is for our present concern is that Kant gives war as an example 
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of the dynamically sublime. It is an exciting remark because war might be as long-
suffering as an earthquake but it is not of nature. Still, Kant does not mention the 
Great Lisbon earthquake in third Critique but he accepts war as the dynamically 
sublime.
80
 Comparing to Kant’s treatment of the Great Lisbon earthquake as 
merely a natural catastrophe but not sublime, his approval of war is stipulated by 
respect for civil rights of man. Thus, as far as “order and a sacred respect for the 
rights of civilians” are provided, Kant sees “something sublime about” war (CJ 
§28). The key content of this remark lies in the respect for human rights. Surely, 
the Lisbon earthquake has surpassed any measure of destruction in the matter of 
rights of civilians, since let alone evoking the feeling of the sublime, it took 
numerous lives. Contrary to such a disaster, the Kantian sublime appears to be a 
disruptive moment but only for good reason: Cherishing of human reason and its 
capacities and, reassurance of human power over nature.  
 
5.4. Kant’s Cosmopolitanism, Sublime and Distant Suffering 
Cosmopolitanism has been dealt as an ideal for centuries but as mentioned in the 
introduction, this ideal has been widely criticized for not having an empirical value 
or because it assumes that the real world operates strictly according to universal 
principles of human rights. The Kantian cosmopolitanism receives its share from 
severe criticisms such as early as Hegel’s. Robert Fine, however, defends the 
Kantian, enlightenment cosmopolitanism by emphasizing that Kant was not a blind 
optimist. He writes: 
                                               
80 As Kant remarks: ‘War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the 
rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a 
manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are 
exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude” (CJ §28).  
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Kant was well aware that cosmopolitanism might be considered 
‘‘fantastical’’ because European states continued to relate to one another 
more like atomised individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature than legal 
subjects under international law. His obstinacy, however, was to hold that 
the idea of a cosmopolitan condition was nonetheless right and that it was 
necessary to look beyond immediate circumstances to longer-term historical 
tendencies to see the justification of the cosmopolitan point of view: to the 
inter-connections of peoples around the world, to the consequence of travel 
and movement across borders, to the expansion of commodity exchange 
between nations, to the risks and costs associated with war, and not least to 
the education of modern republican citizens (2009: 12-3). 
 
Not surprisingly, after WWII, empirical hope has fade out in the face of war. As 
well as the ideal of humanity, that of cosmopolitanism damaged severely. Living 
on the same earth or carrying the same essence of humanity did not help us to 
recover the traumatic effects of the war. Hence, the very ideal of cosmopolitan 
thinking as well as that of humanity have taken a fatal impact back in late 1990s. 
In order to make sure that such violations will not be repeated, beginning 
with the Nuremberg Trial (1945), the ideal of human rights has gained a positive 
existence through the Universal Declaration of Human rights (1948), European 
Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966). Yet, even after horrible experiences contra human rights, the norms in these 
declarations, conventions or covenants are ignored at times. However, it is the fact 
that they did not exist before WWII but they do now, even if they are violated 
clearly and distinctly (Fine, 2009: 16). The worse is that in the present 
circumstances, “in political argument appeal is now regularly made to the idea of 
human rights either to justify state actions or denounce them (Krisch qtd. in Fine 
2009: 16).  
In this century, the endless condemnation of the Holocaust goes parallel 
with contemporary incidents of violations of human rights. Neither the collective 
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memory nor the strict universal norms of human rights declarations or covenants 
are effective to stop the violence that is practiced to terminate the international 
terrorism in the name of the peoples of the world. The fate and value of so called 
humanitarian interventions are disputed widely. Yet in the end, it is astonishing to 
discover that today in order men, who are all subjected to and protected by 
international law, to feel that they all live in the same world, some social or natural 
disasters seem obligatory. In these circumstances, the ancient ideal of 
cosmopolitanism, which now loses blood in midst of debates those that discuss the 
very criteria of it, seems to tie its hopes to the state of distant suffering caused by 
these social or natural catastrophes.  
The opportunity of sublime events or incidents is that the moment in which 
any nationality loses its validity in the face of the horrible events. The collective 
grief is a moment in which every responsible and sane citizen in any country feels 
grief and empathy. The cosmopolitan ideal that entails the feeling of being the 
citizen of the world is felt truly in these dark times. And unfortunately it is not the 
trade or world federation that postulates the laws for a world citizen but the sudden 
breaks in history or natural disasters that supply the ambiance for a thought that we 
live on the same planet and the incidents that effect human beings in one corner can 
touch the others that live in the furthest points on earth. A cosmopolitan existence 
or the feeling of a world citizen arises in these moments of distant suffering. Let us 
turn our attention to the analytics of this experience thorough the particular 
example of the 9/11. 
In today’s world a late-modern subject can notice two significant facts. 
Firstly, international politics is defined as almost a locus that produces awe and 
fear and it is seen as the very nature of global politics (Bleiker and Leet, 2006). 
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Secondly, the contemporary world is defined by transnational experiences in all 
fields, and the media is held responsible for the mobility of transnational 
information all around the world. The late-modern sublime that I try to indicate in 
the present paper emerges at the intersection of these two conditions. The most apt 
example for the late-modern sublime, then, is the bombing of the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001. On that day, images of the collapsing Twin Towers 
left the world struck with consternation. Nearly 3,000 people died and not 
surprisingly, the news of the attack had a broad repercussion in the worldwide 
media.  
Due to “a very explicit aesthetic dimension” (Bleiker and Leet, 2006: 717) 
and a shocking effect on our imagination, the attacks are regarded as 
“quintessentially sublime” (Silverman, 2002: 1) though it is not wrong to hesitate 
for a moment before calling the event the sublime due to “the hideous nature of 
pain and loss involved” (Kearney, 2003: 41). 
In the particular example of the 9/11 attacks the late-modern sublime 
deviates from both the classical Kantian sublime and the sublime aspects of the 
Holocaust and Hiroshima at least in one crucial aspect. Only after three minutes of 
the first plane crash to the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the moments of 
terror was broadcast live worldwide on TV. This caused a bizarre kind of a shared 
experience of disaster and not surprisingly has blurred the distinction between 
direct witness and spectator. This particular example of mediation of the 9/11 
attacks has altered the existing state of news of distant suffering that was usually 
performed following the event. In the televised experience of the 9/11, the 
spectatorship is so embedded in the event that the 9/11 attacks cannot be thought 
without the fact of its being “televised instantaneously around the world” (Bleiker 
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and Leet, 2006: 715). The media carried moments of real terror simultaneously into 
our homes while we remained as “the spectators at a safe distance”. According to 
Kearney, this kind of televised experience generated a feeling of “suffering ‘as if’ 
[spectators] were present to the terror” and he defines this both as “modern 
America’s first traumatic experience of alien Terror on its own soil”; and also as a 
feeling of “detachment by virtue of their real absence from the scene itself (as when 
Bush said to Congress, ‘We are a Nation awakened to danger’)” (2003: 41). 
The possible relation of the Kantian cosmopolitanism and the sublime that I 
try to address here is grounded in this mentioned alteration in the state of 
spectatorship. Recall that Kant’s cosmopolitan vision presupposed as early as the 
18
th
 century that we have entered a universal community and a violation of rights 
can be felt in the farthest corners of the world. I think Kant’s foresighted remark is 
empirically validated in the mediation of the news of the attacks on the Twin 
Towers. Kant never writes of the nature of this feeling but I believe that now in the 
very example of this unfortunate event, we have a chance to scrutinize the 
cosmopolitan feeling that Kant once addressed. Moreover, surprisingly this feeling 
is engaged with the sublime understanding of the philosopher.  
Describing the 9/11 attacks as the sublime certainly suggests that the 
world’s experience of the event is aesthetic rather than cognitive or logical. The 
first reaction of the world was not logical, either. The media, gone mad by the 
possible repercussions of the attack and took over the reality of the incident and 
transformed it into a media event. Following the 9/11 attacks people, who turned on 
their television in order to get timely factual information, saw a ghastly sequence 
and replay of the images of blasting planes, collapsing of the two giant towers or 
unfortunate victims jumping one by one to their death to escape the flames. I 
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believe that between the first and almost simultaneous experience of the attacks and 
the rerun of horrific images over and over again, a cosmopolitan feeling is evoked. 
It is similar to what Kant meant when he wrote that a violation of rights is felt in 
the far away corners of the world. I think we can see this cosmopolitan attitude in 
the registered immediate reaction of spectators which is usually accompanied by 
collective grief and commemoration of the victims.81 
To substantiate this claim I would like to draw upon Lilie Chouliaraki’s The 
Spectatorship of Suffering.82
 
Chouliaraki observes different attitudes in the news 
text in relation to both the portrayal of the sufferer and the narration of the 
suffering on screen. She proposes a hierarchy of disaster news as adventure, 
emergency and ecstatic news. As to their relation to a cosmopolitan attitude, each 
type of news indicates different levels of global relations of power. Among these, 
ecstatic news presents us a truly historic time by unfolding the event moment by 
moment. Furthermore, they emphasize a demand for action in the relationship 
between the spectator and the victims and thus, cause an immediate cosmopolitan 
sensibility (2008:377). Chouliaraki offers the mediation of the 9/11 attacks as a 
typical example of ecstatic news due to the undecidable character of the attacks. 
According to her, their undecidability follows from “a dialectic of openness and 
                                               
81 There are basically two sides that evaluate the possible effects of the media on cosmopolitan 
thinking. The optimist approach claims that as globally broadcasted events, the distant disasters 
gather nations around empathy or pity towards the victims. This basically shows the potential of the 
media in cultivating a cosmopolitan sensibility (Thompson 1995; Tomlinson 1999). The pessimists, 
on the contrary, accuse the media and in particular television of distancing spectators morally from 
the sufferers (Habermas 1989; Robins 1994). See, John B. Thompson, Media and Modernity. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995; John Tomlinson. Globalisation and Culture. London: Polity, 1999; 
Jurgen Habermas.  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1989; Kevin Robins. “Forces of Consumption: From the Symbolic to the Psychotic”. Media, 
Culture and Society, 16:449–68, 1994. 
 
82 Surely, my selected example of Chouliaraki’s approach of ecstatic news does not capture the full 
dynamic or all sides of the mediation. Nor I intend to consider a detailed account of it. For the sake 
of a philosophical enquiry of the cosmopolitan feeling that I plan to expand, here I restricted my 
account to the sublime aspect of the mediation of the 9/11 as ecstatic news. 
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closure, a dialectic with space and time dimensions. In terms of space, the event is 
mediated simultaneously as a local tragedy and as a global political fact. In terms 
of time, the event is mediated simultaneously as contingent, as news, and as 
making history” (2006: 158).  
Chouliaraki’s example of an eight-minute shot of the Manhattan skyline 
burning exposes the mechanism of the mediation of the images as the sublime. She 
describes the aesthetic quality of the scene as a tableau vivant. According to her, 
The camera’s gaze centers on the fumes covering the city and, 
simultaneously, couples two image themes- the grey sky and the clear 
turquoise seawater. In aesthetic terms, the camera couples the horror and 
awe of the sublime with the domesticity and friendliness of the beautiful 
(2006: 173).   
 
According to Chouliaraki, considering the analytics of the mediation of ecstatic 
news brings us to the fact that the time in the mediation of the events such as the 
9/11 corresponds to what Heidegger calls ecstatic temporality.  According to 
Heidegger, in order to know something, say a sensible event, one must go out of 
the event as a requisite for finite knowledge. Such an act of knowing is at the same 
time a constant ‘standing-out-from’, the event. This is what Heidegger calls 
ecstasis. Relying on this, we can say that the ecstatic character of the mediation of 
disaster news indicates both a going-out and standing-out-from the broadcasted 
event. In relation of the media to the disasters, this distancing or spacing addresses 
the inevitable loss of the presence of the event itself.  
What Heidegger’s concept of ecstasy implies is that mediation only 
provides a horizon without fixing knowledge. In Heidegger’s words, as the 
condition of finite knowledge, the “standing-out-from…, precisely in the standing, 
forms and therein holds before itself—a horizon.” (1990: 84). This implies that no 
fixed framework can be decided for what the spectator response will be to the 
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spectacles of suffering, before any account of the diversity of local media and 
manifold of cultural contexts in which such spectacles or images are received.  
Chouliaraki admits that the sublime would also lead to denunciation of 
suffering. Yet still she contends that the sublime with its aesthetic aspect moralizes 
the spectator. Moralization is achieved through symbolic meaning. Two strategic 
inversions constitute the core of the moralization of the spectator: an inversion in 
time (anachronism) and an inversion in space (anatopism). With an inversion in 
time, a past reference is produced. In the case of the 9/11, Pearl Harbour suffering 
is linked to the attacks in an “eternal flow of history”. With the inversion of the 
space, separate locations are equalized and a close proximity is enabled. Thus, with 
both an anachronistic and anatopic structure, the sublime “construes a moral 
horizon” (2006: 174). 
The cosmopolitan thinking that I would like to address is generated by this 
moral horizon in the mediation of the suffering. It requires to be defined as an 
aesthetic experience, since it follows from the sublime as its moral component. 
Therefore, the cosmopolitan feeling here is not intellectual or rational as in Kant’s 
reason-based cosmopolitan view. It is of a different kind, an aesthetic kind. In this 
sense, the aesthetic experience I address here also differs from the discussions of 
existing cosmopolitanism(s) that seek for normative principles.  
In order to analyze cosmopolitanism as an aesthetic feeling similar to the 
sublime, I would like to take recourse to a fundamental distinction between 
experience as Erlebnis and experience as Erfahrung. Simply put, Erfahrung is an 
empirical or cognitive experience which refers to learning or an abstraction. On the 
contrary, Erlebnis corresponds to life experience. More significantly, while 
Erfahrung has to do with generality and thus, universal thinking, Erlebnis refers to 
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a kind of experience that is by its nature individual and singular. Following this 
distinction, we might say that the kind of cosmopolitan experience which is at 
stake here recalls Erlebnis. 
Then, how do we understand the singularity of experience here? What do 
we mean by it? In order to comprehend this, the relation of this experience to the 
sublime nature of the event needs to be emphasized. Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
understanding of the sublime might be of help at this point. In his account of the 
sublime, Nancy makes a distinction between representation and presentation. 
Representation is a signification, which requires conformity or agreement. 
Contrary to this, in presentation what is at stake is “the event and the explosion of 
an appearing and disappearing which, considered in themselves, cannot conform to 
or signify anything” (1993: 2). What I tried to address in this study can be seen as 
an explosion of appearing and disappearing of a cosmopolitan aesthetic feeling as 
the complementary part of the late-modern sublime. Thus, the core of my argument 
can be formulated as follows: today the self-enjoyment of reason or the self-
presentation of the imagination in the classical sublime is lost in the encounter with 
the mediated images of catastrophic events that is now accepted to trigger the 
sublime feeling. The inhuman (and often also immoral) images are tried to be 
compensated by a cosmopolitan feeling or ‘(e)motion’, as Nancy might say. This 
feeling is experienced as a limit experience.  
In the 21
st
 century, it is not the limit of sensibility as in the classical 
sublime, but that of humanity that is confronted. The spectator-subject, who shares 
the unimaginable terror through some mediated images at the limit, encounters a 
cosmopolitan horizon instead of the self-enjoyment of reason. In the classical 
sublime, reason saves the imagination from crisis by recalling the ultimate 
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principle of humanity whereas the very occurrence of the contemporary sublime is 
triggered by a scene of inhuman violence. This time the distress to overcome is not 
as easy as reviewing the mental capacities of man as in Kant’s sublime. And yet, as 
the damage strikes humanistic thought, reason has to apply to a cosmopolitan 
feeling that would remind us the idea of living in the same world and thus, restore 
the moral principle of humanity. Due to the humanistic nature of reason, 
cosmopolitan feeling is expected to be felt by any spectator in the encounter of a 
distant suffering in the form of a violation of rights. In other words, this feeling 
demands to be represented in some communal sense which would later culminate 
in a cosmopolitan action. However, what Bill Readings wrote about Kantian 
sublime, applies here to this cosmopolitan feeling: it “demands to be shared but it 
cannot the object of a social representation” (1992: 414). It cannot be permanently 
represented or enter into an economy of reproduction because it appears as the 
complementary, moralizing part of an aesthetic (sublime) experience. In other 
words, it cannot be abstracted or rationalized as some rationales. Hence, it is 
inevitably and merely experienced as a horizon at the limit, through the limit.  
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CHAPTER VI: 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study has set out to substantiate the claim that the Kantian aesthetics and in 
particular the sublime is more relevant to contemporary political discourse than 
Kant’s political thought which is famous for his cosmopolitan ideas on world 
peace. In order to validate this claim, in Chapter II firstly, Kant’s political 
philosophy was revisited in its cosmopolitan perspective and its close relationship 
to Kant’s ethics. As we have mentioned earlier (in page 51), it is recognized that 
Kant’s practical and political philosophy aim at “the possibility of realizing a moral 
political order through interventions in social-political reality by autonomous 
reason” (Apel, 1997: 82). In accordance with this idea of moral-political order what 
is offered by Kant for the individual is to act with respect to a right which is “the 
sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled 
with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (p.27; MM 
133). Following this, what is offered for international public in order to achieve 
perpetual peace are forming a world federation, recognizing rights of hospitality 
and acknowledging the power of commerce.  
The second part of Chapter II indicated that all these Kantian ideas are 
found their places in discussions concerning United Nations, international courts of 
justice and refugee rights in a transnational public sphere in the late 90s. Yet, in the 
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search for a universal criterion to overcome the inevitable outcomes of 
globalization, that is, the pluralism and multiculturalism, Kant’s thought is taken to 
be provisional but insufficient to the task.   
Besides the normative search for a criterion to regulate the transnational 
world, in the late 90s, Kant has become once more popular in discussions, but this 
time by his aesthetics. Aesthetics was never an element for Kant in his political 
schema. Bearing this in mind, the third chapter provided the sublime in its original 
version in Kant’s aesthetics. After analyzing the two modes of the sublime and the 
role of the imagination, it was stated that the sublime meant more than an aesthetic 
moment. It represented an anti-humanist moment, a moment prior to categories of 
the understanding. In its unique mode the sublime was described as a non-rational, 
non-cognitive non-experience in this study. 
In the next chapter for the evaluated political import of the Kantian 
aesthetics Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard were visited as the two 
thinkers who take Kantian aesthetics into account in political discourse. They 
focused on the judgments of taste and the sublime respectively. Arendt’s study on 
Kant is valuable because she drew attention to sensus communis and enlarged 
mentality that might well be applied to political thought. Following the formation 
of the aesthetic judgments of beautiful Arendt claims that the public sphere, the 
ultimate principle of which is communicability, is constituted by spectators but not 
by acting agents. This helped understanding the power of the spectator in this 
century in which we are surrounded by mediated images all around.  
Lyotard’s reading of the sublime mattered to this study because Lyotard 
unearthed the unique character of the sublime for the Kantian philosophy. For him, 
sublime is a moment of conflict, dissensus which threatenes the unity of the 
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subject. Therefore, what is experienced in the sublime is the reflective mode of 
thought that is prior to any concept, thus prior to the understanding and language. 
In accordance with this, sublime addresses a silence. This mode of the sublime is 
significant for this study in understanding the mode of the cosmopolitan aesthetic 
experience offered in the face of the mediated sublime events. The end of Chapter 
IV expressed the transformation of the sublime in the 90s. Sublime provided a 
framework to describe the horrendous state of human imagination in the face of the 
Holoacust and Hiroshima respectively. And when we come to the 20
th
 century, the 
sublime feeling was called for the feeling that results mostly from immoral human 
acts. Due to this historical fact, the classical sublime lost the aspect of moral 
feeling, which used to complement it.    
After separate theoretical discussions of cosmopolitanism and the sublime 
in earlier chapters, Chapter V provided the empirical instance of the contemporary 
link between the two. It is argued that today, due to the necessarily transnational 
structure of the world in the convergence of the Kantian sublime, its mediation and 
the state of distant suffering, cosmopolitanism was offered as the alternative moral 
feeling that can restore the lost moral aspect of the sublime. Moreover, it was 
contended that cosmopolitanism as a moral feeling which can complement the 
contemporary sublime is of an aesthetic origin in accordance with the sublime.  
Following all above, aesthetic cosmopolitan reaction mentioned in this 
study interpreted as a universal Kantian morality-motivated aesthetic reaction 
which comes prior to a possible moral-political order desired by the Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, which is secured by autonomous reason.  Furthermore, if in the 
sublime, reason and morality are involved and if the sublime means experiencing 
the imperative aesthetically, reflectively and non-determinatively, then the sublime 
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of this century carries a new kind of extensive (may be even moral) connectivity in 
the aforementioned aesthetically experienced cosmopolitan feeling. 
On the mode of this experience, it was argued that this individual 
experience of spectator-subject cannot be represented positively in a normative 
form. Thus, in the end we cannot claim for this mode of cosmopolitan feeling more 
than what Kant argued for the presentation of the infinite in the classical sublime: a 
negative presentation. This implies that now cosmopolitanism cannot be 
represented as some universal concepts or regulations. It is rather a feeling, an 
attitude, which admits singularity. Lastly, if we are to ask what would be inferred 
from cosmopolitanism as an aesthetic experience, the answer is that it creates a 
cosmopolitan spectator whose identification with the images of the distant 
suffering carries a potential to be transformed into a cosmopolitan solidarity.  
As for the possible state of this experience, Lyotard’s sense of the sublime 
was recalled as he claims that the sublime is the moment before the subject, the 
language and thus, before the faculties. Any solid cosmopolitan agenda that is 
experienced as a horizon (Nancy) in this sublime event is necessarily before any 
kind of determined cosmopolitanisms. In this sense it is said that this aesthetic 
cosmopolitan feeling transcends various present cosmopolitanisms by being not 
normative.  
On the state of spectator/ actor it is inferred that today’s mediated sublime 
events enable a convergence between Kant’s sublime and his cosmopolitan view 
and by this means, they supply a second chance for the Kantian cosmopolitan 
world by means of revealing a potential ground for a cosmopolitan public. From 
the perspective of the spectators, they reveal a potential for a spectator/actor in 
Arendtian sense. Different from the Holocaust and Hiroshima, now the spectator is 
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not only a spectator but also somehow a potential actor who can feel like acting just 
after hours from the disaster or just after being exposed to the suffering images of 
others on television. To the crisis of the imagination in the encounter of horrific 
images which clearly indicates that human beings are not by definition respect the 
lives of other human beings, reason comes forward and in the helpless endeavor to 
show that we care for the others, we decide to participate in condemns or aid 
pledges. In other words, today’s sublime events and the response they get indicate a 
form of cosmopolitanism in the form of a feeling that has the potential of leading to 
a cosmopolitan act such as aid pledges, boycott etc... Today’s mediated sublime 
events are the locus where the inable, helpless, compassionate and ashamed 
spectator of the Holocaust and Hiroshima can be changed into a spectator/ actor in 
Arendtian sense. The lost moral aspect of the sublime is actualized in the action of 
the spectator who autonomously decide to participate in aid pledges, boycotts 
etc…Yet, we should be aware that this is not an aesthetic reaction anymore. In 
Kantian philosophy, it is a reaction of a moral and autonomous subject and it will 
affect the other people since it is performed in sensible world, in the phenomenal 
world. If we consider all these, it can be said that in today’s sublime events a kind 
of Kantian aesthetic response could lead to an act decided by free will and 
performed by free individuals who are aware of the rights and freedom of the 
others and who act upon this principle. 
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